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This is an exploration of the effects of the press on British and German foreign
policy between 1876 and 1906. The dissertation considers the growing influence of the
press on Anglo-German relations. Historians have provided discussions of how domestic
presses can affect their home governments. This dissertation adds to that by analyzing
the consequences of the debates between the British and German presses on their
governments’ foreign policy.
The possibility for Anglo-German cooperation during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries receives significant interest due to debates regarding the origins
of World War I. The reasons put forth by historians for the inability to conclude an
Anglo-German agreement despite similar interests during this period include the
volatility of Wilhelm II’s personality, the growth of the German navy, and the expansion
of the German empire. I add to this discussion by analyzing how the British and German
presses’ opinions increasingly inhibited Anglo-German diplomacy.
In this analysis, I use six journals, representing the ‘official’ (London Times,
Kölnische Zeitung), ‘semi-official’ (Pall Mall Gazette, Norddeutsche Allgemeine

Zeitung), and satirical (Punch, Kladderadatsch) segments of the British and German
presses. I begin with a discussion of the two presses during the Near East Crisis (18761878). During this period, the presses expressed growing interest in international affairs,
prompting more concerns with how their governments dealt with other Great Powers.
Following this discussion, I consider the effects of colonial competition in Africa
between 1878 and 1896 on the diplomatic relations of Great Britain, France, and
Germany. This is necessary to establish the background for the final section of the
dissertation. The last part of the dissertation explores the British and German presses’
responses to each other between the Jameson Raid and the Algeciras Conference. It is
during this later period, when British and German imperial interests conflicted, and when
the Russian threat dissolved for Great Britain, that the final efforts for rapprochement
between the two governments failed, leading to permanent estrangement. The British and
German presses had a significant role in causing this separation, by using their articles to
expand the distrust already existent between their governments.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Much changed within European diplomacy between the conclusion of the Near
East Crisis and the beginning of the First Moroccan Crisis in terms of antagonism and
cooperation. In 1878, at the Congress of Berlin, German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck
played the “honest broker,” working to negotiate a peace that would eliminate any pretext
the European Great Powers might have for going to war with each other. By 1906, and
the Algeciras Conference, however, the German government represented a problematic
challenge to the world status to many of the other Great Powers. This change signaled
the end of Bismarck’s arrangement that maintained European peace.
There is considerable historiographical discussion of the British and French
government’s efforts to fault Wilhelm II and the German government for this shift. The
British and German presses’ role during this transition, however, has not featured
prominently in this historiography. This historiography, which will be discussed later in
this introduction, focuses on the study of government policy and the main creators of that
policy. There is little concern with the significant effects of the publics’ opinions on the
main political actors. It also diminishes the role of the press, the primary source for the
publics’ knowledge of foreign affairs, had on those opinions. This dissertation will
establish the importance of these previously ignored political players to the increasingly
antagonistic Anglo-German relationship.

1

Between 1876 and 1878, the debates between the British and German presses that
focused primarily on the motives and desire of Russia in the Balkans. By 1906 the
discussions turned to the interests and tactics used by the British and German
governments. During the transition, the British and German readers followed events and
opinions in the two presses that did not necessarily reflect the two government’s
concerns. This disparity was not always apparent to the newspapers’ readers, often
necessitating official announcements regarding the states’ foreign policies. This meant
that the British and German readers of these journals saw a specific version of events that
did not always reflect the true nature of the two government’s intentions. The two
governments repeatedly tried to explain, in speeches before Parliament and the Reichstag,
in interviews with the presses, and in speeches in front of public assemblies, what exactly
their stances regarding foreign policy were. These representations of events prompted
responses from the other state’s press as well as their publics, and in many cases the
governments, and led to an increase in tensions between Great Britain and Germany.
This dissertation will show how the debates between the two presses maintained and
increased Anglo-German tensions that peaked during periods of significant crisis in
international relations.
The reactions by the British and German presses to the other presses’ articles and
governments’ actions proved an obstacle in the way of the two governments handling
international diplomacy. For example, press hostility, through articles and cartoons, to an
Anglo-German naval agreement successfully negotiated by British Colonial Secretary
Joseph Chamberlain and German Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow resulted in the refusal
of both governments to formally agree to the arrangement. This event reflects the
2

obstacle the British and German presses could, and did, create between the British and
German governments. The frequency with which this occurred increased between the
Near East Crisis and the period between the Jameson Raid and First Moroccan Crisis. In
the earlier crisis, British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli and German Chancellor Otto
von Bismarck could avoid responding to their presses’ demands and conduct diplomacy
among the top diplomats with little outside interference. This was not the case between
the Jameson Raid and First Moroccan Crisis. During this latter period, leaders such as
British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary Lord Salisbury, Joseph Chamberlain, and
German Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow reacted to their presses’ arguments and those
coming from foreign journals when making foreign policy decisions.
The European diplomatic situation differed a great deal between the Near East
Crisis and the period between 1896 to 1906. During the earlier period the British press
and public opinion reflected a sense of traditional Russophobia that portrayed and viewed
everything the Russian government did as suspicious and dangerous. During the Near
East Crisis, the British government deemed the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire as
vital to British interests in the Near East. Political leaders such as Otto von Bismarck and
Benjamin Disraeli dominated their state’s foreign policymaking with little overt interest
in public opinion or the presses’ views of their actions. Both men could achieve their
goals through personal diplomacy rather than letting the publics’ reactions affect them.
For example, Disraeli gained control of Cyprus and Bismarck could play the “honest
broker” in European relations at the Congress of Berlin that settled the Crisis, giving the
German government an important position as a European peace mediator.

3

By 1906 and the Algeciras Conference, this situation greatly differed. The British
and Russian governments were no longer bitter enemies and the British press and public
no longer exuded Russophobia. The German government was now the Ottoman
Empire’s primary protector. The British government no longer based their Near East
policy on maintaining the Ottoman Empire. Competition with Germany in the Far East,
the Near East, Morocco, and in terms of navy size shifted British hostility toward German
intentions following the Jameson Raid. The German government now faced the same
sort of disapproval and skepticism in regards to its actions and motivations that the
British press and public opinion once reserved for Russia.
The British and German presses played significant roles in creating a tense
diplomatic environment. A press war between the two developed in the wake of the
Jameson Raid and continued even beyond the First Moroccan Crisis. While larger
diplomatic crises prompted this print conflict, it was the smaller, but longer lasting
diplomatic issues such as concessions in China, the struggle for control of Samoa, the
contest for control of the Manchurian Railroads, and the interest in Korea’s future that
continued the Anglo-German tensions. A close examination of the press war shows that
there was a great deal of interest by the presses and therefore the publics in smaller
diplomatic issues. This fact opposes the earlier historiographical narrative of these
periods. A closer consideration of these smaller diplomatic events provides a much
clearer explanation for the increasing Anglo-German tensions. The British and German
presses’ articles during the two time periods under consideration accelerated the changing
diplomatic environment.

4

Six newspapers make up the foundation of this study, three from Great Britain
(London Times, Pall Mall Gazette, and Punch) and three from Germany (Kölnische
Zeitung, Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, and Kladderadatsch). These journals had the
most substantial role in the criticisms of the other states press throughout both periods
discussed. They represent the mainstream journals of an “official,” “semi-official,” or
satirical nature that reflected different aspects of public opinion in both states, according
to contemporary foreign observers. None of these newspapers had an overt political
agenda such as representing specific political parties’ platforms. For the purposes here,
namely tracing how the debates between the two presses affected their governments’
foreign policy, they are comparably as follows: London Times and Kölnische Zeitung as
“mouthpieces” of their governments, Pall Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung as the mainstream representation of the more conservative and jingoistic opinions
within both states’ governments and publics, and finally Punch and Kladderadatsch as
the conventional satirical journals that used cartoons and humor to criticize international
and domestic policy. For those trying to ease points of contention between Germany and
Great Britain, it was relatively simple to ignore the opinions expressed by the radical
presses in both states in relation to the actions and motivations of the other government.
The critical attitude expressed by these mainstream journals, however, proved harder to
dismiss. Thus, to understand why the British and German publics became increasingly
hostile to the other state it is necessary to trace the nature of articles from these
newspapers about diplomatic conflicts involving their governments and how they
changed over time.

5

The use of political cartoons to illustrate diplomacy rises during periods of war
and crisis. The historiographical consideration of the British and German presses in
relation to Anglo-German tensions ignores the effects that the interaction between Punch
and Kladderadatsch and its effects on international diplomacy, even as there are
discussions of the role of the satirical press in Germany and Great Britain independent of
each other. Historians often dismiss the importance of what the Germans refer to as
Witzblätter to understanding of historical events. Cartoons, however, for historians such
as Ann Taylor Allen and Thomas Milton Kemnitz, are especially important for fully
understanding society’s views on itself, foreign affairs, and domestic issues. In Satire
and Society in Wilhelmine Germany, Taylor found that historians may consider the
cartoons as “frivolous” compared to the more traditional sources such as political
debates, but that the contemporary readership of these journals including diplomats and
government leaders would not agree with that opinion.1 Allen also argued that the
reactions to those in leadership, depending on if the satirical journals criticized or
supported their actions, showed how important these papers were to those leaders. She
quotes a prominent critic of the German government, Maximilian Harden who said:
The humorist, writer or artist who puts his act in the service
of one of the great illustrated magazines, as an individual,
is only known to a small circle. To the great masses of his
countrymen, he is only a voice which expresses, with wit or
passion, what these people think and feel and have tried to
express. No other sort of publication can have such an
effect on public opinion as the illustrated satirical
magazine, which appeals to the most brilliant and simplest

Ann Taylor Allen, in Satire and Society in Wilhelmine Germany: Kladderadasch and
Simplicissimus, 1890-1914 (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 2, argued that the
“contemporary readers-politicians, courtiers, officers, trade-unionists, priests, and other members of the
journals’ considerable readership” would have disagreed with the “frivolous” description.
1
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mind and, with its scornful challenge and raucous laughter,
attracts attention everywhere.2
Historians can apply this view of the satirical journals in Germany to also discuss
the role of Punch in creating and reflecting British public opinion. Much like the journals
such as Kladderadatsch in Germany, Punch illustrated the most significant events of the
day, to a degree that Charles L. Graves could use the journal to write a history of
“modern England” in 1922.3 In a discussion of the overall usefulness of cartoons for
writing about history, Kemnitz argued that a cartoon “generally conveys its message
quickly and pungently.” He continued concluding that an illustration could describe with
an image something that could lead to a libel suit if written in words.4
The qualities encompassed in the cartoons of Punch and Kladderadatsch are
therefore highly useful in describing the political views and events that divided Great
Britain and Germany, especially between 1896 and 1906. They also prescribe the
inclusion of satirical journals in a discussion of the press’s role in creating public opinion
and altering government policy. This necessity emerges because of the accessibility of
those messages to even those who cannot read the captions. Both journals address stories
from many different quarters of the two states’ presses. More than any other journal,
they reflect the varied opinions of the many diverse interest groups within their societies.
This inclusiveness draws attention to more radical opinions than those expressed in the
mainstream press.

2

Allen, 11.

3

Charles L. Graves, Mr. Punch’s History of Modern England (London: Cassell and Company, Ltd.,

1922).

Thomas Milton Kemnitz, “The Cartoon as a Historical Source,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary
History 4, no. 1 (Summer 1973): 84.

4
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Several features regarding the increase in Anglo-German tensions become clear
after considering the smaller international issues and the effects of the British and
German presses on them. The first of these is the fact that the British and German
presses often reacted to the version of events published in the other press, and not to the
actual events themselves. Repeatedly the two presses refer to the accounts of diplomatic
events through articles from the other state’s media. Both groups also highlighted any
possible indication that the other state’s government’s intentions could be harmful to their
own state’s interest. To prove their point, the presses used particularly “illustrative”
quotes from the other press that indicated such a threat from the other state. In particular,
the two presses continuously stressed those news items that used dangerously
chauvinistic or jingoist language, to further emphasize the threatening nature of the other
state’s international diplomacy. Neither press declined to react to this attacks, or reports
that put their state’s government in a bad light, quoting each other’s harmful statements
and then issuing both a rebuttal and an attack of their own. The nature of this interaction
was not inherently dangerous. It only became so because observers that read their articles
viewed the other press as accurately reflecting that state’s public opinion.
A second trend that emerged involved the increasing importance of Russia’s
position in the deterioration of Anglo-German relations. During the Near East Crisis, the
Russian threat determined much of British policy in the Near East in regards to the
Ottoman Empire. Russia was the great “bogey man” in British foreign relations, while
the German government attempted to work with Russia through the Three Emperors’
League. The decline of Russia throughout the 1890s received a great deal of interest in
both presses, as each tried to determine what a future without a powerful Russia would
8

mean to European relations. The German government actively sought an agreement with
Russia, and the British government showed a more cordial attitude, especially after the
negotiations of the Franco-Russian Alliance and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. As Russia
increasingly became the new “Sick Man of Europe,” Germany became the new primary
threat to British interests. The decline of Russia necessitated a change in British and
German foreign policy, as both states began to look toward the other as their primary
competitor.
A third feature is the increased importance of political cartoons in criticizing
diplomacy. The cartoons in Punch and Kladderadatsch indicated the widespread interest
among the British and German publics in foreign policy. The illustrations represented
opinions that if put into words constituted libel. The illustrations also included a much
more cynical view not only of their own government’s actions, but those of foreign
government’s as well. Throughout the periods discussed in this project, diplomats as
well as other journals referred to the critical nature of these satirical journal’s cartoons,
often defending themselves against these critiques. The images published in these
journals provided clear and obvious attacks on the other state’s press and government, in
a way that words could not due to differences in language. The illustrations made their
hostile points clear, no matter what language the audience spoke.
A final trend is the presses’ amplified role in limiting diplomacy and the effect it
had on public opinion’s potential for affecting Great Power diplomacy. Due to the
presumed relationship between the press and the creation of public opinion, many in
Great Britain and Germany saw the other state’s press as truly reflecting the other state’s
public opinion. The debates regarding foreign policy between the two presses created
9

obstacles to cooperation between the two states because of their hostile nature and the
implication that hostility for what the two publics thought. If the two presses revealed
their publics’ opinions as much as the other public thought, then public opinion itself
limited diplomacy. There existed an assumption dating at least from the mid-Victorian
Era that the presses represented the “man on the street,” or the common person’s opinion.
This meant that many politicians reacted to the articles in the press as if they really
indicated what the publics thought, whether it be their own press or that of the other state.
Thus, public opinion looked to dictate how politicians and diplomats should react to
international events. Even if this did not occur in actuality, the opinion remained that this
was diplomatic reality. This assumption increased the importance of knowing what the
other state’s public opinion wanted. This in turn enlarged the presses’ importance in
altering the leaders’ ability to conduct international diplomacy as their articles
supposedly reflected that public opinion. This significant role of the press in creating
tension between Great Britain and Germany is largely diminished in the historiography of
the development of Anglo-German tensions.
The historiography of the rise in Anglo-German tensions does not consider the
debates between the German and British presses regarding these smaller diplomatic
events along with the major crises when addressing the causes of those tensions. It
traditionally focuses on the political leaders in Germany and Great Britain and how they
dictated foreign policy. In particular, the historiography concentrates on Wilhelm II and
von Bülow and British diplomats’ views of their actions and interests.5 When the

5
L.W. Fuller, The Effect of the First Moroccan Crisis on Anglo-German Relations (Colorado
Spring, CO: Colorado College publications, 1932), Katharine A. Lerman, The Chancellor as Courtier:

10

historiography does consider the presses and their views, it focuses on the opinions of
one press toward the other state’s government. Here, however, there is no consideration
of the perpetual reactions by one press to attacks by the other press. The two groups
accepted criticism of their government from within, but rejected criticism from the other
state’s press, even when it echoed similar domestic critiques. Furthermore, most of the
historiography, including the work of Pauline R. Anderson, discussing the presses
involves the negative perceptions the British press had of the German government, in
particular its negative views of Bismarck, Wilhelm II, and von Bülow, or the German
press’s view of British Imperial Policy.6 While this does address important aspects of the
relationship between Great Britain and Germany and their presses in a domestic context,
it does not fully describe the nature of the conflict between the two presses that led to so
many problems for European diplomacy. This historiography also does not look beyond
the major diplomatic events of the period, commenting on these crises without discussing
how or why Anglo-German relations changed between events such as the Boer War and
First Moroccan Crisis. These works study diplomacy which chooses its historical events
through a teleological lens. I argue that a full survey of the presses’ coverage of
diplomacy of the time will give a far clearer picture of what mattered at the time.
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The historiography of late nineteenth and early twentieth century Anglo-German
relations primarily focuses on the growth of tensions and antagonism between the two
states. One of the primary concerns in this topic questions who was at fault for this
distrust between Great Britain and Germany. Raymond James Sontag, in Germany and
England: Background of Crisis, 1848-1894, placed the blame with Otto von Bismarck
and his unwillingness to do what Great Britain expected Germany to do.7 Klaus
Hildebrand, in German Foreign Policy from Bismarck to Adenauer: Limits of Statecraft,
also argued that Bismarck’s actions in trying to maintain peace in Europe, namely by
playing up the rivalry between Great Britain and Russia, created even more distrust of
Germany in Great Britain.8 Most other historians of this period, such as Paul M.
Kennedy, look to the post-Bismarckian leadership in Germany as being to blame for
much of the Anglo-German tension. L.W. Fuller, Jonathan Mercer, and Katharine A.
Lerman pointed to the actions of Chancellor Bernard von Bülow and Head of Foreign
Office Friedrich von Holstein as being to blame for the distrust of Germany.9 A.J.A.
Morris, in The Scaremongers, claimed that Wilhelm II, especially with the Krüger
Telegram, was to blame for the tensions between the two states.10 Pauline R. Anderson
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also gave Wilhelm II a large role in stirring up distrust between the two states with his
refusal to believe that his actions could possibly lead to war.11
Along with discussion of the major political actors between the Boer War and the
First Moroccan Crisis, there is a significant amount of historiography concerning the
British press’s opinion of Wilhelm II and how it changed over time. At the beginning of
his reign, public opinion according to historians writing about this changing opinion, the
British press did not portray or even view Wilhelm II in a negative light. It saw him
instead as a refreshing change to European diplomacy with his interest in “open”
diplomacy, following years of Bismarck’s more secretive methods. The Krüger
Telegram changed this view, but at this point the historiography splits on Wilhelm II’s
representation within the British press. The more traditional historiography saw antiGerman sentiment being provoked by this message of support for the British enemy. The
British press maintained this sentiment, according to the historians purporting this view,
onward to World War I.12 Other historians find that after the fallout of the Krüger
Telegram, things calmed down and the British press did not espouse the anti-German
sentiment again until the First Moroccan Crisis and the beginning of the Anglo-German
naval race.13

Pauline R. Anderson, The Background of Anti-English Feeling in Germany, 1890-1902 (New
York: Octagon Books, 1969), 30.

11

Eugene N. Anderson, The First Moroccan Crisis, 1904-1906 (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1966),
Ludwig Dehio, The Precarious Balance: the Politics of power in Europe, 1494-1945 (New York: Knopf,
1962), Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Imperial Germany, 1867-1918: Politics, Culture, and Society in an
Authoritarian State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995).
12

William L. Langer, European Alliance and Alignments, 1871-1890 (New York: Knopf, 1950),
Richard James Sontag, Germany and England: Background of Conflict, 1848-1914 (New York: Russell
and Russell, 1964).
13

13

Both of these views discount the continually deteriorating relations between the
two states in the period beginning with the Jameson Raid and ending with the First
Moroccan Crisis. According to my survey of the six presses, while the most vehemently
anti-German hostility in the British press did die down after the period immediately
following the Krüger Telegram, it did not simply disappear until the onset of later
diplomatic crises. The British press responded to Wilhelm II and his government’s
diplomatic actions throughout this period, not just when big problems emerged. These
small issues (concessions in China, Korea, the Manchurian Railroads, control of Samoa)
provoked a great deal of skepticism toward the motives of the other Great Power’s
governments by the British and German presses. This skepticism only served to increase
tensions to a degree that by the onset of the naval race and First Moroccan Crisis,
German and British diplomats could do little to revolve the points of contention between
them.
The historiography of Anglo-German relations also recognizes the importance of
the press opinion to their own government in isolation. Here, historians debate the nature
of the press’s influence on their state’s policies without foreign influence.14 This
historiography limits the understanding of the effects that the two presses had on
international diplomacy. This dissertation attempts to redress this diminished role that
the historiography of Anglo-German relations attributes to the press. Historians find that
the British and German government responded to some extent to their own publics and
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presses, but what is not discussed is how those opinions formed.15 While the
historiography of Anglo-German relations includes a consideration of the possible effects
of the domestic presses on the governments, it largely relegates any influence to a
diminished position. In a discussion of either states’ press or public opinion, it is vital to
not consider them in isolation, which is what previous historians have done. The presses
did not always formulate their views based on their own observations. They instead often
created their opinions based on what the other press reported. Both states’ presses read
the other, viewing their articles as accurate reflections of the public opinion. Based on
these representations, the two presses reacted to what they saw as hostility towards and
attacks on their own state’s government. It was the interaction between the two presses
that caused the hostile international environment that proved such an obstacle to
diplomacy between Great Britain and Germany in 1906. It is those relationships and the
consequences they had on international diplomacy that constitute this basis of this
project’s research.
The historiography of Anglo-German tensions includes literature discussing the
role of the press in affecting their governments. What the historiography does not discuss
is the role the other state’s press had in creating that public opinion. They both
continually republished or paraphrased articles from the other, using them to describe the
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views of the other government and public. The two presses did not always choose the
most objective items to reprint, and depending on the issue, often chose the more
offensive articles to show the hostility of the other state to their own state’s interest. By
only considering one press or the other, it looks like the periodicals did not choose
articles with an agenda. By comparing the articles chosen to others published within the
same journal on the same subject but with less objectionable language, it becomes clear
that the presses chose what to reprint with specific considerations in mind. This mutual
interest in what the other side published made the presses’ potential influence on not only
domestic but also foreign opinion increasingly significant in the late nineteenth century.
A final often studied historiographical aspect of Anglo-German relations regards
which had more power over the other, the press or the government.16 Both presses saw
the other as being controlled by the government to varying degrees. They each referred
to the journals of the other’s press as being “official” or “semi-official,” clearly implying
the view that the government dictated at least some of the views expressed. Historians’
view of control of the press by the government, however, differs from that contemporary
opinion. Despite what the presses and governments of each state thought, historians
describing this relationship find that neither government could dominate their state’s
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press. This did not, however, keep the governments from trying to do so, whether using
persuasion through offers of exclusive information in return for the press publishing what
the government wanted or through threats to extort compliance.
The effect of these two presses on both societies did not necessarily reflect what
the British and German governments wanted. What these presses did, however, was to
fulfill the role psychologist William Stephenson dictated for mass media, “it short circuits
older beliefs, substituting new values for them.”17 The presses’ coverage of Russian
diplomacy reflected this role. The changing perception of the Russian threat from high to
low published in the British press, for example, and its influence on the traditional
Russophobia in the British public showed how media can alter society’s views on issues.
This newer role for the presses, where they dictated how another state was portrayed, also
allowed the editors and publishers of the journals within them to pursue their own
agendas, such as prompting Germanophobia.18
Any exploration of the press’s role in influencing government policy dictates the
necessity for a discussion of the effects of mass media on society, as it has a significant
position in changing the government through elections. Within media studies, there is an
ongoing debate regarding how much influence mass media, including newspapers, books,
television, radio, and film, has on the formation of public opinion. The first real research
on this topic emerged during the period between the World War I and World War II. The
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social scientists involved in these studies focused on the role of media leading up to and
during World War I for propagandist purposes. The early researchers indicated that mass
media heavily affected public opinion, with people being easily swayed by what they
read in the press.19
Following World War II and in the early years of the Cold war, social scientists,
using empirical studies, rather than just observations utilized previously, decided that the
media did not have the level of influence on public opinion previously believed. This
view indicated that people were not so susceptible to outside influences such as mass
media due to acquired knowledge regarding the methods of propaganda used during and
after the World Wars. This empirical method showed little evidence for mass media’s
creation of public opinion, but data did show that the other social factors, including
personal relationships, family and community, caused much more significant changes in
peoples’ beliefs.20
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, this minimalist view of mass media’s
effect on public opinion came under attack from two groups: Marxist social scientists and
those that used similar empirical methods to the Interwar Period social scientists, but
came to different conclusions. The Marxist researchers argued that the practical data
could not gauge the relationship between mass media and public opinion because it
ignored the impact of ideology on both. Those that used the same empirical methods but
with different groups that the post-war generation used found that mass media played a

James Currian, Michael Gurevitch and Janet Woollacott, “The Study of Media: Theoretical
Approaches,” in Culture, Society, and the Media, ed. Michael Gurevitch, et.al. (London: Methuen, 1982),
11-12.
20
Currian, et al., 12.
19

18

key part in the creation and reinforcement of society norms, which made the media
critical to the formulation of public opinion.21
The most recent theory regarding the role of mass media in forming public
opinion involves the pluralist view of society, which involves considering the opinions of
multiple societal groups. In this theory, mass media does not reflect those in power or
any specific group. Mass media instead is a tool for use in the debates between
conflicting groups in society and politics. According to this view, it is this purpose that
gives the mass media a more decisive role in creating public opinion.22

This

dissertation, in its examination of the consequences of the presses on both diplomacy and
public opinion, will employ the current media studies’ understanding that mass media
relates directly to public opinion by influencing how those opinions are formed.
Many considering the effects of mass media on society, for example Lucian W.
Pye, in Communications and Political Development, found that with control of
information, the media can control how the public reacts to the government and then how
the government reacts to the public’s response.23 Kevin Williams, in Get Me a Murder a
Day!: a History of Mass Communication in Britain, argued that the newspapers in Britain
played a role in both social control and political decision making. This new role for the
presses emerged as the number of literate people in Great Britain grew throughout the
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late Victorian period, a trend that paralleled the increasing tensions between Great Britain
and Germany.24
Perhaps the most enlightening example of the overt attempt of a newspaper editor
to influence the British government was Leopold Maxse’s use of his newspaper, The
National Review, to try and expose the German danger to British interests after 1899. It
is misleading to, however, use such overtly chauvinistic, radical journals such as The
National Review to explore the role of the press’s agenda for altering government policy.
To usefully survey the effect of the press on the general population and on governments
requires a consideration of the more mainstream journals and their portrayal of the other
state. The mainstream journals of both states published articles and editorials that had
chauvinistic and jingoist tinges to them. It was these articles that prompted more
resentful and hostile reactions from the other state’s press due to their “official” or “semiofficial” nature. The debates between these journals clearly fulfills the role of mass
media described by the pluralist model as they published the debates not only from within
their own state and society, but also those debates relating to them within the other state’s
press.
This primary role of any media source, during the period under consideration here
the British and German presses, has potentially dangerous consequences depending on
how or what the source reports as “objective” information. For the most part, especially
before the vast use of media for propagandist reasons during World War I and the
disillusionment caused by this, the public viewed the information provided by
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mainstream journals such as the London Times as a true representation of ongoing events.
Thus, when these journals began to characterize another state’s actions and interests as
malicious and threatening to their own, the public believed them. This role as
disseminators of information gave the presses a great deal of power that cannot be
quantified, but is nonetheless extremely important and eventually destructive.
Communications studies make it clear that the media plays a large role in the public
understanding in either accepting or rejecting the actions of the government by providing
the information necessary to make such decisions. In the case of Anglo-German relations
and the increase in tensions between the two governments, this informative role for the
presses proved problematic
The six chapters of this dissertation consider the years of the Near Eastern Crisis
(1876-1878) and between the Jameson Raid and the Algeciras Conference (1896-1906),
focusing on a selection of representative journals in the British and German presses.
Chapter One looks at the Times and Kölnische Zeitung and how they report events of the
Near East Crisis. Chapter Two considers the Pall Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung’s jingoistic response to the Great Powers’ actions in the Near East.
Chapter Three looks at Punch and Kladderadatsch’s satirical portrayal of the Great
Powers’ interests in relation to events in the Balkans.
The second half of the dissertation focuses on the period between the Jameson
Raid and the Algeciras Conference and how the British and German presses’ responses to
events during that period changed European diplomacy compared to during the Near East
Crisis. Chapter Four shows the ‘official’ responses, in the Times and the Kölnische
Zeitung, to the diplomatic challenges between Great Britain and Germany that emerged
21

following the Jameson Raid. Chapter Five shows the newly antagonistic tone of the
jingoistic Pall Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung toward other Great
Powers and the effect it had on diplomacy. Finally, Chapter Six considers Punch and
Kladderadatch’s portrayal of the increasing Anglo-German antagonism, reflecting both
the ‘official’ representations as well as the jingoistic sentiments present in both presses.
Using these journals, this dissertation will show the important role that the British and
German presses had on the deteriorating Anglo-German relationship.
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CHAPTER II
THE NEAR EAST CRISIS AND THE ‘OFFICIAL’ JOURNALS

We were now hearing more of these atrocities from
the newspapers, because they were better informed
than
Her
Majesty's
government.
Their
correspondents, our own countrymen, were on the
spot, and many of them men of great reputation
known to all of them. They all knew what The
Daily News correspondence was in the FrancoGerman war, and how it gave the earliest
information, and gave it long before the government
gave any. The enterprize [sic] of the press
outstripped the processes of Ministers, who
believed in red tape, and who made these commonplace statements about exaggerations. That was
simply the stereotyped language of diplomacy. The
mystery-mongering of the Foreign Office never
brought out the truth unless the press had brought it
straight to them long before. Hence the doubt
thrown by the Prime Minister on these statements. 1
This was how Parliamentarian Mr. Mundella responded to the unwillingness of
the British government to act against the Ottoman Empire in the wake of the Bulgarian
Atrocities. Information coming from British press representatives in Bulgaria, clearly
trustworthy according to Mundella, provided abundant evidence against the Ottoman
government that should have prompted an official anti-Ottoman response from the British
government. This did not happen, however, as the British press did not yet hold enough
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influence to pressure the Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli to change his traditional Near
East policy. This quote represented the limited role the presses played in European
diplomacy during the Near East Crisis. At the beginning of this period, the ‘official’
journals of the British and German presses, the Times and the Kolnische Zeitung,
respectively, served as reflections of their government’s opinions. The journals began to
critique some aspects of their government’s foreign policy as the Near East Crisis
continued, but the loyalty to their government’s intentions in the Near East consistently
overrode any significant condemnation of their government’s actions.
The Near East Crisis of 1875-1878 emerged following decades of repression by
the Ottoman government of the Balkan Christians. By 1875, nationalist movements in
the Ottoman provinces of Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro were causing
chaos for the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman government responded to this disorder by
sending in its army and irregular militia to suppress the insurrection, resulting in the
Bulgarian Atrocities, a series of violent actions against Christian civilians by the Ottoman
government. This reaction in turn provoked intense interest in Near East from the
European presses.
Articles in the “official” British and German journals, the Times and Kölnische
Zeitung respectively, reflected and responded to this new attention from the British and
German publics. These two newspapers, both of which originally appeared in the late
eighteenth century, had the reputation as being “inspired” by their home governments,
meaning they seemed to provide their governments’ official opinion. Thus the domestic
and foreign readerships looked at them as indicating the opinions of the two
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governments. At the same time, however, both journals also appeared objective, at least
to their domestic audiences, in their discussions of the Near East Crisis.
The information provided by the Times and Kölnische Zeitung educated their
readers about the day’s events, focusing on the actions of the leaders of foreign states that
represented the interests and concerns of their state’s foreign and domestic policy. In
particular, for the Times and Kölnische Zeitung, the response of Disraeli and Bismarck to
differing aspects of the Near East Crisis indicated the direction of Great Britain and
Germany’s Near East policy. In this chapter, I argue that the increased interest of the
British and German publics in international affairs prompted the Times and Kölnische
Zeitung to expand their coverage of Near East events and their government’s responses to
them. This shift epitomized the consequences of the two public opinions’ increased
attention to their leaders’ foreign policy decisions. Later, following the Jameson Raid,
this interest meant the two governments were more reactive to their public opinions, but
during the Near East Crisis, British and German public opinion followed the decisions of
their leaders, albeit with more comments on those choices. This chapter also considers
the effect the Times and Kölnische Zeitung’s coverage of Near East Crisis had on British
and German public opinion and how those publics’ views affected the reaction of
Disraeli, Bismarck, and the Russian government to the Near East situation.
Times, Kölnische Zeitung, and the Balkan Revolts
In 1875, the Balkan Provinces, with their majority Christian populations, started
revolting to free themselves from the Ottoman Empire’s continual repression. The Treaty
of Paris that ended the Crimean war required the Ottoman Empire to reform and better
protect is Christian subjects, but by the 1870s, it was clear there were no forthcoming
25

reforms. The initial phase of revolts failed to evoke much concern among the Great
Powers as the Ottoman government’s forceful suppression of internal dissent was not a
new occurrence. The expansion of the rebellions throughout the Balkan Provinces into
areas bordering other Great Powers, however, prompted a response from the Three
Emperors’ League. This group, Germany, Russia, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire,
represented those states with direct territorial interest in what occurred in the Balkans.
The Times and Kölnische Zeitung both discussed the effects of the possible interference
of those powers in the Ottoman Empire itself. At the same time, they emphasized the
interests of their own states in the Near East, noting how the involvement of the Three
Emperors’ League there could affect those concerns, starting with their coverage of the
initial Balkan Revolts.2
In response to the Balkan instability, and the Ottoman Empire’s subsequent
refusal to deliver the demanded reforms, the Three Emperors’ League met to discuss a
possible European solution to the chaos. The Balkan volatility imperiled both the
Russian and Austrian states because it allowed the dangerous Pan-Slavists a window
through which they could agitate for a large, independent Slavic state as the best way to
protect the Balkan Christians in the future, a move that could lead to the collapse of both
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Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire.3 The initial agreement made by the Three
Emperors’ League’s delegates, the Andrassy Note, received some support from Disraeli
and the British government. The Ottoman Empire, however, refused to adhere to the
suggestions. This spurred the subsequent Berlin Memorandum, which echoed the
Andrassy Note, but advised the utilization of force to compel the Ottoman Empire to
reform. Disraeli outright refused to support the Berlin Memorandum, arguing that it
infringed too much on the Ottoman Sultan’s sovereignty. Disraeli and the British
government’s decision to not back the Berlin Memorandum indicated the divisions
amongst the European Great Powers regarding the Eastern Question. This allowed the
Ottoman Empire to exploit the disagreements between them to successfully reject the
proposed reforms without facing significant consequences.
According to both the Times and Kölnische Zeitung, the Balkan Revolts involved
more than a conflict between the Ottoman government and its Balkan Christian
population. Neither journal focused its coverage on the revolts themselves, rather they
considered the actions of the European Great Powers in the area and the consequences of
those actions. In this discussion, the British, German, and Russian governments all
represented significant actors in the Balkans’ future in relation to the Ottoman Empire.
Reflecting the interests of their governments, the Times and Kölnische Zeitung promoted
their states’ Near East policy while indicating suspicion toward the foreign policy of the
other Great Powers. In particular, both newspapers expended considerable effort in
debating the role of Russia in Balkan events.
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Following Disraeli’s refusal to support Ottoman reform with the Berlin
Memorandum, both the Times and Kölnische Zeitung expanded their discussions
regarding of the Near East to the European Great Powers’ involvement in that region.
Two points of contention emerged in these conversations about the Ottoman instability.
The first focused on the British government’s continual support of the Ottoman Empire in
the face of Continental opposition. A second concern related to the efforts of the Three
Emperors’ League to mandate Ottoman reform. While both of these journals’ articles
expressed support for their own governments and suspicion of others, they continued to
relate information regarding the struggle between the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan
Provinces in a much more objective manner than their “semi-official” counterparts that
will be discussed in Chapter Two.
The Times and Kölnische Zeitung focused their coverage of the Near East Crisis
on the diplomats involved in Great Power diplomacy in the region, namely Disraeli,
Bismarck, and the Russian government’s representatives. The journals expressed more
interest in the effects of the Balkan Revolts on European diplomacy than the sufferings of
the Balkan Christians. The newspapers both favored reform for the Ottoman Empire but
differed regarding how that would occur. In this aspect, as in many others, the two
journals reflected the interests of their governments regarding Ottoman reform. The
Times and Kölnische Zeitung backed the aims of their own governments while
questioning the motivations of the other states. These types of pro-government portrayals
included support their government’s involvement, or non-involvement, with the Andrassy
Note and Berlin Memorandum.
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The Times echoed the opinions of the majority of the British cabinet when it
argued that the Ottoman Empire needed to reform. It contended that without some sort of
change, the Ottoman Empire would collapse, with or without British assistance. The
journal, however, only provided minimal support for the reforms proposed by the Three
Emperors’ League in the Andrassy Note and Berlin Memorandum. Like the British
cabinet, the Times argued that the Three Emperors’ League’s proposals provide too
significant a threat to Ottoman sovereignty, as well as a direct challenge to the Treaty of
Paris that ended the Crimean war.4 The Times supported the British government’s refusal
to agree to the Andrassy Note and Berlin Memorandum. This reflected Disraeli’s Near
East position but not necessarily that of all in the British government. For example,
many, including Queen Victoria, criticized Disraeli’s decision, contending that not
making the Ottoman Empire accept the reforms created the impression that Great Britain
would defend the Ottoman Empire against all the other Great Powers no matter the
consequences.5
Disraeli represented the most significant obstacle to a European solution to the
Near East Crisis. The British Prime Minister’s objections to the Andrassy Note and
Berlin Memorandum, many in the European presses argued, prompted the Ottoman
Sultan to reject them as well. Disraeli’s critics, both in the domestic and foreign presses
and governments, contended that this consequent Ottoman reaction increased Near East
tensions, which in turn prevented a quick resolution to the Balkan instability.6 The Times
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disagreed with this view, contending that the Ottoman Sultan intended to refuse the
Andrassy Note and Berlin Memorandum before the announcement of the British
decision.7 The journal again defended and advanced the British government’s Near East
policy. The German press, however, did not portray these actions in a similarly positive
light.
The Kölnische Zeitung provided a critical opinion of Disraeli’s opposition to the
Andrassy Note and Berlin Memorandum. The German journal, unlike the Times, which
defended the action, expressed hostility toward the British government. It indicated this
sentiment in response to the British government refusing to support the Three Emperors’
League’s attempts to aid the Balkan Christians by forcing Ottoman reform.8 The
Kölnische Zeitung contended that the struggle over the Andrassy Note and Berlin
Memorandum was a contest for Near East dominance between the Three Emperors’
League and Great Britain. In this competition, the Three Emperors’ League supported
the Balkan Christians while Disraeli wanted to secure the British road to India by
maintaining British control of the East Mediterranean.9
Despite the Kölnische Zeitung’s critique of Disraeli’s repudiation of the Three
Emperors’ League’s reform plans, along with the German government, did not try to
pressure the British government to agree to enforce Ottoman reform. The German
journal, like Bismarck, viewed positive Anglo-German relations as more important to
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German interests than the Ottoman reforms pursued by Russia.10 The Kölnische Zeitung
already had significant exposure to the repressive tactics used by the Ottoman Empire
against its subjects, which limited its demands for its governments’ involvement in
improvement the Balkan Christians’ lives.11
London Times, Kölnische Zeitung and the Bulgarian Atrocities
The Bulgarian Atrocities sparked an increased demand for news regarding
international diplomacy from the European publics, which the European presses readily
provided. They were a consequence of the Ottoman government trying to reestablish
order in Bulgaria with its irregular militia, the bashi bazouks. While the Ottoman Empire
had long utilized violent methods to restore dominance in the Balkans, the attack on
Bulgaria prompted a new Europe-wide interest in the fate of the Christians there. One
event characterized the devastation and destruction wrought by the bashi bazouks during
the Bulgarian Atrocities: the massacre of Batak’s Christians. At Batak, the bashi bazouks
murdered three thousand of the town’s seven-thousand person population by locking
them into a church and then burning it down. Following weeks of rape, murder, and
pillage that left between twelve and twenty thousand dead, the press coverage of this
town’s experience sparked a hostile backlash from the European publics against the
Ottoman Empire.12
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The European presses, beginning with the British Daily News that broke the story,
responded to their publics’ fascination with the sensational news by highlighting the
victims’ plights, in particular the attack on Batak. Britons and Germans both indicated
their support for the Balkan Christians, urging their governments to do something to
alleviate their suffering and punish the Ottoman Empire for its actions. At this point, in
the summer of 1876, the anti-Ottoman agitation, including letters, marches, and large
public meetings, amidst the European populations pressured the European Great Powers’
governments into reacting against the Ottoman Empire.13 The British public’s reaction
represented the most surprising response to the Bulgarian Atrocities, as it showed many
segments of British public opinion favored abandoning the British government’s
traditional Near East policy of protecting the Ottoman Empire. The other European
publics reacted similarly to the British public, and their governments addressed their
concerns by accepting the Russian government’s demand for a conference between the
European Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire to discuss plans for reforming the
Balkan Provinces.14
The Bulgarian Atrocities sparked a great deal of anti-Ottoman hostility in Great
Britain and Germany, as well as in the other European Great Powers. The Times, while
not supporting the Ottoman Empire against criticism, did not condemn the British
government’s inaction in response to the Bulgarian Atrocities. The British journal also
supported Disraeli’s arguments regarding the dubious nature of the early reports of the
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massacres.15 The Times reported Disraeli’s contention, made in a speech in Parliament,
that these accounts were nothing more than “coffeehouse babble” and therefore should
receive little credence. The British journal also echoed his sentiments after he noted in
another parliamentary speech that he doubted that “torture has been practiced on a great
scale among an Oriental people who seldom, I believe resort to torture, but generally
terminate their connection with culprits in a more expeditious manner,” thus the reports
could not possibly be accurate.16 The Times, as well as other observers, took these
utterances as an indication of the British government’s opinions on Near East events.
Much of Disraeli’s skepticism regarding the Bulgarian Atrocities came from his
Ambassador at Constantinople, Sir Henry Elliot, a staunch Turkophile. Elliot refused to
acknowledge the Bulgarian Atrocities occurred as reported and therefore did not relate
the information back to Disraeli. According to the Marquis of Salisbury, a member of
Disraeli’s cabinet as the Secretary of State for India, Elliot did know about the Bulgarian
Atrocities. Lord Salisbury also contended that Elliot knew the bashi bazouks’s reputation
in relation to revolting populations validated many of the atrocity stories coming out of
the Bulgarian Atrocities.17 Despite these opinions from British political elites, the Times
continued to defend Disraeli’s justifications for British inaction against the Ottoman
Empire. The British journal maintained this support even after an official British
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commission sent to investigate the Bulgarian Atrocities provided evidence for the initial
claims, countering those contentions issued by Disraeli and Elliot.18
The Times also provided coverage of anti-Ottoman sentiment both domestically
and abroad. Due to the expansive nature of British protests, including marches, letters,
and mass meetings, against the Ottoman Empire’s actions, Disraeli had little choice but to
reluctantly justify his government’s position. Disraeli argued that since the Ottoman
government did not order the bashi bazouks to massacre populations, but also could not
stop them, then it could not be responsible for the Bulgarian Atrocities. The Times
highlighted this view by publishing a dispatch from Lord Derby to Elliot that claimed
officials at Constantinople did not know about the Bulgarian Atrocities, and thus did not
order them.19 The journal further defended the Ottoman Empire, reflecting the efforts of
Disraeli and the British government, by contending that the Ottomans themselves fell
under attack by the Christians in the Balkan Provinces, only serving to increase
tensions.20
The Times and Disraeli pointed to other actors’ involvement that produced the
tensions in the Balkans outside of the Ottoman Empire. Neither viewed the Balkan
Christians as agitating toward their own goals. They both argued, rather, that “secret
societies” of Europe utilized the discontent to destabilize the Ottoman Empire for their
own ends. In particular, they pointed to the influence of the Russian government on the
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chaos in the Balkans.21 This suspicion only increased when Serbia took advantage of the
British government’s distraction to declare a war for independence. This action provoked
a larger crisis in the Near East as the Serbian leaders intended to gain complete separation
from the Ottoman Empire rather than just the reforms pursued by the other Balkan
revolutionaries. This movement prompted a great deal of concern among the Great
Powers because it directly challenged that territorial integrity guaranteed by the European
Great Powers in the Treaty of Paris.22 It also increased suspicion between the European
Great Powers within the other Great Powers’ presses.
The British press and government saw Russia’s presence in every action taken
against the Ottoman Empire in the Near East. In Parliament, the Conservative
government highlighted the presence of Russian officers in the Serbian army, but
downplayed the evidence of British officers in the Ottoman Empire. For example, Lord
Derby argued:
As to the other part of the noble Earl’s Question-that
relating to Russian officers who may have crossed into
Servia [sic] with a view of entering into the Servian [sic]
army-I am afraid that I cannot answer it. Everybody
knows, however, that there is a strong sympathy felt among
the Russian population for the cause of the Servian [sic]
insurgents; and it is possible and not improbable that
various persons who have held rank and been employed in
the Russian service may be serving as volunteers in the
Servian [sic] army.23
At the same time, the Liberal Lord Gordon wrote to Gladstone:
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What I fear now is the breach of neutrality we are
committing in allowing so many English officers to join the
Turks. I know myself of six officers of the Royal
Engineers on full pay who are at present in Turkish
garrisons and one of these (Colonel Lennox) has probably
been taken prisoner along with his friends.24
The Times supported the British government’s contention that the Russian government
had a hand in the Serbians’ decision to declare war, despite claims to the contrary.25
The Kölnische Zeitung differed in its representation of the Bulgarian Atrocities
and the aftermath, as it favored greater intervention like previously suggested in the
Andrassy Note. In its analysis of the Bulgarian Atrocities and later Serbian-Ottoman
war, the German journal critiqued Disraeli and the British government as much as it
defended the Russian government’s interest in assisting the Balkan Christians. The
Kölnische Zeitung supported the German government’s involvement in addressing the
Eastern Question, like the Times did with the British government, stressing Bismarck’s
justification for his government’s stance. According to the Kölnische Zeitung, the
German Chancellor wanted to utilize his, and Germany’s, position, in the Three
Emperors’ League to maintain order and stability in the Balkans. Bismarck based his
foreign policy on maintaining European peace. For him, the Near East Crisis was critical
for this policy, which dictated his response to Near East events.26
The German press disliked the British government’s unwillingness to support
enforceable Ottoman reform, especially after the Bulgarian Atrocities. The Kölnische
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Zeitung attribute the British government’s refusal to act in support of the Balkan
Christians to Disraeli’s decision to maintain Great Britain’s dominant position in the Near
East by completely support the Ottoman Empire against all challenges.27 Even following
his tardy justification for his government’s inaction, the German journal critiqued
Disraeli’s Ottoman policy. The Kölnische Zeitung, using similar language to that of his
critics in the British Parliament, argued that he worried too much about Russian
expansion in the Balkans and its effects on British Near East interests than on the Balkan
Christians’ suffering.28
The Kölnische Zeitung expressed a less Russophobic bias toward the SerbianOttoman war reflecting the German government’s stance on the event. The German
journal viewed the war as a rational expression of long term grievances of the Serbians.
While the German government and the Kölnische Zeitung disagreed with the supposed
Russian presence in dictating the Serbian war effort, they also expressed concern with the
possible outcome of the war itself. The German journal hoped, and argued that both the
British and German publics did as well, that the conflict did not provoke a larger conflict
between Russia and the Ottoman Empire.29 While the Kölnische Zeitung indicated this
optimism, it critiqued the British government’s selfish motives in the Near East that
threatened peace. The German journal highlighted this view by arguing that Disraeli
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overemphasized the terms of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 to keep Russia from intervening
in the Near East, which could negatively affect British interests in the region.30
By late 1876, the Serbian war effort collapsed and the Serbian government
requested an armistice. This request provided an opportunity to both end the SerbianOttoman war and end the Balkan Revolts by ensuring Ottoman reforms. The armistice
itself caused tension between Great Britain and Russia, as Disraeli, again echoed by the
Times, expressed skepticism toward the Russian government’s real interest in the
conflict, implying that the Russians wanted the armistice to last long enough for the
Russian army to completely mobilize and be able to join the war against the Ottoman
Empire.31 In this environment, the European Great Powers called for the Conference at
Constantinople. The Kölnische Zeitung remained skeptical regarding the British
government’s interest in pushing for the Conference at Constantinople. The German
journal doubted that Disraeli’s emissary’s mission meant that the he actually supported
Ottoman reform. To prove this point, the Kölnische Zeitung pointed to Disraeli’s
alternative to the Andrassy Note, which suggested the need for reform but rejected the
enforcement articles demanded by the Russian government in the Andrassy Note.32 Both
the Times and Kölnische Zeitung, however, supported their governments’ decision to
attend the conference because it would provide an opportunity to advance their interests
in the region.

30

Kölnische Zeitung, December 16, 1876, 1.

31

London Times, January 1, 1877, 9.

32

Kölnische Zeitung, January 15, 1877, 1.

38

London Times, Kölnische Zeitung and the Conference at Constantinople
The European presses’ demand for their governments to assist the Balkan
Christians threatened the maintenance of peace between those European Great Powers
with Near East interests. The Serbian request for an armistice allowed the European
Great Powers’ governments to address both their presses’ demands to help the Balkan
states as well as negotiating terms for peace and reform to end the conflict between
Serbia and the Ottoman Empire. This led to the decision to call and attend the
Conference at Constantinople. The meeting presented an opportunity for the British
government to have involvement in the Balkan instability. The Three Emperors’ League
intended to pursue the changes suggested in the Andrassy Note and Berlin Memorandum,
while Disraeli’s goals remained more ambiguous.
At the meeting, the British plenipotentiary, Lord Salisbury, worked with the
Russian Representative, Count Igantiev, to design reforms to which the Ottoman Empire
could agree. Salisbury and Ignatiev managed to agree upon terms acceptable to their
states’ interest. These included a Bulgaria that would be partitioned into two parts, which
would block Russia’s access to the Aegean Sea, as well as the Russians no longer
demanding Russian occupation of Christian territories in the Balkans, accepting instead
Belgian or Swiss police guards to protect these areas. These terms satisfied the
representatives at the Conference at Constantinople, but met with rejection from the
Ottoman government.33 Salisbury criticized the Ottoman contention that the proposals
“would compromise their dignity,” writing to Lord Derby that the rejection was “like a
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street cleaner complaining that he had been splashed.”34 Even while Salisbury pursued
this goal, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, Elliot, following Disraeli’s
prompting, continually reiterated the British government’s interest in maintaining the
status quo in the Near East. With this reassurance, the Ottoman Sultan rejected the
Conference at Constantinople’s proposals, claiming they inhibited his sovereignty.35 The
British government’s decision to retain its traditional Near East policy of supporting the
Ottoman Empire placed Disraeli in opposition to all the other European Great Powers. In
this period of “splendid isolation,” this mattered little as the British Prime Minister could
utilize the British navy in projecting the British government’s power in the Near East
without cooperation with another Great Power.36
The Times and Kölnische Zeitung highlighted the efforts of their governments to
produce results at the Conference at Constantinople that could resolve the Near East
Crisis. At the same time they also critiqued the ulterior motives they argued drove the
actions of the other Great Powers. The Times indicated that the Conference at
Constantinople provided a way for all of the European Great Powers to affect the
necessary Ottoman reforms. This broader resolution, the British journal continued, meant
that the Near East’s future did not simply lay with the Three Emperors’ League or Great
Britain.37 This meeting therefore made it possible for the best solution for all of the Great
Powers to emerge. The Times continued to advocate the British government’s response
34
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to the Near East Crisis following the deposition of the Sultan by his nephew and the
Ottoman government’s subsequent promise of a constitution. This action, the British
journal and government argued, made the Conference at Constantinople inconsequential
since the Ottoman Empire already began to reform with this change.38
The Times concluded from this shift in the Ottoman government that not
everything that happened to the Ottoman Empire affected British interests. The British
journal “happily” reported this fact as a reminder that events in the Near East did not
dictate British foreign policy. It was the Russian response to incidents in the region that
concerned the Times more than those by the Ottoman Empire. 39 The British journal’s
coverage of the Conference at Constantinople reflected this concern, as the Russian
government’s motives at the meeting received far greater criticism in the newspaper than
the Ottoman Empire’s did.40
The Kölnische Zeitung’s discussion of the Conference at Constantinople provided
a very different interpretation of the meeting. The German journal expressed skepticism
toward the British government’s intentions at the Conference at Constantinople. The
Kölnische Zeitung argued that the Three Emperors’ League represented those truly
interested in producing reforms the Ottoman Empire could accept. The British, the
German journal continued, only wanted to prevent Ottoman reforms because these might
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disrupt British interests.41 The German journal continued to critique the British
government’s action in the Near East, finding them far more dangerous than Russian
aims. The Kölnische Zeitung contended that the British government altered its Near East
policy based upon indistinct Russian threats rather than recognized Ottoman actions.42
The British and German presses echoed the sentiments of their governments
rather than the overt opinions of their publics, as expressed through public
demonstrations. The British and German populations at the time tended to trust their
governments to act in the best interest of their states’ subjects, an attribute that the Times
and Kölnische Zeitung emphasized. Russophobia, present in Great Britian since the time
of Catherine the Great, best reflected the British public’s support of the British
government and British press’s anti-Russian sentiment. The Times, as well as other
British journals, highlighted the common British opinion that the British could not trust
the Russians.43 The British press’s emphasis on this fact reflected the British public
opinion’s view of the Conference at Constantinople. This meant that despite Salisbury’s
ability to successfully negotiate with Ignatiev, the British public remained skeptical of
Russia’s Near East policy. There was no similar Russophobia prevalent in German
public opinion. The Kölnische Zeitung reflected this, arguing that the Russians did not
want conflict in the Near East but that Disraeli intended to exploit the Near East tensions
to justify direct British involvement in the region in order to restrain Russia.44 This
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German position did not change following the Conference at Constantinople’s failure as
the Kölnische Zeitung supported the Russian government’s threats to go to war against
the Ottoman Empire in order to protect the Balkan Christians.45
The Ottoman Sultan’s rejection of the Conference at Constantinople’s
propositions intensified the Near East Crisis. By refusing the diplomatic solution offered
by the European Great Powers, the Ottoman Empire amplified the likelihood that Russia
would declare war on the Ottoman Empire to protect the Balkan Christians from future
attack. The Russian government worked, following the Conference at Constantinople’s
failure and before its declaration of war, to get a mandate from the other European Great
Powers to aid the Balkan Christians. Ignatiev’s Circular, which outlined the Russian
justification for such a role, did not elicit much support from the other European Great
Powers, which prompted the Russian government to declare war against the Ottoman
Empire.
London Times, Kölnische Zeitung and the Russo-Turkish War
When the Russian government refused to demobilize, following the collapse of
the Conference at Constantinople, it appeared to many contemporaries, especially in
Great Britain and Germany that war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire was
imminent.46 The Russo-Turkish War’s onset, therefore, surprised few but caused
trepidation for many, especially in Great Britain. When the Conference at Constantinople
collapsed, the Great Powers deflected blame from their own governments to the other
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states’ governments. Disraeli argued that the meeting failed due to Bismarck and the
Russians wanting a war, not due to any subversion by him or his ambassador at
Constantinople. Disraeli publicly stated that he and Salisbury did all that possible to
achieve success at the conference. He dismissed claims that he or Elliot convinced the
Sultan not to accept the proposals. Furthermore he argued that Bismarck undermined the
process so that the Russians would declare war.47
The Ottoman government, knowing as it did that the British government would
never allow Russia to cross the Straits or conquer Constantinople, protested little at the
Russian declaration of war. During the initial stages of the war, the Russian
government’s struggle to militarily assert itself in the Balkans elicited mockery from both
British and German public opinion. The Russian army had limited capabilities in
fighting any large scale conflict, and most observers wondered how long the Russians
could fight before the war effort collapsed, bringing the state with it.48 The army’s losses
indicated Russia’s continual decline as a Great Power that began with its defeat in the
Crimean war. The British and German governments also recognized this problem, but
they also welcomed the benefits of Russia weakened by war.49
As long as the Russians appeared incapable of defeating the Ottomans, most
discussions in press and government circles focused upon what a loss would do to the
Russian state and what types of punishment the Russian government should receive for
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its audacity to start another war with the Ottoman Empire.50 As the war progressed,
however, the Russians proved capable of winning. As they advanced deeper into
Ottoman territory, more in the British press and public indicated support for some sort of
British involvement to stop the Russian advance. There were demonstrations in favor of
Disraeli’s Near East policy, such as a march by a group of medical students in London
and protests again organizations like the City Neutrality Committee, which protested
Disraeli’s attempts to involve Great Britain in the war, by pro-interventionists.51 As the
war continued, the debates regarding British intervention in the Near East intensified.
Those who favored intervention indicated the Russian threat to British interests inherent
in their progression toward Constantinople. Those that wanted the British to stay out of
the Near East argued that the Treaty of Paris (1856) allowed the Great Powers to assist
the Balkan Christians, but did not expressly dictate the nature of this assistance.52 As
long as Constantinople was not in imminent danger of collapse, much of this debate
remained simply a discussion. The Straits represented the beginning of British interests
in the Near East, thus general British support for intervention did not escalate until the
fall of Plevna in December 1877 when then the Russian advance moved too close to the
Straits.53
The fall of Plevna in December 1877 prompted significant concern in the
European Great Powers regarding Russia’s intentions in the Near East. No longer did
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Disraeli and Bismarck mock the Russian effort, as it looked more likely that the Russians
could conquer the Straits and Constantinople. Plevna represented the last Ottoman
stronghold between the Russian army and Constantinople thus its collapse created
panic.54 At this point, Disraeli prepared Great Britain for war while Bismarck tried to
convince the Tsar (Alexander III) to allow outside mediation. The Russian government,
however, saw no reason to allow other Great Powers to involve themselves in a war it
was winning. By March 1878, the Russian army sat at the gates of Constantinople,
hesitating to cross the Straits due to the presence of the British navy. While the Russians
waited, Disraeli shifted Sepoy troops from India to Malta and reinforced the British navy
near the Straits. With this show of force, the British Prime Minister indicated that the
British government would not allow Russia to move any further toward Constantinople
without risking war with Great Britain. 55
The British bluff appeared moot with the Treaty of San Stefano’s publication.
This treaty, signed on 3 March 1878, established new boundaries and autonomy for the
Balkan Provinces. The enlarged Bulgaria provided for in the agreement provoked the
most concern with the treaty’s primary critic, the Conservative government. Though it
blocked Russia’s access to the Aegean Sea geographically, many British diplomats,
especially Disraeli contended that Russian influence over the new Bulgaria would allow
the Russian government to establish hegemony over the Bulgarians. With this, they
continued, the Russians would have access to a warm-water port on the Aegean. British
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concern regarding the Treaty of San Stefano prompted the British government to demand
a congress to discuss the new treaty. Justifying the request for this meeting, Disraeli
pointed out that the Treaty of Paris that ended Crimean war required the signatory powers
to confer regarding any changes made to the Ottoman Empire’s territory. 56 The Russian
government acquiesced to this British demand and Disraeli and Bismarck arranged for
the European Great Powers to send delegates to Berlin to negotiate what, if any, aspects
of the Treaty of San Stefano should remain in force.
The Times and Kölnische Zeitung differed on which Great Power caused the
Russo-Turkish War to erupt. The British journal argued that when Bismarck refused to
force the Russian army to demobilize after the conference, he effectively caused the
conflict to occur.57 At the same time, the Kölnische Zeitung declined to blame the
Russians for the Russo-Turkish War, 1877-1878, viewing the Russian government as the
only one willing to do what was necessary to resolve the Eastern Question.58 During the
earlier months of the war, the Times, like most in Great Britain, did not favor direct
British involvement in the Near East as the Russian did not threaten British interests
there. The British journal argued that the British government should not provide any
direct aid to the Ottoman Empire if it meant a conflict with Russia, even as it denounced
the Russian justification for war as illegitimate.59 As the war progressed, the Times’
view of Russian intentions fluctuated. Initially, the journal portrayed the Tsar as peaceful

56

Allan, 29.

57

London Times, December 5, 1877, 4,7.

58

Kölnische Zeitung, April 3, 1877, 1.
London Times, October 2, 1877, 9.

59

47

and only interested in providing positive change for the Balkan Christians. At the same
time, however, the Russian press was bellicose and not indicative of the Russian
government’s stance. When the Tsar failed to reassert his previous peace interest in
change, his actions became suspect. This caused all Russian actions to appear
dangerously aggressive.60
Until Plevna fell, however, support for direct action in the Near East found little
favor among Britons. This collapse prompted the British public opinion, according, to
the Times to increasingly favor the British government’s intervention in the Near East, as
now Russian actions directly threatened British interests. Despite Russian promises not
to attack Constantinople after taking Plevna, the Times’ articles furthered the
Russophobic sentiment reemerging in British public opinion following the Russian
advances.61 The British journal indicated the prevalent British opinion that any Russian
actions taken at this point contrary to British suggestions showed the treacherous nature
of the Russian government’s intentions. For the Times and the Conservative
government’s supporters, it remained obvious that the British offer of mediation was the
best option for all the belligerents despite the fact that the Russians were winning the war.
For example, when the Russian government refused to accept British mediation to end
the war, the journal argued that the refusal showed that the Russians wanted territorial
acquisitions in the Balkans and not simply improvements in the Balkan Christians’
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existence.62 The Times did not echo the alarmist character of other British journals that
the Russian conquest of Constantinople was imminent once Plevna fell. It instead
blamed the Russians for causing this anxiety due to their failure to state their goals in the
Near East, as well as their refusal to demobilize. The journal argued that the British
government needed to heed this opinion, since it was shared by the British public at
large.63
The Treaty of San Stefano only intensified the Times’, as well as the British
public opinion’s and German government’s, suspicion of Russian aims in the Near East.
It also prompted critiques of the British government’s Near East policy in reaction to
these suspicions. When Disraeli sent the British navy to the Straits to “protect” British
interests in the Near East, for example, many observers in Great Britain and abroad,
including the Kölnische Zeitung, pointed to it showing the real meaning of British
“neutrality.” According to this definition description, disputed by Disraeli’s critics, the
British could intervene and remain neutral but none of the other powers could do the
same.64
The Times disputed this argument, as well as the contention that this mobilization
violated the Treaty of Paris, thus nullifying the document. Despite the Times’ contention
that the Russians’ declaration of war was not justified, it also recognized that the
Ottoman Empire’s sudden offer to accept the Conference at Constantinople’s proposals in
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order to end the war was too little for the Russians to accept at this point.65 The Russian
government itself, the British journal stated, believed the reason that the Ottoman
government offered to accept those reforms was because the Ottomans viewed the
changes as the only terms the Great Powers would force them to accept.66 While the
Times and many in the British government agreed that the Russian victory required that
the Russian government receive more than the Ottoman Empire’s acceptance of the
Conference at Constantinople’s proposals, the new, large Bulgaria was not acceptable.
The British journal discounted Russian claims that the new entity represented the best
way to guarantee good government for the Bulgarians, expressing suspicion about a
Russian sphere of influence expanding to the Aegean Sea.67 Furthermore, the British
journal argued, the Russians wrote the treaty in such a way that it had to be discussed by
the European Great Powers in order to force the British government to reveal its terms for
the Near East’s future.68 To increase European support for a congress, the Times
contended that the large independent Slavic state of Bulgaria threatened the German
government’s interests in the Near East due to its existence threatening the AustroHungarian Empire’s security. This proposed Slavic state threatened Austrian sovereignty
emerged due to the Empire’s large Slavic population that wanted to be free of Austrian
rule and would want to join their Slavic brothers.69
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The Kölnische Zeitung expressed more concern about the altruistic British
motives than those of Russia. From the outset of the Russo-Turkish War, the German
journal supported the Russian government’s claims regarding its interests in protecting
the Balkan Christians against Ottoman repression, with force if necessary. The Kölnische
Zeitung expanded its pro-Russian leanings when it highlighted resentment in the German
government and German public opinion toward the British press’s “pleased” tone at the
“correct” peaceful character of the German Emperor’s speech that reiterated the German
government’s pacific intentions and policy of neutrality.70 The anti-British sentiment
expressed by the German journal only increased as it published the opinion that the
British government only wanted to amplify tensions in the Near East with its attitude
toward the Russo-Turkish War, even if it threatened European peace.71
The Kölnische Zeitung’s articles reflected the German government’s primary
focus on keeping the Russo-Turkish War from expanding into Europe. The concern the
German journal had about British actions epitomized this concentration. The Kölnische
Zeitung expressed satisfaction for the failure of the British attempts to mediate between
Russia and the Ottoman Empire. This unsuccessful attempt eased the threat to the Three
Emperors’ League as it kept the Austro-Hungarian Empire from moving toward the
British side against Germany and/or Russia.72 The Kölnische Zeitung did not share this
anti-Russian skepticism, viewing Plevna and the subsequent Russian advance toward
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Constantinople as an indicator of the superiority of Russian aims in the war.73 The
German journal stated that Plevna represented a moment at which Bismarck could return
to the European diplomatic arena as a mediator, arguing that his ability to moderate
relations between Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire meant he could do so
between Russia, Great Britain, and the Ottoman Empire. To do so, however, Bismarck
had to deflect accusations that he wanted to use the Near East Crisis as an opportunity to
annex either the Netherlands or Belgium.74 The Kölnische Zeitung, like many in
Germany, supported Russian victories in defense of the Balkans Christians, stating that
the Russians would act in accordance to their previous promises not to take
Constantinople.75 The German journal critiqued Disraeli as a way to defend Bismarck
from the accusations that he wanted something more than the reestablishment of peace
and stability in the Near East.76
These critiques only increased following the Russo-Turkish War’s armistice and
the Treaty of San Stefano. Disraeli’s decision to send the British navy to “protect”
Constantinople despite the Ottoman Sultan’s refusal to ask for such assistance prompted
the Kölnische Zeitung to inquire about what steps he might take to force the issue of the
Ottoman Empire needing British intervention against Russia.77 The German journal
maintained its skepticism toward British intentions in the Near East even as it agreed that
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the Treaty of San Stefano needed to be submitted to the other Great Powers for
approval.78 At the same time, the Kölnische Zeitung and the German government
differed from the Times and the British government in that they viewed the Treaty of San
Stefano as a fair result of a hard fought military campaign.79 The Kölnische Zeitung,
however, supported German government’s accepting the offered position as mediator at
the Congress of Berlin. The German journal echoed the sentiments of Friedrich von
Holstein, the future head of the German Foreign Office, who viewed this as an
opportunity for the German government to improve its diplomatic position in Europe. By
not exploiting the Near East Crisis for territorial gain in Western Europe, Holstein
continued, Bismarck bolstered the opinion among European diplomats that he would use
his “dexterity” to “localize” the crisis in the Balkans. At this moment, British and
Russian distrust of Bismarck’s diplomacy became secondary to his potential as a fair
mediator for the Near East Crisis.80 The Kölnische Zeitung viewed this role for Bismarck
as increasingly important after the Treaty of San Stefano because the British government
indicated its willingness to directly intervene at the slightest provocation in the Near East
Crisis.81
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Times, Kölnische Zeitung, and the Congress of Berlin
The Congress of Berlin epitomized the European Great Powers’ official response
to the Near East Crisis. At the meeting, the representatives worked for an agreement that
would satisfy their Near East interests, with little regard to the Balkan Christians’
concerns. Disraeli suggested that Bismarck host the congress because the German
government represented the best possible arbiter for the conflicting British and Russian
governments. The Great Powers also recognized that the Germans had no territorial
ambitions in the Near East that made their mediation even more rational.82 Disraeli
demanded the Congress of Berlin to discuss the Treaty of San Stefano but it also served
as method to prevent armed conflict between Great Britain and Russia over the Near
East.
The primary issue discussed at the Congress of Berlin was the Treaty of San
Stefano in relation to the guarantees made by the Treaty of Paris of 1856. Following
Plevna’s fall, Disraeli agitated heavily in favor of British intervention to defend the
Straits and Constantinople, but the Treaty of San Stefano seemingly negated that issue as
it stopped the Russian advances into Ottoman territory before the Russian army moved
across the Straits. The Conservative British government argued instead that since
Russian government obviously forced the Ottoman government to sign this document
that it negated the treaty’s enforceability. The signatory powers from the Treaty of Paris
sent representatives to Berlin to negotiate those aspects of the Treaty of San Stefano that
challenged the earlier arrangement. The Treaty of San Stefano’s redistribution of
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Ottoman territory in the Balkans represented the most significant challenge to the Treaty
of Paris. Disraeli vehemently opposed this feature and utilized the language employed to
justify his demand for a European congress.
The other Great Powers agreed to this demand for their own reasons. Bismarck
wanted to establish Germany as the “honest broker” while maintaining European peace.
The Austro-Hungarian Empire wanted to expand its influence in the Balkans. The
Ottoman Empire wanted to rid itself of the Treaty of San Stefano’s provisions. The
Russian government, which contended that as the victor in the Russo-Turkish War it did
not need to present the Treaty of San Stefano to the other Great Powers for approval, only
acquiesced to prevent a conflict between itself and Great Britain.
The Congress of Berlin officially met from 13 June 1878 to 13 July 1878, but the
Great Powers negotiated solutions for the primary points of contention in the months
between the Treaty of San Stefano’s publication and the beginning of the meeting.
Despite winning the war that prompted the assembly, Russia emerged as the biggest
loser, as it received only limited material gains, and those only to the detriment of its
Rumanian allies. The Ottoman Empire remained in nominal control of all its Balkan
territory except Bosnia and Herzegovina, which the Austro-Hungarian Empire acquired.
The British government gained the Eastern Mediterranean island of Cyprus, something
long coveted by Disraeli, in exchange for protecting the Ottoman Empire in Central Asia.
Finally, the German government established itself as the primary European mediator
while also maintaining European peace, realizing Bismarck’s primary goals. The Balkan
Provinces gained nothing from the treaty of Berlin and representatives from these states
could not even gain access to the meetings at which the primary decision making
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occurred. After the Congress of Berlin, the Russian government blamed Bismarck for its
loss of prestige. Disraeli established the British government as the dominant power in the
Near East and Central Asia. The meeting failed to resolve the issues that prompted the
Near East Crisis, in particular not ending the oppression of the Balkan Christians. This
outcome indicated that the true intentions of the Great Powers involved protecting their
interests in the Near East rather than establishing the necessary Ottoman reforms to
prevent more revolts from happening.83
The Times promoted the efforts and successes of the Congress of Berlin from the
moment Disraeli called for it. The British journal emphasized the need to protect the
Ottoman Empire from Russian aggression rather them focusing on the possible effects the
Russian advances into Ottoman territory might have on British Near East interests. The
Times considered the Ottoman Empire as the best bulwark against Russian threats to the
British Empire, thus the British needed it to remain intact. The British journal also
praised the diplomatic victory of getting Cyprus without having to sacrifice anything for
it. Most importantly to the British newspaper, the Congress of Berlin defined the
European Great Powers’ interests in the Near East in such a way that prevented any
future Russian aggression in the Near East, which in turn secured British interest in the
Near East.84 Those aspects of the Congress of Berlin the Times highlighted and
emphasized the British government’s successful realization of their goals at the meeting.
These achievements drew support from the British public opinion as well as the British
press as they reinforced the preeminence of the British Empire in the Near East. The
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German press and German government, as indicated in the Kölnische Zeitung, did not
share the same opinion regarding British success at the Congress of Berlin.
Like the Times, the Kölnische Zeitung supported the call for the Congress of
Berlin. The German journal did so because it represented an opportunity for Bismarck
and the German government to successfully establish Germany as a mediating power.85
The German journal agreed with the Times that the very fact the assembly met reflected a
diplomatic victory for the British government because it gave the British a role in
determining the peace even as it they had no official role in the war itself. The Kölnische
Zeitung’s recognition that the Congress of Berlin represented benefits for the British
government prompted concern in the journal. In particular, the newspaper echoed the
German government’s trepidation that the British government worked in the background
to come to an arrangement with the Austro-Hungarian Empire regarding Bosnia and
Herzegovina that could injure Austro-German relations. 86 This was not an unwarranted
suspicion as the Austrian government did agree to support Great Britain at the Congress
of Berlin in exchange for the two Balkan Provinces. Disraeli chose to deal with the
Russians directly at Berlin in order to limit the effectiveness of the Three Emperors’
League as a coordinated group that threatened to isolate the British diplomatically at the
meeting. Disraeli’s ability to deal with each of the Three Emperors’ League’s members
individually destroyed the possibility that the league could become a diplomatic bloc
powerful enough to challenge the British government for dominance in the Near East.87
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Disraeli’s action further vindicated the Kölnische Zeitung’s suspicious interpretation of
British diplomacy at the Congress of Berlin. The German journal distrusted the British
government’s diplomacy, but it offered a more sympathetic portrayal of Russian
diplomacy at the Congress of Berlin.
The Kölnische Zeitung justified the Russian government’s terms in the Treaty of
San Stefano, arguing that they were the hard-won war prizes achieved by the Russian
army against the Ottoman Empire.88 At the same time, the German journal supported the
German government’s efforts to reduce the threat of war between Russia and Great
Britain by pressuring the Russian government to put the Treaty of San Stefano to a
European congress for discussion. The huge losses faced by Russia at the Congress of
Berlin created a great deal of anti-German sentiment in the Russian press and government
as they felt that Bismarck abandoned their interests to the other Great Powers. The
German journal argued that the Russian government voluntarily put the Treaty of San
Stefano before the European congress to preserve European peace, but this decision was
not popular in Russia. The Russian press, the Kölnische Zeitung stated, portrayed the
Russian diplomats as enjoying Berlin’s nightlife while the rest of Europe negotiated away
Russian conquests.89 The Kölnische Zeitung did not denounce these critiques, it instead
highlighted them and their effects on Russo-German relations.
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Conclusion
The Near East Crisis showed the growing interest the European presses had in
international events. The sensationalized nature of events such as the Bulgarian
Atrocities spurred more demand for information from the presses and reaction from the
different governments. No longer able to establish foreign policy in a vacuum removed
from public view, governments increasingly had to react to, either with action or
justification for inaction, their presses’ concerns regarding Near East events. Examples
of this include Disraeli’s justifying the British government’s inaction in light of the
Bulgarian Atrocities and Bismarck defining the German government’s role at the
Congress of Berlin to the German press in terms of increasing Germany’s prestige. The
“great men” of the period, particularly Disraeli and Bismarck, attempted to remain aloof
to the British and German presses’ opinions, but even they could not avoid responding.
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CHAPTER III
THE NEAR EAST CRISIS AND THE ‘SEMI-OFFICIAL’ JOURNALS

“England and the War” - The Times observes that now that
Parliament has said all that can be said in the Eastern
Question, it becomes a matter of anxiety to know how we
stand in regard to the war and its possible issues. All the
chief elements of the question are those that defy
calculation. We have been reminded in this debate of a
falling Empire, and rising races; and as we cannot really
suppose these races are to be regenerated only to augment
the armies and fleets of Russia, we can only suppose that as
Europe gave Greece independence so it may give the like
boon to the other races, with some means of common
government and mutual defence [sic]. To whichever way
events shall seem to incline, there is no slight chance of a
European intervention. When that time arrives, it will not
trouble much the great statesmen and soldiers of the
Continent if they ‘bite before they bark’ and dictate at the
head of advancing armies. That course will not be so easy
or so comformable [sic] to usage in this country; but should
there ever again be a thing as a European concert, it may be
our fate.1
The “semi-official” journals from Great Britain and Germany, the Pall Mall
Gazette and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung respectively, provide different insights
into European diplomacy than their “official” counterparts. Unlike the Times and
Kölnische Zeitung, these journals reflected a more jingoistic and less objective
representation of events during the Near East Crisis. These chauvinistic interpretations
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appeared to many contemporaries, both within the government and in the general
populations, to indicate the true interests and opinions for that journal’s government,
observers viewed the ‘official’ newspapers as reflecting the opinion that their
governments wanted to show to the other Great Powers.
The Pall Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, both dating from
the 1860s, presented a more suspicious tone toward Near East events than the Times and
Kölnische Zeitung. They also portrayed the other European Great Powers as having
ulterior motives that prevented their own governments from maintaining their state’s
Near East interests. Beyond reporting on the Near East Crisis in a jingoistic way that
emphasized the destructive interests of the other Great Powers and the altruistic motives
of their own government, the Pall Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung
also highlighted the effects of the Liberal Party’s anti-Ottoman agitation on the British
government and British public opinion, something that the Times and Kölnische Zeitung
did not emphasize. In their discussions of the Near East Crisis, and the motives of the
Great Powers as well as the challenge of the Liberal Party to Disraeli’s government, both
jingoistic journals utilized a more attacking tone when reporting on Near East events
rather than the objective reporting provided by their ‘official’ counterparts. This
aggressive tone, along with the different issues focused on gave the Pall Mall Gazette
and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung a greater role in creating tensions between the
European Great Powers’ governments than the Times and Kölnische Zeitung, a role that
continued through the First Moroccan Crisis, which will be discussed in Chapter Five.
In this chapter, I argue that the way in which the Pall Mall Gazette and
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung portrayed the Near East Crisis created significant
61

tensions among the publics and governments of the European Great Powers. The
journals’ jingoistic sentiment also helped created domestic consensus for their
government’s Near East goals. This ardent support for their state’s interests, regardless
of the effects on other states’ interests, increased suspicion regarding foreign policy of the
different European Great Powers. The jingoistic articles publics by the Pall Mall Gazette
and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung implied that British and German public opinion
favored a foreign policy that promoted their state’s interests even if it meant ignoring the
plight of the Balkan Christians, which indicated different opinions than those of the
Times and Kölnische Zeitung. These types of articles created resentment among foreign
observers, but this did not restrain diplomacy as much as it did following the Jameson
Raid, a topic covered in Chapter Five. This resentment caused by these two journals,
however, prompted an underlying hostility between British and German public opinion
that erupted following the Jameson Raid.
The Pall Mall Gazette, Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, and Jingoistic Support for
Governments
Throughout the Near East Crisis, the Pall Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung indicated complete support for their government’s actions and
interests. The jingoistic manner in which these two journals covered the Near East Crisis
differed from the tone used by the Times and Kölnische Zeitung, particularly when
discussing the justifications for their own government’s behavior versus that of the other
European Great Powers. While the two ‘official’ journals reported on the British and
German governments’ activities with little indication of partiality, these two ‘semiofficial’ journals did not attempt to suppress the pro-government tone of their articles.
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This jingoistic sentiment continued throughout the Near East Crisis as the European
Great Powers negotiated the Balkan Christians’ future based on the interests of their own
state rather than the oppressed populations.
Most contemporaries recognized the significant interest the British had in the
Near East based on its value to the route to India. While the British press and
government viewed these interests as unchangeable, other Great Powers, especially those
of the Three Emperors’ League, questioned why the Ottoman Empire could remain the
same unreformed, oppressive state just because of its geographical position. The
oppressive nature of Ottoman actions in the Balkans, however, led to the British public
challenging, through anti-Ottoman agitation, the traditional British Near East policy of
propping up the Ottoman Empire. Unlike the Russians, who defended their actions by
contending they intended to save the Christians, the British government pointed out two
major factors dictating their lack of action: the Ottoman actions, including the Bulgarian
Atrocities, did not warrant a change in traditional British Near East policy and none of
the Great Powers, especially Russia, really worked to improve the Balkan Christians’
lives, despite their claims to the contrary.2 Stressing these two points, both the
Conservative British government and the Pall Mall Gazette emphasized the Ottoman
Empire’s importance to British foreign policy and to highlight the hypocritical nature of
the other Great Powers’ Near East policy. Disraeli and his cabinet clearly stated that
something like the Bulgarian Atrocities did not warrant changing Great Britain’s
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traditional Near East policy.3 The Pall Mall Gazette and many jingoes within the British
government openly advocated this view, but the anti-Ottoman agitation made it complex
to justify British action with those terms. This stance, however, did not appease those in
the British public that demanded Ottoman change, thus Disraeli couched his Near East
action in rhetoric stressing saving the Balkan Christians, even as it was obvious to
publications such as the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung that Disraeli really only
sought to protect British interests even at the expense of the Balkan Christians.4
Many British observers worried that Ottoman actions could force the government
to react in such a way that would injure British interests in the Near East.5 The Bulgarian
Atrocities, and the anti-Ottoman agitation that it sparked, made this concern more acute.
The Pall Mall Gazette warned the British government that it needed to make the Ottoman
Empire provide some assurances that the repression would stop and the perpetrators of
the repression punished, or else be pushed into action by “unregulated emotions of
sympathy and indignation.”6 British accusations regarding Ottoman responsibility for the
Near East Crisis justified for a time the British government’s Near East policy of
inaction.
As Ottoman actions such as the Bulgarian Atrocities came to light, however, even
some Conservative members of Disraeli’s government began to advocate some sort of
European involvement to ensure Ottoman reform. For example, the Marquis of
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Salisbury, at the beginning of the Near East Crisis British Secretary of State for India,
advocated a British plan that would provide Ottoman reform without the other European
Great Powers’ involvement. He supported Disraeli’s rejection of the Andrassy Note and
Berlin Memorandum, arguing that working with the Three Emperors’ League would cost
Great Britain its long held influence at Constantinople. His opinion changed following
the Bulgarian Atrocities and at the Conference at Constantinople, when he worked with
the Russian representative to achieve acceptable reforms. He failed in these attempts
because he could not get Disraeli or Lord Derby to back the view that something needed
to be done to force changes, even if it meant European intervention.7
The Pall Mall Gazette also discerned that others might reproach the British
government for the Ottoman Empire’s refusal to accept either of the Three Emperors’
League’s reform plans. In particular, the British journal recognized that Germany and
Russia both had segments of their population that viewed British Near East policy as that
of unconditional support for the Ottoman Empire. 8 The Pall Mall Gazette maintained
that until the British government asserted a “bold and manly line of conduct” in defining
its Near East interests to the belligerents, the Near East Crisis would continue.9 In this
context, the British newspaper urged the British government to fully project its position.
Once Disraeli did fully involve his government in the Near East, first by moving the
British navy toward Constantinople, then later by demanding the Congress of Berlin, and
finally by successfully promoting British interests at that meeting, he succeeded,
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according to the Pall Mall Gazette and his supporters in Great Britain, in ending the Near
East Crisis.10
The Pall Mall Gazette continued its pressure for the British government to react
to Near East events in a way that protected its traditional interests there. According to the
British journals, the British government’s resistance to acting as they had in the past
meant that the Near East Crisis continued. Conservatives and Anglophiles agreed with
the Pall Mall Gazette in this observation, contending that Lord Derby’s unwillingness to
directly involve the British military in the Near East allowed events such as the RussoTurkish War and Treaty of San Stefano to occur.11 Lord Derby faced criticism from
those in Great Britain who wanted the British government to assert its interests in order to
end the Near East Crisis. For those groups, he represented the British loss of prestige that
emerged as a consequence of this inaction. He became the scapegoat for the British
government’s failures in the Near East Crisis, especially once the British press publicized
his wife’s relationship with the Russian Ambassador Shuvalov. This association made
Lord Derby appear suspect, and the implication that the Russian government received
information regarding British cabinet deliberations on the Near East Crisis from
Shuvalov made the British Foreign Secretary at best appear incompetent and at worst
seem like a pro-Russian conspirator. The focus on Lord Derby allowed Anglophiles, and
the Pall Mall Gazette, to vindicate the British government from overall culpability
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regarding the Near East Crisis while still responding to the criticism about the British
Near East policy.12
Following the Conference at Constantinople’s failure and the onset of the RussoTurkish War, the Pall Mall Gazette’s coverage of the Near East Crisis focused on the
effects of the Russian army’s advance toward Constantinople on British interests, echoing
Disraeli’s concerns. The British jingoistic journal supported the British government’s
involvement in the Near East in order to restrict Russian intervention on behalf of the
Balkan Christians. This coverage went beyond the skepticism within the Times. It
continually asserted Russian intervention violated international law and thus needed to be
stopped, with British force if necessary.
The Pall Mall Gazette echoed the British government’s objection to European,
from Russia or any other European Great Powers, intervention in the Balkans throughout.
The British journal linked calls for reform to Russian territorial aims in the Near East.
For the Pall Mall Gazette, the Three Emperors’ League’s proposals did not represent true
Russian aims, despite being back by Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This
view disregarded the face that since the Austrian government had significant Balkan
interests it would work to restrain Russian expansion in the region. Conservative British
observers’ criticisms continued as they argued that the Russians and Austrians both
sought to create, with these proposals, a situation that would necessitate their intervention
in the Balkans.13
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The Pall Mall Gazette highlighted these ulterior motives to the reforms suggested,
trying to get the British public, especially those involved in the anti-Ottoman agitation, to
support the pro-Ottoman leanings of British Near East policy.14 Furthermore, it
encouraged the British public to support the British government and stop its anti-Ottoman
agitation so that the Balkan Christians’ future would be dictated by diplomacy, which the
British government worked for, and not war, which the Russian government wanted.15
The “anarchy” in British public opinion caused by the anti-Ottoman agitation, the Pall
Mall Gazette warned, only increased Russian “pretensions” in the Near East because it
made it appear that the British public would not support the British government
defending the Treaty of Paris.16 When their attempts to mobilize pro-Ottoman sentiment
based on the dangers posed by the Russians in the region failed, the Pall Mall Gazette
and the British government changed tactics. Both the British journal and the government
shifted to supporting their claims regarding the dangers of foreign intervention in the
Ottoman Empire by pointing out that the intervention would lead to the Ottoman
Empire’s collapse which would cause a bigger problem in the region for the European
Great Powers to resolve that the instability already in existence, a stance they maintained
throughout the Near East Crisis.17
For Disraeli and the Pall Mall Gazette, the danger to the Ottoman Empire came
from more than just the European Great Powers; there was also danger within the
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Ottoman Empire itself. The Ottoman Empire needed protection from Russian-backed
Christian minorities as much as it needed help against Russian aggression according to
Disraeli and the Conservatives.18 Disraeli and the Pall Mall Gazette argued that British
intervention represented the best hope to protect the Ottoman government from the rebels
as well as the other European Great Powers. The British also, according to these
jingoistic elements, embodied the foremost option for producing any sort of positive
change in the Near East. The British journal stated that the British government needed to
involve itself in the Near East before the Russians took a too powerful position there.
The newspaper argued that the British public would support such an intervention, even if
it was done unilaterally, adding that the British government needed to make this clear to
the belligerents in the Near East.19 Even Anglophiles with strong connections to other
European Great Powers, such as Crown Princess Victoria in Germany, believed that
Disraeli’s failure to successfully secure British intercession in the Near East not only
threatened the Balkan Christians’ future, but also the future of British foreign policy in
the region.20 Disraeli and his government used Russian success to secure support from
Parliament in the form of war credits to prepare for a seemingly imminent need for
military intervention. This demand for war credits provoked the greatest amount of
criticism for British intervention in the Near East, both domestically and internationally.21
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While trying to prevent the other European Great Powers from intervening in the
Near East, Disraeli actively pursued policies designed to promote British involvement
there. These policies provoke both support from Anglophiles and Conservatives such as
the Pall Mall Gazette and disapproval at home and abroad. Disraeli defended his
attempts at intervention using the same reasons he objected to Russian involvement in
Near East: the Treaty of Paris. According to this agreement, the European Great Powers
guaranteed the Ottoman Empire’s territorial sovereignty, thus the British cabinet sought
to intervene in the Near East to “protect” the Ottoman Empire from collapse at least that
was the publicized justification.
For Disraeli and the Pall Mall Gazette, the Treaty of Paris clearly forbid any
outside intervention in Ottoman affairs, meaning that all attempts from the other
European Great Powers to force the Ottoman Empire to change with threats of military
action violated the treaty.22 Disraeli rejected all attempts at anything resembling
intervention, including the reforms suggested within the Andrassy Note and Berlin
Memorandum, arguing that they threatened Ottoman sovereignty guaranteed by the
Treaty of Paris.23 Initially, all members of Disraeli’s cabinet supported this view,
allowing him to present a unified front to the British public and Europe.
Following the Bulgarian Atrocities, Disraeli lost this consensus, and only regained
it after the Russian army advanced well into Ottoman territory during the Russo-Turkish
War. Disraeli dismissed the Russian claims that trying to protect the Christians justified
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their invasion of Ottoman territory. The Pall Mall Gazette advocated Disraeli’s
interpretation of the Treaty of Paris restrictions, while also promoting the need for the
British government to intervene to save the Ottoman Empire from Russian aggression.
According to both Disraeli and the Pall Mall Gazette, the same Treaty of Paris that
prevented Russia from aiding the Christians made it necessary for the British government
to send the British navy into the Straits, technically constituting a prohibited intervention
by an outside power, to “protect” the Ottoman Empire.24 The Conservatives in Great
Britain argued that by pushing as far as they did into Ottoman territory before demanding
the treaty, the Russians forced the other European Great Powers to call for a congress to
discuss the changes to the Ottoman Empire, particularly territorially.25 The Pall Mall
Gazette echoed this view, arguing that the Russians continued into Ottoman territory,
knowing that they would be forced into a congress, to have a better position at the
meeting based on the amount of land it held in the Balkans.26
Compared to the British public’s response to their government’s inaction, there
was far less disapproval in the German public for Bismarck’s response to the Near East
Crisis. This fact accounts for the less considerable need for the Norddeutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung to defend its government’s actions from attacks in the German public. Questions
regarding German Near East policy coming from foreign observers, such as the British
press, however, prompted the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung to publish articles
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supporting the German government’s foreign policy during the Near East Crisis. The
German ‘semi-official’ journal’s coverage of Near East events differed from those in the
Kölnische Zeitung as it actively promoted an expanded German interest in the region and
echoed Bismarck’s justifications for the German government responding to events as it
did. In particular, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung supported two aspects the
German government’s Near East policy: supporting Russian attempts at forcing the
Ottomans to reform and protesting foreign claims regarding Bismarck’s interest in
exploiting the Near East Crisis for German interests.
The German government and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung did not reflect the
same sort of disbelief regarding Russians goals coming from the British government and
Pall Mall Gazette. The German press portrayed Russia as the Christians’ protector, the
only European Great Powers willing to do whatever was needed to make sure the
Ottoman Empire finally fulfilled its promises to reform.27 This did not equate to
complete support for Russian goals in the Near East, or even an unbiased interpretation of
Russian intentions. The emergence of the Pan-Slavs in positions of power and influence
represented Bismarck’s main concern in regards to Russian intentions. The Pan-Slavs
threatened the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which in turn
threatened Germany’s stability. The Russian Pan-Slavs symbolized those among the
Russian population most in favor of helping the Balkan Christians who were also Slavic.
Bismarck’s distrust of this group manifested itself in his foreign policy.28 Bismarck did
not challenge Russia’s claim to be helping those Christians, but he also refused to
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aggressively support the Russian government’s reform plans. The Norddeutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung articulated this view, detailing the danger represented by the PanSlav annexationists in Russia to peace in Europe, while also indicating the positive
aspects of Russian foreign policy in trying to aid the Balkan Christians.29
Both Bismarck and the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung viewed Russian
intervention in the Near East as justified, seeing the Ottoman Empire’s refusal to produce
the reforms promised by the Treaty of Paris as enough of a reason to warrant European
intervention.30 They both also criticized Disraeli’s hypocritical stance that allowed him
to send the British navy to the Straits, despite the Sultan’s request for him to remove the
ships, while condemning all other attempts by European Great Powers to address the
problems in the Near East.31 Bismarck refused to join with the British and Austrian
demands that the Russians halt their advance through Ottoman territory and sign an
armistice with the Ottoman Empire. He also denounced those critics that argued the
continued Russian advance proved that the Russian government wanted territory and not
to aid the Balkan Christians.32 This view reflected the German government’s opinion on
the subject, but Bismarck declined to openly support either the Russian or the British
view, as he did not want to alienate either of the two powers because that could lead them
to ally with France.33
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Bismarck’s ambiguous and autocratic diplomacy made him one of the most
distrusted but powerful diplomats in Europe during his tenure as German Chancellor.
Not delineating his foreign policy plans increased European hostility toward Bismarck,
but his success as a diplomat meant that European diplomats recognized his importance
to maintaining European peace.34 Unlike the British or Russian governments, Bismarck
did not have to appease anti-Ottoman agitation with action because Germany did not
have any direct interests in the Near East. What anti-Ottoman sentiment in Germany
allowed him to do, according to the Pall Mall Gazette, was to use the diplomatic situation
to ease domestic problems resulting from the Kulturkampf and the emergence of the
German socialists.35 Bismarck’s main goal from the outset was to prevent the European
balance of power from being upset. He attempted to resolve the Eastern Question by
dividing the Ottoman Empire’s European provinces up and giving them to the AustroHungarian Empire and Russia while safeguarding British interests, but the other
European Great Powers rejected this attempt.
The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung denied these claims, arguing that Bismarck
sought only European peace, which also reflected the German government’s stance.36
Bismarck represented the best mediator for the Congress of Berlin, a role he actively
sought. He did not want any territory in the Near East and his role in the Three
Emperors’ League increased his potential influence over achieving cooperation between
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the Austrians and Russians at the meeting.37 His lack of interest in the Balkan Christians’
future allowed the Great Powers to negotiate the treaty of Berlin without their
participation. This agreement led to the Balkans being divided up with little regard to
native populations’ opinions on their future.
The Pall Mall Gazette, Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, and Distrust of Other
European Great Powers in the Near East Crisis
Associated with the adamant defense of their government’s policy the Pall Mall
Gazette and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung expressed complete distrust for the other
European Great Powers’ actions that conflicted with their state’s Near East activities.
Unlike the ‘official’ newspapers, the two ‘semi-official’ journals attacked the actions and
motivations of the other Great Powers. In particular, the Pall Mall Gazette attacked
Russian, and sometimes German, intentions while the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung
heavily critiqued Disraeli and the British government’s Near East policy. The
aggressively antagonistic interpretation of the European Great Powers’ actions during the
Near East Crisis paralleled the jingoistic defense of their own governments in the Pall
Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung.
The British government and the Pall Mall Gazette distrusted the Russian
government above all the other European Great Powers, even as they both expressed
skepticism toward Bismarck and the German government. Disraeli and his government
attributed the Balkan instability to both German and Russian machinations through the
efforts of the Three Emperors’ League, and the Pall Mall Gazette both accepted and

37

MacColl, 167.

75

promoted this view.38 Disraeli never wavered from blaming the expansionist interests of
the Russian government for events during the Near East Crisis, a stance which the
jingoistic Pall Mall Gazette continually supported throughout the period. When the
revolts broke out the British journal argued that the Russians obviously incited the Slavic
Christians to rebel, pushing the anti-Ottoman sentiment in hopes of destabilizing the
Ottoman Empire enough to be able to easily conquer Ottoman territory.39 The British
newspaper continued, contending that the Three Emperors’ League was “antagonistic”
and “indifferent to the Ottoman Empire’s interests, which caused the inability for the
European Great Powers to work with the Ottoman government to end the rebellions and
implement reform.40 The Pall Mall Gazette and the British government maintained their
stance that the Russians were the instigators of the instability with the declaration that
Russia was the only Great Powers to express “sympathy for the Turkish insurgents.”
This statement not only reiterated Russian blame, but it also highlighted the Conservative
view that the Ottoman government was the victim fighting for its existence.41
Neither Disraeli nor the Pall Mall Gazette believed the early reports of the
Bulgarian Atrocities, contending they were false creations of Russian instigators. The
British Ambassador to Constantinople, Sir Henry Elliot, thought the reports were a
creation of Russian agents seeking to construct a reason for the Russian government to
conquer Ottoman territory.42 Even after the reports proved true, the British journal
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blamed the Russians for the devastation, contending that none of it would have occurred
if the Russians had not been backing the Balkan Christians. The Pall Mall Gazette argued
that ultimately the Russians were responsible for the violent oppression of the Balkan
Christians, including the Bulgarian Atrocities, due to their instigation of “a vague but
nervous feeling of insecurity and impending disaster.”43
In the wake of the instability caused by the Balkan Revolts and the destructive
action of the Bulgarian Atrocities, Serbia declared war on the Ottoman Empire. The
Serbians instigated the conflict in an attempt to throw off Ottoman control, but the Pall
Mall Gazette and Disraeli believed another actor prompted the Serbian action: the
Russian government. The occurrence of Russian officers serving in Serbia only
buttressed this opinion. The British journal contended that the presence of these officers,
serving openly in Russian uniform increased the carnage and destruction of the war.44 It
was not just presence of Russian officers in the Serbian army that implied Russian
participation in the conflict. The Conservative government and Pall Mall Gazette agreed
that the onset of the Serbian-Ottoman war created the opportunity the Russian
government sought to directly intervene in the Balkans. This chance proved short lived,
however, as the Ottomans managed to defeat the Serbians and forced the smaller state to
request an armistice.45 The pause in fighting allowed the European Great Powers to
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successfully demand a meeting of the Great Powers to decide how to end the instability
in the Balkans.
At the Conference at Constantinople, Salisbury and his Russian counterpart
Ignatiev worked together to establish reforms acceptable to both the Ottoman Empire and
the European Great Powers. Despite this cooperation, both the Pall Mall Gazette and
Disraeli reiterated claims that the Russians looked for a reason to attack the Ottoman
Empire, they did not seek a peaceful settlement of the Balkan instability. This distrust of
Russian motives made Salisbury’s task as a plenipotentiary able to complete negotiations
without direct involvement from Disraeli more difficult.46 The Pall Mall Gazette focused
on Salisbury’s ability to discover Russian motives at the Conference at Constantinople.
The journal declared this a paramount concern as the whole of the Eastern Question,
including the possible necessity of British intervention, depended “on the unknown
policy of Russia.”47 This view contradicted the frequent statements from the Russian
government regarding its intentions. The Russian government, through its representative
Ignatiev, made it clear that it wanted good government for the Balkan Christians, not
conquest of Balkan territory.48 These reassurances did little to deflect the blame from the
Russians for the Balkan instability. They also failed to provide confidence that the
Russian government wanted order restored at the Conference at Constantinople. The Pall
Mall Gazette reflected these suspicious attitude of the Conservative government,
contemplating what the Russians really wanted at the meeting rather than what they said
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they wanted. The journal decided that if Ignatiev demanded the Russian occupation of
Bulgaria at the Conference at Constantinople and then the Russian government declared
war on the Ottoman Empire, it proved the treacherous nature of Russian diplomacy. The
war caused by this duplicity, the Pall Mall Gazette continued, would be “the most
wanton, unrighteous, unchristian war that has ever graced the civilized world.”49
The British press and government focused the majority of their skepticism toward
Russia, reflecting the state of British Near East policy since the Crimean war. Disraeli
and the Pall Mall Gazette saw Russia as being behind every challenge to Ottoman
authority in the Near East, even though the Russian government continually denied any
such involvement. When the Russian government began clamoring for enforceable
change following the Bulgarian Atrocities, Disraeli immediately dismissed any
suggestion that the Russians wanted to help the Christians.50 The anti-Russian portion of
the British government and press instead charged the Russians with both instigating and
escalating the revolts in order to destabilize the Ottoman Empire and then move in to
conquer Balkan territory.51 This skepticism strengthened as the diplomatic attempts to
resolve the Eastern Question failed and the Russians declared war. At this point,
traditional Russophobia overrode the anti-Ottoman sentiment which had reached a high
point with the Bulgarian Atrocities. From the onset of the Russo-Turkish War to the
culmination of the Congress of Berlin, Disraeli and the Pall Mall Gazette highlighted all
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the ways in which the Russians could possibly be showing their true expansionist
intentions.
The Conference at Constantinople’s failure to resolve the outstanding Balkan
issues only heightened Disraeli and the Pall Mall Gazette’s interest in the Russian
government’s next step in the Near East. Though the Russo-Turkish War did not
immediately follow the Ottoman Empire’s rejection of the conference’s proposals, many
within the Conservative government and press viewed a conflict as imminent. The Pall
Mall Gazette argued that the Russians pursued a justification for military intervention that
would allow them to conquer Balkan territory by demanding a European mandate to
protect Christians in the region.52 When the other European Great Powers refused to give
the Russians this authorization and the Ottomans demonstrated their unwillingness to
reform in order to end the revolts, the Russian government declared war on the Ottoman
Empire. The accusations against the Russians only intensified after they declared war on
the Ottomans, a war the Tsar argued came from the Ottoman Empire’s refusal to accept
reform through diplomacy. The Conservative government decided that since Russia was
the driving force behind the Balkan Revolts then it was solely responsible for the
consequent Russo-Turkish War.53 By not reiterating his initial aspiration of simply
providing good government to the Balkan Christians, the Tsar’s intentions in the RussoTurkish War appeared far more aggressive than before, further provoking claims from the
Pall Mall Gazette and Conservative government that the Russian government pushed for
events in the Near East to develop in such a way that rationalized a Russian declaration of
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war on the Ottoman Empire.54 To the Conservative elements within British society
represented by Disraeli and the Pall Mall Gazette, the nature of the fighting in the war
proved that the Russians did not fight for they Christians, they fought for territorial gain
in the Near East.55 As evidence of this, Disraeli and the Pall Mall Gazette highlighted the
reports of Russian excesses that were comparable to the Bulgarian Atrocities.56 Stories
such as those depicting attacks on Jewish and Muslim populations by Balkan Christians
supported by the Russian army permeated the British jingoistic journal’s columns.
Disraeli and the Pall Mall Gazette did not limit their accusations regarding the
Near East Crisis to the Russians. They both also attributed blame for events on
Bismarck’s diplomacy. The German Chancellor represented the illiberal methods used to
unify and govern Germany, making that state an ideological opponent of British
liberalism but to a lesser degree than they did with the Russians. Bismarck’s ambiguous
diplomacy, his refusal to clearly define his future foreign policy or Germany’s interests in
the Near East, created distrust that remained in a limited fashion at the Congress of
Berlin.57 To blame him for events in the Near East Crisis, Disraeli and the Pall Mall
Gazette linked his vague diplomacy to the Russians’ willingness to use more aggressive
methods to resolve the Eastern Question. They argued the Russian government
interpreted Bismarck giving implicit approval to act as it wanted in the Near East as long
as it did not injure the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s interests there. He, they continued,
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promoted this opinion by not overtly restraining Russia in the Balkans because that was
unnecessary to support his Near East policy which focused on maintaining the Austrian
position in the Balkans.58
Disraeli and the Pall Mall Gazette distrusted Bismarck as much as they did the
Russian government, but for different reasons and with different effects. The German
government blatantly stated it had no territorial interests in the Near East as long as the
Austro-Hungarian Empire remained unthreatened.59 Bismarck insisted that the German
government only sought “benevolent neutrality” and enforceable reforms for the Balkan
provinces, but also admitted that the Balkan Christians did not matter as much as
maintaining European peace.60 Despite Bismarck repeating this opinion throughout the
Near East Crisis, the Conservative government remained suspicious of Bismarck and his
diplomacy. Unlike the Russian government, the German government did not define its
Near East policy based on helping the Balkan Christians, rather it developed its policy
around maintaining European peace.61 This base for German Near East policy did not
openly contradict that of either Great Britain or Russia, but both governments continually
criticized Bismarck’s diplomacy.
The Pall Mall Gazette supported Disraeli’s government’s disapproval of
Bismarck’s ambiguous diplomacy, arguing that he intended not to preserve peace but to
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push Russia toward war.62 This view epitomized his position at the Congress of Berlin.
Here the consistent British mistrust of Bismarck and his diplomacy became secondary to
his ability to mediate between the Great Powers like he had between perpetual enemies
Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire.63 In place of that distrust, Bismarck became
the “honest broker,” completing his goal of becoming Europe’s arbiter. The Pall Mall
Gazette highlighted the British and European skepticism about Bismarck’s Near East
policy, particularly the view that he wanted Russia to go to war in order to weaken that
state, easing pressure on the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and making it unlikely that
Germany could be threatened by a Franco-Russian alliance. The British journal also
indicated a persistent opinion that Bismarck waited for Great Britain to become
enmeshed in a conflict with Russia in the Near East so that he can use the opportunity to
take either the Netherlands or Belgium.64
Bismarck, according to the Conservative British press, sought to use British and
Russian conflict in the Near East as an opportunity to take territory in Western Europe.
This goal, the journals continued, motivate Bismarck to support the Russian declaration
of war on the Ottoman Empire, and this approval gave the Russian government the
confidence necessary to start the Russo-Turkish War, thus Bismarck was the cause of it.65
Disraeli and the Pall Mall Gazette continued to stress the effects of Bismarck’s inaction
against Russian aggression in the Near East. This focus failed to address the negative
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effects the British government’s provocative actions in the Balkans had on Russian and
Ottoman diplomacy in the region. At the Congress of Berlin, this changed and Bismarck
gained British support for his diplomacy, while losing it from the Russian government.
At this meeting, the German Chancellor successfully emerged as the “honest broker” in
British opinion. At the same time, however, the Russian government blamed him for its
losses, thereby making him and the German government responsible for the terms of the
treaty of Berlin and its consequences.
The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, like the Pall Mall Gazette, responded to
Near East events in a way that promoted their state’s position while questioning the
actions of the other European Great Powers. In this type of coverage, the German ‘semiofficial’ journal differed from the Kölnische Zeitung, as it actively accused the British
government and Disraeli of working for British Near East interests rather than trying to
resolve the Near East Crisis in the interest of all involved. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung, with these accusations, also challenged those critiques of Bismarck’s Near East
policies coming from the British press. The German journal dismissed British and
Russian claims that the German government and Bismarck deserved blame for the Near
East Crisis. Instead it focused on the behavior of Disraeli and his government in regards
to the Near East and how that led to the intensification of the Near East Crisis., which
served to underscore Disraeli’s foreign policy’s threat to German interests, especially in
Europe.66 The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung condemned Disraeli’s continued
support for the Ottoman Empire, despite that state’s continued refusal to protect of all its
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subjects from a corrupt administrative system.67 The German journal pointed to
Disraeli’s unwillingness to agree to the Three Emperors’ League’s proposals as a reason
that the Ottoman Empire rejected them and then began to use more destructive methods
to suppress the revolts. To prove this point, the newspaper emphasized Elliot’s approval
for the Ottoman Empire’s ability to stem the tide of revolt in the Balkans, which appeared
to provide tacit support from the British government for the Bulgarian Atrocities.68 The
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung’s skepticism toward the British action and its effects
on the Near East increased to a fever pitch by the time of the Conference at
Constantinople.
While Russia represented the most dangerous threat to the Ottoman Empire’s
sovereignty according to the British, for many Germans the British epitomized as
significant a concern to the status quo in the Near East. Disraeli’s overt pro-Ottoman
Near East policy was not popular following the Balkan Revolts and only appeared worse
following the Bulgarian Atrocities. Disraeli defended his government’s policy by
stressing Europe’s need for the Ottoman Empire to exist as it in order to maintain peace.
Disraeli, rather than addressing the Ottoman Empire’s problematic and provocative
behavior, instead highlighted the threat posed to all of Europe from both Russian and
German aggression. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung criticized this viewpoint,
questioning why Disraeli needed to accept and perpetuate the Ottoman Empire’s
continued existence as it was without even pushing for reforms.
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Bismarck and the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung did not accept Disraeli’s
contention that the Ottoman Empire could and would reform without pressure.69 The
German journal argued that the British government only sought to protect its own Near
East interests, even if that meant maintaining a corrupt Ottoman Empire unchanged.70
The British government tried to portray many of its much threatening behavior, such as
moving a naval squadron closer to the Balkan coast, as a way to provide safety for the
Balkan Christians that was not being provided by the conquering Russians.71 The
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung indicated that many in Germany thought there was
another reason it was sent, namely to keep the Russians from pushing the Ottoman
Empire to collapse.
There was both foreign and domestic criticism of Disraeli’s government’s efforts
to prevent intervention in the Near East. The two most significant critiques from both
home and abroad emerged from questions regarding the contemporary validity of the
Treaty of Paris itself. In Parliament, Disraeli tried to declare the Russian actions
illegitimate according to the Treaty of Paris because the treaty forbade European
intervention in Ottoman affairs. This stance, however, prompted his parliamentary
opposition to reference the British government’s repeated interference in the Near East
that according to Disraeli’s definition violated the treaty. Disraeli’s critics also pointed
out that what the Russians did was not necessarily a violation of the treaty because the

69

Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, November 7, 1876, 2.

70

Ibid., December 28, 1877, 2.

71

Blake, 588.

86

document did not prohibit European support for the Balkan Christians.72 The other claim
referenced the treaty’s obligation to protect the Ottoman Empire’s Balkan Christians.
According to the Treaty of Paris, the Ottoman government accepted responsibility
for assuring its Christian subjects received fair treatment in exchange for the European
Great Powers guaranteeing the Ottoman Empire’s territorial sovereignty. When the
Ottoman government failed to do this, according to Disraeli’s opposition, it violated the
treaty thereby making it null and void. They also argued that this earlier violation and
nullification of the Treaty of Paris by the Ottoman Empire mooted Disraeli’s
condemnation of Russian actions against the agreement.73 The Russian government’s
undertaking to try and aid the Balkan Christians represented to many within Germany, as
well as Russia, an attempt by a Great Powers, Russia, to finally force the Ottoman
Empire to reform.74
Disraeli’s critics took the opportunity offered by his behavior toward events in the
Near East Crisis not only to question his policies but also the nature of British interests in
the Near East overall. Critics in the British Parliament regarding Disraeli’s Near East
policy focused on the Treaty of Paris. They argued that the British government
continuously interfered in the Ottoman Empire, which violated the treaty. These
politicians objected to moving British troops from India to Malta, as well as sending the
British navy to the Straits, because these actions constituted the direct intervention the
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Conservative government objected to from Russia.75 Foreign critics made similar
observations. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung wanted to know why Disraeli and
his government seemed so intent on defending the Ottoman Empire at all costs.76 It
argued that the British government preventing European intervention only made the
Balkan Christians’ lives worse while also making it less likely the Ottoman government
would agree to any reforms without overt force.77 The German journal became more
hostile in its criticism as the British presence in the Near East increased. It claimed that
though he did not directly intervene in the Russo-Turkish War, “John Bull” affected the
course of the war with embargoes against Russia and direct aid to the Ottoman Empire.78
Disraeli’s critics also challenged the Conservatives’ opinion regarding the supposed
threat Russia posed in the Near East. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung and other
detractors argued that Disraeli could not justify British intervention in the Near East by
simply alluding to the “Russian Bogey” that wants to destroy the Ottoman Empire when
the British also had ulterior motives in the Balkans.79
The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, much like Disraeli’s critics in the British
press and Parliament, questioned his opposition to Russian involvement in the Balkans
while continuing to overtly involve the British government in Ottoman affairs. The
German journal argued that the Treaty of Paris did not preclude outside intervention to
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aid the Christians, rather it provided appropriate responses to aggressive attacks on the
Ottoman Empire from other powers.80 The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung urged the
British government to quit defending the Ottoman Empire and allow the Christians to be
free of the Ottoman “yoke.”81According to the German newspaper, the Russians sought
to reassert their position as the protector of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire, thus
their invasion did not necessitate the responses dictated by the treaty.82 Both Bismarck
and the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung viewed Russian intervention in the Near East
as justified, seeing the Ottoman Empire’s refusal to produce the reforms promised by the
Treaty of Paris as enough of a reason to warrant European intervention.83 They both also
criticized Disraeli’s hypocritical stance that allowed him to send the British navy to the
Straits, despite the Sultan’s request for him to remove the ships, while condemning all
other attempts by European Great Powers to address the problems in the Near East.84
Bismarck refused to join with the British and Austrian demands that the Russians halt
their advance through Ottoman territory and sign an armistice with the Ottoman Empire.
He also denounced those critics that argued the continued Russian advance proved that
the Russian government wanted territory and not to aid the Balkan Christians.85 This
view reflected the German government’s opinion on the subject, but Bismarck declined
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to openly support either the Russian or the British view, as he did not want to alienate
either of the two powers because that could lead them to ally with France.86
Throughout the Near East Crisis, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung
highlighted the growing interests Disraeli had in involving the British government in the
Near East. The German journal reflected a recurring European opinion that the British
Prime Minister took advantage of the first opportunity to undermine the Russian efforts
in the Balkans.87 The Treaty of San Stefano gave Disraeli the chance he needed, and he
used it to demand the Congress of Berlin. The Congress of Berlin, the Norddeutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung contended, also resulted from British demands, even as the other
Great Powers accepted and supported the petition. The German newspaper criticized the
British response to the Russo-Turkish War, denouncing Disraeli’s obvious desire to
involve the British in the war to protect British interests.88
Like most European journals, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung approved of
the need for the Congress of Berlin, but it did not agree with all of the meeting’s results.
In particular, the German journal disapproved of the fact that the Austro-Hungarian
Empire received territory, while Germany did not.89 The newspaper also questioned the
fact that Disraeli and the British government achieved so much with the Cyprus
Convention while the Russians lost almost all of its war gains and the Ottoman Empire
remained in Europe. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung concluded that the Congress
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of Berlin’s results indicated that the driving force behind events in the Near East was
Disraeli’s interest in expanding British influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.90
The Liberal Party in Great Britain and the Near East Crisis
The Pall Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung introduced another
significant actor in the Near East Crisis: the Liberal Party in Great Britain. The Times
and Kölnische Zeitung did not emphasize the effects of the reemergence of the Liberal
Party like the two ‘semi-official’ journals. While dealing with the conflicting interests of
the other Great Powers, Disraeli also had to manage the consequences coming from the
reemergence of the Liberal Party in British politics. Previous to the Near East Crisis, the
Liberal Party constituted a weak opposition party. Disraeli could, and did, largely ignore
its criticisms of how he managed British foreign policy. The plight of the Balkan
Christians produced an issue that the Liberals could use to build a new base of consensus
in the British public, especially following the Bulgarian Atrocities, due to Disraeli’s
unpopular handling of the situation and the British public’s increased support for
Ottoman reforms advocated by Liberal Party leaders. With the renewed interest in the
Balkan Christians from “the virtuous masses” of the British public, Disraeli’s primary
domestic political opponent, Gladstone, reentered British politics. The Liberal Party used
the anti-Ottoman agitation in Great Britain to attack the Conservative government’s
foreign policy, limiting British government’s ability to deal with the Near East Crisis, as
the Liberals insisted on critiquing and stalling Disraeli’s Near East plans in an
unprecedented way. Previously during Disraeli’s tenure, his government managed
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foreign policy with little input, or even really concern, from the British public.91 The
Liberals’ anti-Ottoman agitation used the British press to criticize the British government
and prompt the British public to pressure the British government to change its Near East
policy.92
Disraeli and the Pall Mall Gazette both harshly condemned the Liberal Party’s
use of public agitation to inhibit British foreign policy. In particular, they criticized the
willingness of these political figures to use “emotional” responses to undermine
“rational” political interests in the Near East.93 According to the British journal, the
Liberal Party created a significant obstacle to the British government’s ability to manage
its Near East policy. The British journal contended that “the incidents of the rebellion in
Bulgaria have unfortunately afforded the incendiaries of the press and of Parliament too
many opportunities of stirring up an irregular and passionate movement of the public
emotions, and the dangerous forces of this moral upheaval have been directed with
mischievous skill against the national policy of England.”94
The Pall Mall Gazette attributed all of these public manifestations of antiOttoman agitation to Liberal Party actors. It also criticized the Liberals for using the antiOttoman agitation to attack the Conservatives, not to impel the British government to
help the Balkan Christians, but to drive the Conservatives out of power.95 The British
newspaper chose to dismiss all criticism coming from the Liberal Party, going so far as to
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equate the “sin” of the Ottoman Empire of allowing the Bulgarian Atrocities to happen
and rewards the perpetrators with the Liberals’ “wickedness” for giving the British
government some responsibility for the Bulgarian Atrocities. By doing this, the British
journal argued, the Liberal Party commits and “injustice” to their government due simply
to a difference in opinion as the government feels “the burden of responsibility for the
direction and conduct of national policy” and thus cannot afford to be swayed by the
public opinion like the Opposition could.96 The Pall Mall Gazette continued its hostility
to the Liberal Party following the onset of the Russo-Turkish War, despite the fact that
British public opinion returned to its traditional Russophobia and support for Disraeli’s
Near East policy. The Liberal Party, according to the journal, made the British
government look foolish and incapable of controlling its own population, which made
Disraeli’s attempt to mediate between the other Great Powers look ludicrous.97
Gladstone epitomized, according to the Pall Mall Gazette, the danger posed by
the Opposition to Disraeli’s government’s Near East policy, despite not being the Party’s
leader. He led the appeals for anti-Ottoman agitation, especially after the Bulgarian
Atrocities. Gladstone specifically wanted reforms that threatened the Ottoman Empire’s
territorial sovereignty. At least the Pall Mall Gazette and the Conservative government
held this opinion. His calls for the British government to step in and do something to
protect the Balkan Christians, even if it meant the Ottoman Empire losing territory,
prompted claims of hypocrisy. Gladstone’s participation in the Crimean war cabinet that

96

Ibid., August 30, 1876, 1-2.

97

Ibid., January 24, 1878, 1-2.

93

so adamantly defended the Ottoman Empire’s territorial sovereignty made his postBulgarian Atrocities stance problematic.98 The Pall Mall Gazette supported Gladstone’s
insistence that the Ottoman Empire should be removed “bag and baggage” from Bulgaria
after the Bulgarian Atrocities. The British jingoistic journal, however, questioned his
omission of what should replace the Ottoman government. It also asked where the
Ottomans living in the areas should go once they left Bulgaria.99
According to Disraeli and the Pall Mall Gazette, Gladstone wanted to use the
British public’s response to the Bulgarian Atrocities, to pressure the British government
to turn away from its traditional, and successful, Near East policy. They contended that
this change would lead to Russian expansion in both the eastern Mediterranean and
central Asia.100 The British journal’s censure of Gladstone’s attacks on the British
government surged following the Russian successes in the Russo-Turkish War, despite
public opinion reverting from supporting anti-Ottoman agitation back to its traditional
Russophobia.
The Liberal Party’s challenge to Disraeli’s government received attention on the
Continent as well as from within Great Britain itself, which the Pall Mall Gazette argued
undermined the British government’s position among the European Great Powers during
the Near East Crisis. The British jingoistic journal reported and challenged Gladstone
each time he spoke against the British government. According to the Pall Mall Gazette,
the Liberal Party’s agitation led to the Russians increasing their demands as it looked like
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the British would do whatever necessary, including give up British interests in the Near
East, to save the Ottoman Empire.101 The Liberals’ claims that the British government
continued to give the Ottoman Empire “moral support,” though not true, the British
journal continued, embarrassed the government by making it appear that it gave the
Ottoman government unconditional support even after the Bulgarian Atrocities.102
Gladstone’s attacks on Lord Derby also received significant attention in the Pall
Mall Gazette. Gladstone challenged Lord Derby’s inaction and justification for that
hesitancy. Lord Derby, as British Foreign Secretary, represented British foreign policy,
thus his decisions reflected the British government’s opinions, making Gladstone’s
attacks on him signify strikes against the of the Conservative government. The Pall Mall
Gazette argued with Gladstone that it represented the majority of British public opinion
as it expressed the satisfaction with the British public’s support for Disraeli’s war credit
request. The British jingoistic journal was sure that the fact that British public opinion
applauded the British Parliament’s approval of the war loans gave Gladstone “fits.”103
The Pall Mall Gazette, however, did warn the British government that if it did not react
to the challenges presented by the Liberal Party, both in the British press and in
Parliament, that the British would soon lose their position of power in Near East
diplomacy.104

101

Pall Mall Gazette, October 5, 1876, 1-2.

102

Ibid., July 11, 1876, 1-2.

103

Pall Mall Gazette, July 4, 1877, 1-2, May 9, 1878, 1-2.

104

Ibid., June 10, 1876, 2-3.

95

The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung recognized the effect the reemergence of
the Liberal Party had on British politics. Unlike the Pall Mall Gazette, the German
journal viewed the Liberal Party as representing the true opinions of the British public,
which demanded Ottoman reform.105 The journal wondered why the British government
did not address the desire of the population like the Liberal Party did in reference to the
Near East Crisis. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung did not view the Liberals’
actions as undermining the British government, rather it viewed the Liberal Party as
advocating the stance the British government should take.106 The German journal,
however, did recognize the possible challenge posed by the ideals behind the Liberal
Party-inspired agitation to Disraeli’s government. The debates prompted by the Liberals,
according to the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, were necessary in getting the British
government to act in coordination with the Three Emperors’ League against the Ottoman
Empire.107 While the German newspaper recognized the importance of the Liberal Party
in pushing the British government to change its Near East policy, it also observed the
negative portrayal of the effects of the Liberals’ challenges within the British press. The
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung linked the opinions of Conservative British journals
such as the Pall Mall Gazette to Disraeli’s interests in the Near East. This connection
prompted the German journal to dismiss these journals’ criticisms of the Liberal Party.
The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung concluded that these newspapers only represented
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the opinion of those that would defend the Ottoman Empire at all costs. They did not
indicate overall British public opinion.108 This opinion reinforced the Pall Mall Gazette’s
belief that the Liberal Party’s agitation negatively affected the British government’s
ability to conduct diplomacy with the other Great Powers.109
Conclusion
The Near East Crisis created an environment of hostility and suspicion that
threatened to provoke a general European war. The Pall Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung’s coverage of events in the Near East contributed to this situation.
Unlike the ‘official’ journals, the Times and Kölnische Zeitung, these ‘semi-official’
journals actively supported their government’s self-interested policies. They promoted
their government’s actions by attacking those taken by the other Great Powers. This
jingoistic sentiment and its focus on the European Great Powers’ Near East interests had
a significant role in almost transforming a regional confrontation between the Ottoman
Empire and its provinces into a European-wide conflict. Despite this growing presence,
even at the end of the Near East Crisis the diplomatic leaders could still negotiate without
addressing the negative effects of the jingoistic journals’ articles when they wanted to do
so. The long term consequences of this type of attacking journalism, however, emerged
in full force following the Jameson Raid, which will be discussed in Chapter Five.
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CHAPTER IV
THE NEAR EAST CRISIS AND THE SATIRICAL JOURNALS

Figure 4.1

Um den heiligen Krieg möglichst zu localisiren-It Is Possible to Localize the
Holy War

Kladderadatsch July 1, 1877
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The potential ramifications for Europe from the Near East Crisis did not escape
the interest of Punch and Kladderadatsch. Both satirical journals recognized that the
Balkan instability could expand and envelop the European Great Powers in a general
conflict if parameters were not set to localize the problem. In “Um den heiligen Kreig
möglichst zu localisieren,” (“It Is Possible to Localize the Holy war; Figure 4.1),
Kladderadatsch illustrated the belief that the Russians would not allow its conflict with
the Ottoman Empire, the Russo-Turkish War, to spread beyond the Balkans. The image
reflected the German view that the Russian government would fulfill its promise to aid
the Balkan Christians with their struggles with the Ottoman Empire. It also showed the
intense interest that the British and Austrian governments had in the confrontation. In the
image, Great Britain and the Austro-Hungarian Empire focus their attention on the
Ottoman Empire’s middle section (Bulgaria/Balkans) as Russia explains its intentions.
Meanwhile, Otto von Bismarck sits in the shadows preparing surgical equipment
presumably to repair the expected damage from the conflict to prevent the Ottoman
Empire’s or Russia’s death. The cartoon illustrated the European Great Powers’ interests
and concerns during the Near East Crisis with few words but with substantial effect that
reflected the way in which Punch and Kladderadatsch portrayed the Near East Crisis as a
whole.1
Punch and Kladderadatsch both date from the tumultuous 1840s, when the British
and Prussian governments (Punch published in London, Kladderadatsch in Berlin) faced
considerable social and political challenges. The two satirical journals provided a
critical, yet respectful, interpretation of foreign events. They each also provided a
1
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supportive but satirical voice regarding their governments’ actions. The Near East Crisis
provided an opportunity for Punch and Kladderadatsch to comment on events that
involved their states’ role in international diplomacy. I argue in this chapter that an
analysis of the cartoons from these satirical journals showed that they both closely
followed the Near East Crisis and illustrated a clear opinion on Near East events.
The cartoons presented in this chapter represent the images, both metaphorical
and based on real people, Punch and Kladderadatsch utilized to portray the Near East
Crisis and the actions and interests of the Great Powers during that period. The two
satirical journals illustrated Near East events with recognizable metaphors. They used
images of women, children, and animals, as well as cartoons involving different forms of
popular entertainment (theatre, horse-racing, and classical literature). A final type of
imagery that Punch and Kladderadatsch utilized to describe the Near East Crisis showed
the primary figures of diplomacy, Bismarck and Benjamin Disraeli, as well as the
fictional John Bull. All of the images the two satirical journals chose to illustrate Near
East events included their own characteristics that the British and German publics
immediately recognized and used to interpret the cartoons in Punch and Kladderadatsch.
This interpretation, I argue, allowed the readers to more easily understand the Near East
Crisis than they could simply by reading the ‘official’ and ‘semi-official’ journals.
Women Children, and Animals as Metaphors for Diplomacy
During the Near East Crisis of 1875-1878, Punch and Kladderadatsch did not
often use females to metaphorically indicate a state’s weakness. When they employed
female metaphors, however, they usually portrayed the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans.
In these cases, the females did not appear to have agency in their lives. This mirrored the
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mid-Victorian idea of a female’s role in determining her future, namely she did not have
much of one. When not used to portray helpless lesser powers, the female image
indicated a state’s limitations. For example, both journals used Britannia to represent
British public opinion at time when it objected to the British government’s inactions, but
could do little to change it. The images indicated the opinion that if a state could not act
like a Great Power presumably should, then it was inherently weak, like a female.2
By commencement of the Near East Crisis, the Ottoman Empire needed the
assistance of another Great Power to prevent its collapse. Benjamin Disraeli, the British
Prime Minister, wanted Great Britain to be that power, as he believed it necessary to keep
the Ottoman Empire territorially intact to prevent the Russian Empire from threatening
British dominance in India. The other independent state in the Balkan region, Greece,
was another potential problem for Great Britain. Greece’s successful war for
independence, which ended in 1824, represented the only significant change to the
Ottoman Empire’s territorial structure.
This sovereignty did not equate to diplomatic respectability and Greece still
needed assistance, from Great Britain in particular but also sometimes France, to assert
itself diplomatically. For example, in the months leading up to the Near East Crisis, the
Greek request for loans necessary to maintain its independence from the Ottoman Empire
caused the most significant issues in the Near East involving the European Great Powers.
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This issue was especially problematic for the British government as it did not want to
lose its special position with the Ottoman Empire by supporting the Greeks. At the same
time, the British wanted to maintain Greek independence, which put the British
government into potential conflict with the Ottoman Empire. Due to this conflict of
interests, the British government refused to full support either the Greek or Ottoman
demands. The inability of the Ottoman and Greek governments to effectively push their
interests found illustration in Punch and Kladderadatsch. The two satirical journals
portrayed these states as females for two reasons: to show the smaller states’ dependence
on the larger states and to indicate the European Great Powers’ interests in the lesser
powers.
During the 1870s, unlike in the later decades of the nineteenth century, female
largely remained in a position in which males in their lives made decisions for them.3
The last decades of the nineteenth century marked a transitional period in the role of
women publicly and privately. The challenges presented to the societal status quo by
movements such as feminism, socialism, and anti-imperialism prompted the society’s
leaders, at the point middle class and elite men to reinforce their hierarchical dominance.
These trials paralleled shifts occurring in society that emerged with advances in science
and technology. For example, the popularity of Social Darwinism provided the stalwarts
of established society with justification for maintaining their position. At the same time,
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however, the idea presented a specific target for those wanting more freedoms and power
to attack. The image of females able to effectively challenge the dominance of men in
colonial society created for the imperial powers another reason to ignore demands made
within the empires for autonomy or independence.4
While females remained without political power, they increasingly had control
over their personal lives. For example, during the late Victorian and early Edwardian
Eras, more females chose their husbands. The Social Darwinism so prevalent in opinions
regarding colonized peoples also played a significant role in the courtship process.
Pamphlets on choosing a spouse encouraged females to select a male based on his genetic
qualities (which included his morality), not on his financial or social position. These
suggestions undermined the economic and social underpinnings of so many marriages to
this point.5
Punch and Kladderadatsch reflected the view that females needed a male figure
to aid her in making decisions. They both also illustrated the notion that a female could
make a decision regarding which male would best suit her needs. This choice, however,
did not always appear wise according to the two satirical journals. Punch and
Kladderadatsch usually used female figures to represent the colonies or areas the Great
Powers wished to colonize, either territorially or economically. These women often
appeared capable of fending for themselves when left alone, therefore they admirable
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opponents to conquer and possess valuable assets to exploit. The areas represented by
these females, however, did not remain isolated, which meant they needed protection for
their own good. The primary point of contention regarding these regions between the
Great Powers then became who really wanted to safeguard them and who wanted to
exploit them. This marked a shift away from justifying colonization based merely on the
positive benefits of the enterprise for the colonizer toward using “The White Man’s
Burden” to defend taking possession of densely populated territory. Illustrating the states
over which the Great Powers contended as women allowed Punch and Kladderadatsch to
portray their need for protection from their state in order to avoid exploitation from
another Great Power. As with the using children to describe the smaller states, the image
of a vulnerable woman helped rationalize their state’s intent to control them while also
criticizing the other Great Powers’ actions. In both types of representation, the two
satirical journals show that their state only sought to protect the subject population while
all others interested merely wanted to exploit them. Neither journal mentioned the
women nor children having any agency in their future, with the male figure, or the Great
Power, dictating what will happen to them.
Much like the German government, Kladderadatsch did not indicate the same
supportive position toward the Ottoman Empire held by the British government. In
“Russland und Türkei schliessen aus freier Hand Frieden” (“Russia and Turkey Rule Out
Free Handed Peace; Figure 4.2), the German satirical journal indicated the view that the
Russian government would dictate the future of the Near East to the Ottoman Empire
after the Russo-Turkish War. The image referred to the preliminary negotiations for the
Treaty of San Stefano which ended the war. In the cartoon, Russia, who looked like Tsar
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Alexander III holds a scroll of Balkan Christian groups that at the time were agitating to
be free of Ottoman control. The caption read that this list was a prospectus of the peace
terms Russia would require the Ottoman Empire, in the cartoon a female, to accept. The
Ottoman Empire appeared to shy away from the demands but not object to them by
turning away completely. This reflected the Ottoman Empire’s inability to reject outright
the Russian government’s conditions for ending the war as well as showing the Russian
government’s perceived interest in fighting it. The Ottoman Empire as a female in this
image reflected the opinion that males dictated females’ futures. In this case, Russia’s
document laid out the Ottoman Empire’s future composition. Kladderadatsch also
echoed the German government’s more positive view of Russian diplomacy with this
image. According to the cartoon, the Russian government’s goals simply involved
freedom for the Balkan States, not any territorial advantage for Russia itself and the
Ottoman Empire could protest little unless another male (a European Great Power)
stepped in to alter her fate.6
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Figure 4.2

Russland und Türkei schliessen aus freir Hand Frieden-Russia and Turkey
Rule Out Free Handed Peace

Kladderadatsch, February 3, 1877

Unlike Kladderadatsch¸ Punch never characterized the Ottoman Empire as an
inherently weak female, echoing Disraeli’s opinion that the Ottoman Empire controlled
its own future.7 The British satirical journal illustrated the other independent state in the
Balkans dependent on assistance from the European Great Powers, Greece, as a female
needing a male escort to guide her through the Near East Crisis. In the cartoon “Mr.
Bull’s Little Partner” (Figure 4.3), Punch showed Greece as a young female waiting
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outside of the Congress of Berlin. John Bull asked her if he could escort her into the
meeting, and she accepted while noting she did not have a choice if she wanted to attend.
The accompanying poem noted all of the reasons that Greece could not count on the
Three Emperors’ League to consider its interests at the meeting because those
governments focused on the future of the Ottoman Empire with little regard to the
interests of other states in the region. Here, Punch echoed the British government’s
distrust of the intentions of the Three Emperors’ League toward the Near East toward the
Three Emperors’ League’s intentions in the Near East. Greece represented a steady and
dependent ally that Great Britain could guide into the Congress of Berlin and whose
interests it could use to block the expansion of the influence of the other Balkan states in
the Near East.8
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Figure 4.3

Mr. Bull’s Little Partner

Punch March 23, 1878

Punch and Kladderadatsch both illustrated weaker powers during the Near East
Crisis with a female image, but they differed on which state warranted that
characterization. This difference indicated the opinions held by both the journals and the
British and German governments regarding the challenges to the Ottoman Empire during
108

this period. By not showing the Ottoman Empire as a female, Punch reflected the British
government’s view that the Ottoman Empire could maintain its sovereignty by itself.9 By
illustrating Greece as a female the British satirical journal highlighted the Greek
dependence on British involvement for its continued independence. Kladderadatsch,
however, indicated the German government’s opinion that the Ottoman Empire would
collapse without outside intervention.10 These metaphors of weak females clearly
reflected the two journals’ and governments’ attitudes toward the political actors
involved in the Near East Crisis.
During the Near East Crisis, both Punch and Kladderadatsch utilized the image of
Britannia, distinct from John Bull, to indicate British public opinion. The Britannia
image has a long history in Great Britain, dating back to the Roman Period. She
appeared throughout literature for generations and during the reign of Charles II on
British coins. By the 1870s, she represented the traditional Victorian virtues “of Truth,
Justice, Bravery and the Empire.” Dressed like a female warrior with armor, a helmet,
and weaponry, she appeared ready to defend those with force if necessary as.11 In both
journals, Britannia represented a strong female capable of pursuing her own interests in
relation to the British government’s policies. Increasingly during this period images such
as Britannia and John Bull, a character that will be discussed later in this chapter,
indicated a public opinion separate from the government. The journals used Britannia in
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a way that indicated the view that the British public could push back against the British
government if it wanted to do so.
Both negative and positive attributes of Britannia emerged in Punch and
Kladderadatsch. The differing opinions depended on in which of the two newspapers the
image appeared and how the British government acted in different situations.
Kladderadatsch attributed more conniving and malicious characteristics to Britannia, or
British public opinion, while not outright attacking the British government. In contrast,
Punch illustrated Britannia as British public opinion that objected to both the initial
inaction of the British government and Disraeli’s later push for war for war against
Russia.
Kladderadatsch, like others in the German government and German press, as
discussed in previous chapters, distrusted the nature of British diplomacy during the Near
East Crisis. With their refusal to cooperate with the Three Emperors’ League’s attempts
to force the Ottoman Empire to reform, it appeared to many European diplomats and
newspapermen that the British had ulterior motives. The German satirical journal,
following Punch’s example, illustrated British public opinion with Britannia. The way in
which Kladderadatsch utilized the image of Britannia indicated that it did not trust the
British government’s involvement in the Near East. In “Du stolzes England-schäme
dich!,” (“You Proud England-Shame Yourself!”; Figure 4.4), the German satirical journal
critiqued the British government’s protection of the Ottoman Empire following the
Bulgarian Atrocities, as well as the perceived support shown by the British public. In the
cartoon, an armed Britannia shielded the Ottoman Empire, who had a knife to his
enemy’s throat, from the Three Emperors’ League. Kladderadatsch argued that
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protecting the Ottoman Empire after the Bulgarian Atrocities sullied British honor.
Using Britannia rather than any other figure, such as Disraeli or Lord Derby, to represent
Great Britain in this instance indicated that the German satirical journal viewed British
public opinion in favor of this protection. The inclusion of a weapon for Britannia
showed that she, and through representation the British public, would defend the Ottoman
Empire against outside interference with force if necessary.12
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Figure 4.4

Du stolzes England-schäme dich!-You Proud England Shame Yourself

Kladderadatsch, September 17, 1876

According to Kladderadatsch, when the threat of force failed to produce the
intended results, the British government tried to divide the Three Emperors’ League. In
the cartoon “Wirklicher Geheimer Neutralitäts-Rath,” (“Private Council of Neutrality;
Figure 4.5), the German satirical journal illustrated a different, albeit just as suspicious,
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side of British diplomacy. The image showed Bismarck being pulled by both Britannia
and Russia, she holding a cup of tea and Russia holding a sword. In the caption
Kladderadatsch urged Bismarck to heed the warning from Britannia about maintaining
peace and not be “ensnared” by the Russian government’s interest in taking action in the
Near East. Here, the German journal showed Britannia trying to induce Bismarck to
abandon the path he chose in cooperation with the Three Emperors’ League to push
reform on the Ottoman Empire. This cartoon also critiqued the avowed neutrality by
Great Britain. By trying to draw Bismarck to stand with her and not Russia, Britannia
undermined the British government’s claim of neutrality and not interfere at all in the
situation.13

13

Kladderadatsch, November 5, 1876.
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Figure 4.5

Wirklicher Geheimer Neutralitäts-Rath-Private Council of Neutrality

Kladderadatsch November 5, 1876

Punch’s portrayed Britannia in an altruistic manner. Throughout this period, the
British journal utilized Britannia’s image to counter Disraeli illustrating the British
government. The British satirical journal utilized Britannia to show, the British
government as well as other observers, how British public opinion objected to the proOttoman stance taken by Disraeli in the Near East Crisis. In the wake of the Bulgarian
Atrocities, most segments of the British press criticized Disraeli’s unwillingness to act in
support of the Balkan Christians. Punch participated in this critique, imploring the
British government to respond in some fashion. In “Neutrality Under Difficulties”
(Figure 4.6), the British satirical journal showed Britannia appealing to do something to
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stop the carnage behind her. He responded by arguing that he could do nothing about it
because he could not find the Bulgarian Atrocities in his “official reports.” Here, unlike
in Kladderadatsch, Punch indicated that Britannia, and thus British public opinion,
wanted the British government to act to protect the Balkan Christians and not the
Ottoman Empire.14 It also showed that British public opinion did not want the same
things as Disraeli sought with his diplomacy. It further indicated the British public’s
efforts to defend their demands against the interests of the British government’s
leadership.

14

Punch, August 5, 1876.

115

Figure 4.6

Neutrality Under Difficulties

Punch August 5, 1876

The collapsing Ottoman war effort during the Russo-Turkish War prompted
Disraeli to advocate British intervention in the conflict. According to Punch, however,
the British public did not support this shift. In “On the Dizzy Brink” (Figure 4.7) the
British satirical journal indicated the hesitancy in the British government and public to
join Disraeli’s drive to war with Russia. In the cartoon, Britannia pulled away from
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Disraeli not wanting to go any closer to the cliff. She told Disraeli that she was already
too close to the edge. On the other side of the ledge was “war” and it was already too
close for her comfort. This portrayal of British public opinion differed from that in
Kladderadatsch as Britannia fought Disraeli as opposed to going along with him.15

Figure 4.7

On the Dizzy Brink

Punch January 19, 1878

15

Punch, January 19, 1878.
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In all four of these portrayals, Britannia acted in the interests of British public
opinion. Her ability to behave as she wanted and even persuade the men with whom she
dealt to follow her guidance reflected the perceived strength of British public opinion on
the British government. This interpretation of those effects of Britannia’s agency
differed in Punch and Kladderadatsch depending on the journals’ support of or
opposition to the British government’s foreign policy. These portrayals of Britannia
reflected a more ambiguous characterization of women during the Victorian Era. Unlike
the females used to portray the Ottoman Empire and Greece, Britannia did not depend on
a male to determine her future. She could challenge the dominance of the male actors
from the other Great Powers.
By the mid-Victorian techniques for child-rearing were in a transformative
process. According to social scientists, parents increasingly maintained that they acted in
the best interests of their children even if the younger people had little voice in their own
lives. This opinion paralleled that regarding females in which they had little agency in
their own lives during this period, even thought it was gradually changing.16 During the
late nineteenth century, notions regarding the nature of raising children changed.17 Shifts
in a government’s role in controlling the lives of families created new relationships
between both parents and children and children and the state. The intent of state
governments to control their populations did not simply end with the adults. It also

Rebekka Habermas, “Parent-Child Relationships in the Nineteenth Century,” German History 16,
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affected the everyday existence of children. In particular, the growth of governmentcontrolled school systems began to dictate the schedules of those, especially in the middle
class, with school aged children.18 The expansion of these schools paralleled the
emergence of “disinterested parenting” which argued parents should act with the best
interests of their offspring but that they should decide on the course of action without
input from the children. This represented a marked change away from a reciprocal type
of parent-child relationship that emphasized interaction between the two groups.19 Punch
and Kladderadatsch reflected these new opinions regarding the status of children. Both
journals used the image of children now dependent on the adults in their lives to make
decisions for them.
Punch and Kladderadatsch utilized this view of a parent’s role in deciding their
offspring’s future when illustrating the position of the Balkan Christians during the Near
East Crisis. The Balkan Christians had the most at stake during the Near East Crisis.
Despite this fact, the European Great Powers largely ignored their interests during
diplomatic negotiations during this period, unless the larger states wanted to justify their
own actions by claiming to assist the Balkan Christians. The fate of the rebellious
subjects fighting to rid themselves of Ottoman oppression appeared to bother European
diplomats involved in the Near East Crisis very little.20 What they did worry about
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greatly were the likely consequences of the revolts on the Ottoman Empire’s territorial
integrity. With this in mind, many of these diplomats acted much like fathers of unruly
children. At least that is how Punch and Kladderadatsch taught their readerships to see
it. Punch and Kladderadatsch both indicated this opinion that the Balkan states needed
to be managed. For the journals, the Great Powers represented the parents supposedly
acting in the best interest of the Balkan Christians as their children.
Kladderadatsch indicated more sympathy for the Balkan Christians’ struggles
throughout the Near East Crisis than did Punch. The German satirical journal cynically
portrayed their efforts to pursue their goals in the Near East as doomed to fail. In “Die
Zangäste des congresses” (“The Fenced Off Congress”; Figure 4.8), Kladderadatsch
illustrated the Balkan states’ inability to have standing at the Congress of Berlin. In the
cartoon, the Balkan Christians appeared as children, wearing knee pants worn by boys
during this period, trying to push a door open. The sign on the door read “Complet!,”
indicating that the Great Powers had already completed their negotiations for the Near
East’s immediate future. The illustration of the Balkan Christians as children echoed the
European diplomats’ opinion that the Balkan Provinces’ leaders were in capable of
deciding their own fate. This view critiqued the diplomats’ contention that the Balkan
Christian did not need to be involved in deciding the future of the Ottoman Empire’s
presence in the Balkans.21

Politics, 1852-1886 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 198, Friedrich Curtius, ed., Memoirs of Prince
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Figure 4.8

Die Zangäste des Congresses-The Fenced Off Congress

Kladderadatsch June 23, 1878

Punch illustrated a similar view of the Balkan States as children whose
involvement in the Near East Crisis was rejected by the Great Powers as adult males. In
“Dame Europa’s Christmas Pudding,” (Figure 4.9), the British satirical journal showed
the Great Powers’ representatives to the Conference at Constantinople standing around a
pot labeled ‘conference.’ As the adult males add different ingredients into the pudding, a
child, a Balkan Christian, tried to help stir the concoction with his sword. Salisbury
pushed him away, telling him that he will ruin the pudding, or the effects of the
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conference, with his actions.22 The image indicated Punch’s opinion that the Great
Powers did not want the Balkan states to have a role at the Conference at Constantinople.
Like in Kladderadatsch, here too the Balkan Christian appeared as a child who could not
cook properly or take care of themselves, and whose future needed to be decided by
adults, reflecting the Great Powers.23

Figure 4.9

Dame Europa’s Christmas Pudding

Punch December 23, 1876

22

This refers to the common saying “Too many cooks ruins the pudding.”
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Punch, December 23, 1876.
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The Balkan Christians as children reflected the unwillingness of the Great
Powers’ governments to consider their interests in rebelling against the Ottoman Empire.
The Balkan Christians as naïve children represented the perceived illegitimacy of their
revolts. Punch and Kladderadatsch viewed the Great Powers as adult males making
decisions for the children under their care, as the Ottoman Empire’s Christians were
supposed protected by the Christian Great Powers. The Great Powers clearly made
choices to end the Balkan instability that benefitted the Ottoman Empire’s stability and
maintained peace in Europe. The diplomats made decisions they could argue were in the
best interest of not only themselves but also the Balkan Christians. What these options
did not do was to fulfill the demands of the Balkan Christians to be rid of Ottoman
control. Thus the smaller states’ wishes, like those of children, found little support
among the Great Powers, as adults.
As with the images of females and children, the use of animals as representations
of different states aid in analyzing the presses’ assumptions regarding Great Power
diplomacy during the Near East Crisis. Punch and Kladderadatsch both illustrated
events of the Crisis with animals reflecting the actions and interests of the powers
involved. They utilized the more recognizable images such as the British Lion and the
Russian Bear as well as more generic animals such as unidentified dogs.24 The two
journals employed these creatures and their characteristics to indicate their opinions of
the other governments. The different attributes referenced indicated the perceived
strengths or weaknesses of the Great Powers during the Near East Crisis. For example,

By the 1870s, the British Lion and Russian Bear had long illustrated Great Britain and Russia.
The Lion’s image came from the lion on the English coat of arms. The Bear represented the most
identifiable Russian animal.
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the Russian Bear appeared as an aggressive beast while the journals showed the Ottoman
Empire as skinny turkey, often being served up to the other Great Powers on a platter.
The animals also allowed the journals to account for the different behaviors of the states.
The traits inherent in the animals’ nature reflect the view that the states acted instinctively
and not necessarily rationally when dealing with the different Great Powers.
Kladderadatsch and Punch illustrated the Balkan states as dogs dependent on the
Great Powers as humans. The two satirical journals showed the dogs being led or
restrained by a human entity, indicating their opinion that the Balkans needed to be
controlled by a stronger power or they would follow their irrational animalistic instincts.
In “Alles um der armen türkischen Christen willen!” (“All for the Poor Turkish
Christians’ Sake!”; Figure 4.10), Kladderadatsch showed Russia as a man holding
another man, the Ottoman Empire, against a wall. While Russia restrained the Ottoman
Empire, he allowed the dogs, the Balkan states, to take tidbits out of the Ottoman
Empire’s pockets. The items the dogs pull from the captive man’s pockets represent
territorial concessions the Balkan states wanted from the Ottoman Empire. As Russia
held the Ottoman Empire against the wall, Germany distracted John Bull and the AustroHungarian Empire from observing the situation. Here, Kladderadatsch implied that if
Russia did not restrain the Ottoman Empire, the Balkan States could not force it to give
into their demands.25
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Kladderadatsch, November 26, 1876.
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Figure 4.10 Alles um der armen türkischen Christen willen!-All for the Poor Turkish
Christians’ Sake!
Kladderadatsch November 26, 1876

This image reflected the view that none of the Great Powers would step in to
assist the Balkan Christians, this meant that Russian coercion remained the only option
for Balkan reform as the Ottoman government would not change without outside
pressure. Germany distracting John Bull and the Austro-Hungarian Empire illustrated the
necessity to keep those two Great Powers from becoming involved in the process as both
states also had territorial designs on Ottoman possessions in the Balkans. It also
suggested that Germany and Russia were working together to bully the Ottoman Empire
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to give into their demands. If the British and Austrian governments recognized the
Russian government’s actions favoring of the Balkan Christians, they would protest and
demand concessions of their own to support the Balkan states’ acquisitions, further
destabilizing the Near East. The possibility that the Near East Crisis could intensify if
Great Britain and the Austro-Hungarian Empire interfered proved a significant problem
for the German government which is why Bismarck worked to keep them from
recognizing the changing situation, much like the German figure distracted John Bull and
the Austrian figure in the cartoon.26
Punch assumed, like many others in the British government and press, that Russia
controlled the actions of the Balkan revolutionaries against the Ottoman Empire. In the
cartoon “The Dogs of War” (Figure 4.11), the British satirical journal illustrated this
view. In the image, John Bull warned Russia that he needed to keep his “dogs,” the
Balkan states, leashed so they do not attack the man in the distance, the Ottoman Empire,
and make the situation “awkward.” John Bull, like many leading men in the British
government, presumed that Balkan states’ agitation represented the primary problem in
the Near East. The opinion that Russia, as the Slavic “brother” of those states, needed to
restrain them paralleled this view. The emergence of Pan-Slavism among the Russian
ruling elite only bolstered this opinion. John Bull’s comment, however, reflected the fact
that Russian involvement with the Balkan states at this point provided a way to keep the
rebellious Ottoman territories from provoking a European crisis. The use of John Bull
rather than Disraeli in the image indicated the opinion that the British public, unlike
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Kladderadatsch, November 26, 1876.
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Disraeli’s government, did not yet see Russia as an immediate threat. Later, the British
view changed and Russia no longer represented a restraint on the Balkan states but rather
a provocateur of further insurrection and rebellion against the Ottoman Empire.27

Figure 4.11 The Dogs of War
Punch June 17, 1876

27

Punch, June 17, 1876.
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Punch and Kladderadatsch included animal metaphors to illustrate international
diplomacy less frequently during the Near East Crisis than in subsequent decades. The
journals both used familiar images such as the Russian Bear and the British Lion to
illustrate those respective states. As with Britannia, these animalistic characterizations of
different states allowed Punch and Kladderadatsch to portray those states’ actions as
representative of the whole population and not simply their governments. These types of
representations increased the strength and potential danger of the critiques inherent in the
images because if Punch and Kladderadatsch utilized the animal metaphor to overtly
criticize another state’s actions or response, the interpretation appeared to attack the
whole of the other state’s population.
This type of illustration was also dangerous due to the connotations regarding
animal nature. If animals could not be reasoned with and needed a leash so that others
could control them, then using these images to describe a state’s or population’s behavior
was particularly insulting. These chained animals, unlike illustrations with Disraeli or
Bismarck, or another recognizable man, indicated Punch and Kladderadatsch’s view that
the population needed a man’s, or Great Powers, control to keep them from getting
unruly. In those cases where the animal personified a state, as in the cases below, the
animal took on more human characteristics which indicated they did not need others to
control their behavior.
Kladderadatsch provided little criticism of Russia’s drive toward Constantinople
during the Russo-Turkish War but did question why the “neutral” British government
protested the Russian advance as vigorously as it did. In “Man sucht kennt hinter der
Thür, wenn man nicht selbst schon dahinter gesteckt hat” (“Nobody Looks behind a Door
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if They Have Never Been behind It”; Figure 4.12), the German satirical journal criticized
Disraeli’s rush to intervene in the Near East between Russia and the Ottoman Empire.
The German newspaper cynically examined the British government’s justification for
needing to involve itself in the struggle between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, in this
case with John Bull’s image. In the cartoon, John Bull protested the Russian Bear being
so close to Constantinople while at the same time he loaded his newest territory, the
Transvaal, into his bag. At this time, the British government had recently acquired
suzerainty over the Transvaal. The inclusion of this territory made Great Britain look
overtly hypocritical as it denounced Russia’s advance across the Balkans as illegally
taking the Ottoman Empire’s sovereign territory while it was clearly doing so in South
Africa. Here, Kladderadatsch did not portray the Russian Bear critically rather the
animal acted instinctively, following its prey as it fled. Within this interpretation then the
German satirical journal showed the Russians, as the Russian Bear, not acting outside the
realm of acceptable international diplomacy with the Russian army’s advance through the
Ottoman Empire’s Balkan territory toward Constantinople. This was a natural response
to an enemy’s retreat during wartime.28
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Kladderadatsch, July 29, 1877.
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Figure 4.12 Mann sucht kennt hinter der Thür, wenn mann nicht selbst schon dahinter
gesteckt hat.-Nobody Looks behind a Door if They Have Never Been
behind It
Kladderadatsch July 29, 1876

By the last months of the Russo-Turkish War, Punch, like most within the British
government and public responded to all Russian actions in the Near East with skepticism
and hostility. When the Ottoman Empire refused to allow the British navy to dock at
Constantinople, the British satirical journal, as well as most in the British government
and public, believed that the Russian government forced the Ottoman Empire to reject a
British presence in the Straits with threats of destruction. In “Awkward” (Figure 4.13),
Punch illustrated the British opinion that the Russian government forced the Ottoman
Empire to reject its presence in the Straits. In the cartoon, the Russian Bear held a knife
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to the throat of the bandaged Sultan. As the British Lion, dressed as a naval officer,
requested permission to land a force to “protect” Constantinople, the Sultan responded
that his help was not needed and that he and the Russian Bear were now good friends.
The illustration indicated the British assumption that it was obviously in the Ottoman
Empire’s best interests to accept the British navy’s presence in the Straits despite the
threat of war between Russia and Great Britain that such a position entailed.29
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Punch, February 23, 1878.
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Figure 4.13 Awkward
Punch February 23, 1878
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Entertainingly Competitive Diplomacy
Along with the metaphors of women, children, and animals, Punch and
Kladderadatsch also illustrated diplomacy during the Near East Crisis as types of
entertainment and competition. In many ways, the Near East Crisis played out as a
theatrical production. The nature of the play often remained unclear, but dramatic
aspects remained throughout the length of the show. The play’s audience, if it approved
of how the performers acted, could sit back and simply enjoy the production. If the
audience did not like the show, they could protest through yelling at the actors or with
negative reviews. In this second scenario, the spectators’ negative reactions could end
the performance, it could force the actors to change their methods (or a government to
alter their policy), or the performers could ignore the jeers and continue without
admitting they needed to change (a government maintaining its policies in spite of public
protest). Much like with a production, where the actors could change their performance
based on positive or negative reviews from an audience, there existed the perception that
the public and presses’ reaction could pressure European diplomats to change their long
term foreign policy.
Punch and Kladderadatsch both reflected this view of the Near East Crisis as a
play. In “Welt=Theater” (“World Theater”; Figure 4.14), Mr. Kladderadatsch escorted a
woman by a stage curtain, behind which an acting troupe performed the play ‘The
Eastern Question.’ As they walked along, he explained that the no one knew what kind
of performance it was, whether it was a ‘comedy,’ a ‘tragedy,’ or simply a ‘farce.’ As
they moved by the curtain, a voice from behind prompted them to wait and see the last
act of the production before they decided what kind of show it was. This cartoon
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reflected the opinion that the Near East Crisis was a stage production with the Great
Powers as the principal actors but without a clear ending. The fact that the audience, in
this case the German public, could not determine what kind of production it was showed
the confusion many had regarding the situation in the Near East.30

Figure 4.14 Welt=Theater-World Theater
Kladderadatsch April 1, 1877
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Kladderadatsch, April 1, 1877.
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Punch showed the Near East Crisis early on as a production that threatened to
provoke riots among the audience, in this case the British public, unless the British actors
performed well. Rioting remained a persistent threat from the Old Price Riot of 1809 and
they largely emerged due to political, social, or economic issues.31 The cartoon “A Call
for the Manager” (Figure 4.15) showed this concern. In the image, Mr. Punch prompted
the manager, Disraeli, to speak to the crowd, here Parliament, regarding the Bulgarian
Atrocities. The people expected a performance regarding the issue and protested when
none came. The crowd waited impatiently for something to be done on stage much like
the British Parliament and public wanting the British government to respond in some
fashion, or put on a show, to the Bulgarian Atrocities. Mr. Punch contended that if
Disraeli would just speak to the crowd, then it would stop its agitating behavior. The
British public’s agitation against the British government’s inaction proved similar to a
crowd rejecting the lack of explanation for the non-performance of a highly anticipated
play. Here, Punch sided with the British public that supported the anti-Ottoman agitation
by trying to prompt Disraeli to address the issue to calm the population, much like a stage
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manager’s explanation for a delayed or canceled performance settled down an irate
theater audience.32

Figure 4.15 A Call for the Manager
Punch September 30, 1876

32

Punch, September 30, 1876.
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By the beginning of the Near East Crisis, horse racing was a sporting event
accessible to most of the public. The ability of the general public to participate in betting
on the races increased their knowledge of the terminology relating to the sport.33 The
popularity of horse racing guaranteed a public familiar with the stakes and issues
surrounding it, making it an ideal metaphor for Punch and Kladderadatsch to apply to the
Near East Crisis. In “Derby-Rennen um den Staatspreis von sechs Millionen Lstr”
(“Derby Runs for the State Award of Six Million Pounds”; Figure e.16), Kladderadatsch
illustrated the dissention in the British cabinet on the issue of requesting war credits to
prepare the British military for possible intervention in the Near East. By early 1878,
Disraeli obviously intended to involve Great Britain in the Russo-Turkish War at the first
opportunity. This decision, however, had critics both among the British Opposition and
within his own cabinet. Lord Derby, Disraeli’s Foreign Secretary, adamantly opposed
Disraeli’s move to ask the British Parliament for funds to prepare for war, which included
the cost of moving troops from India to Malta.34 Kladderadatsch showed Disraeli, on the
horse “war,” racing Lord Derby, on the horse “Peace,” for the prize of a six million
pound war credit. The German satirical journal remarked that Disraeli was way ahead in
the race but now his competition did not appear to be able to finish at all. This image
reflected the opinion among European diplomats, including those in Great Britain, that
Disraeli would receive his request for war credits to prepare for a possible war with
According to Ross McKibben in “Working-Class Gambling in Britain 1880-1939,” Past and
Present 82 (February 1979): 147-178, during this period the British Government legalized gambling, which
along with the emergence of easier accessibility of the telegraph, increased the ability of more of the
population to participate in gambling on horse races. The democratization of this process led to an
enlarged interest of all classes of society in the competitions. This in turn spurred an expanded knowledge
of terminology relating to horse racing.
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Russia in the Near East. Lord Derby falling behind in the race foreshadowed his
resignation from Disraeli’s cabinet and the subsequent lack of significant opposition to
Disraeli’s interest in introducing British military involvement in the Russo-Turkish
War.35

Figure 4.16 Derby-Rennen um den Staatspreis von sech Millionen Lstr.-Derby Runs for
the State Award of Six Million Pounds
Kladderadatsch February 3, 1878
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Kladderadatsch, February 3, 1878.
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A later Punch cartoon again showed Mr. Punch representing the voice of British
public opinion. In this case, he questioned the British government’s conclusion that
events in the Near East necessitated moving troops from India to Malta. In “The ‘Dark’
Horse” (Figure 4.17), the British satirical journal critiqued this transfer of manpower. In
the cartoon, Mr. Punch asked Disraeli if the horse was worth the cost. Disraeli responded
the horse paid for itself as it forced the race, the Congress of Berlin, to be run. Mr.
Punch, as the voice of the British taxpayer, did not necessarily refer simply to the
financial cost of the “horse.” The shift of Sepoy troops to Malta, represented by the
“Dark” horse was not popular due to the expense of moving them and the implication that
Disraeli intended to send the British military into the Straits at the first opportunity.
Disraeli transferred Sepoy troops to Malta while the British Parliament was out of
session. This move caused resentment and hostility from all sides. Disraeli’s gamble,
however, appeared to succeed since it made the Russians agree to discuss the Treaty of
San Stefano without having to actually use British military force to compel them to do so.
The image reflected that British public opinion could accept Disraeli’s decision to move
the troops without Parliament’s consent due to its success, despite the British public’s
initially disagreement with the move.36
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Figure 4.17 The ‘Dark Horse’
Punch June 3, 1878

Punch and Kladderadatsch both invoked myths and well-known stories to
illustrate diplomatic events. The rise in literacy rates among the British and German
populations made it likely that readers of all classes could understand the implications
related to the specific imagery used by the two journals. In order for Punch and
Kladderadatsch’s consumers to understand the illustrations employed by the two
journals, they needed to recognize the stories from which the metaphorical images came.
At the same time, however, the two satirical journals needed to ensure that they included
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metaphorical stories that strongly resonated with their readerships. This way, the
cartoons included provoked a specific response to events during the Near East Crisis.37
In “Die türkischen Parzen,” (“The Turkish Fates”; Figure 4.18), Kladderadatsch
used Michelangelo’s “The Three Parcae” to characterize the Three Emperors’ League’s
intentions regarding the Ottoman Empire. In the original painting, Michelangelo showed
the three Fates, or Parcae, of Roman mythology. They each held an item related to their
role in the myths. One held the string associated with the person whose fate is being
considered, another measured the length of the string which equated to the person’s
lifespan, and the third held scissors preparing to cut that string and end the person’s life.
In the cartoon, Andrassy held the Sultan’s thread, or fate. Russia reached around
Andrassy to cut the thread, ending the Ottoman Empire’s life while Bismarck stood aloof
in the background. Kladderadatsch showed the opinion that it was the Three Emperors’
League that determined the Ottoman Empire’s future with its pressure on the Ottoman
government to reform or face punishment from Russia. The positioning of Andrassy,
Russia and Bismarck in the image indicated the position of those governments. The
Russian government wanted to act, the Austrian government sought to wait and see, and
the German government wanted to stay out of the situation. There also emerged the
realization that the Austria and German governments’ hesitancy to act did not signify
they would restrain the Russian government from taking action against the Ottoman
Empire. 38 The German educated middle class would recognize the classical myth from
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the cartoon including the arrangement of diplomatic figures and what that meant for their
intentions in the Near East Crisis.39

Figure 4.18 Die türkischen Parzen-The Turkish Fates
Kladderadatsch May 14, 1876

At the time this cartoon appeared, there existed in Europe, especially in Germany, a reemergence
of interest in classical Greek and Roman mythology. This revival spurred a demand for reprints of artwork
associated with this classical past. In the Suzanne Marchand and David Lindenfeld edited Germany at the
Fin de Siecle (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2004), essays contend that the
modernizing world prompted many to look backward to the Golden Age of Greece and Rome for
alternatives to the chaotic world in which they lived. This sentiment led to an increased familiarity with
images such as this by Michelangelo.
39

142

Classical mythology did not provide the only type of literary metaphors used by
the satirical journals. They also employed more elementary tales such as nursery rhymes
to discuss international diplomacy. In “Humpty Dumpty” (Figure 4.19), Punch cynically
illustrated the Cyprus Convention. According to this agreement, Great Britain received
the island of Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire. In return, Disraeli promised to use
British troops to secure the Ottoman Empire’s eastern border with Russia. In the cartoon,
Disraeli and Cyprus place the Sultan, or “Humpty Dumpty,” back on the wall which
represented the Asian Frontier. Behind the wall, soldiers, that according to the nursery
rhyme included in the illustration were “all the queen’s men,” meaning Queen Victoria’s
British troops, stood waiting. Punch here showed that everyone in Great Britain viewed
the acquisition of Cyprus as a great diplomatic victory for Disraeli. The new protective
role for the British government in the Ottoman Empire’s Central Asia frontier increased
the likelihood that conflict would erupt between Russia and Great Britain in the region.
This worried the Ottoman government less than opponents of Disraeli’s imperialism,
indicated by the Sultan’s smile as the British Prime Minister restored him to his position
on the wall.40
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Figure 4.19 ‘Humpty-Dumpty’!
Punch July 20, 1878

Big Men of Diplomacy: Disraeli, Bismarck, and John Bull?
During the Near East Crisis, both Punch and Kladderadatsch illustrated policies
and actions of the British and German governments using cartoons images of the top
leaders of the two states, Disraeli and Bismarck respectively. The way in which these
two men conducted their governments’ international diplomacy indicated the leaders’
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own views on Russia’s role in the Near East. The way in which Punch and
Kladderadatsch depicted the two diplomats’ actions highlighted the objectionable aspects
of their governments’ foreign policy. Both satirical journals critiqued Disraeli’s inaction
in the Near East Crisis, especially following the Bulgarian Atrocities. Bismarck did not
escape consideration though. Punch provided a much more critical portrayal of the
German Chancellor than did Kladderadatsch. The inclusion of specific diplomats as
metaphorical representations of their states’ foreign policy appeared prominent during
this period, perhaps due to the longevity of their tenure, but more likely due to their
extraordinary control over government policy, as compared to other leaders. Those
segments of the European publics that followed international diplomatic events
recognized the power wielded by Disraeli and Bismarck. The European educated classes
recognized this power, thus when Punch and Kladderadatsch included cartoons of these
men’s actions within their cartoons, the readers understood that the two satirical journals
employed this figures to illustrate the British and German governments’ overall foreign
policy.
Disraeli’s refusal to support the Andrassy Note or Berlin Memorandum signaled a
change in the Anglo-German diplomatic relationship in the Near East. Previous to this,
particularly in regards to Egypt, the two states worked together to pressure the Ottoman
Empire to concede to European demands. With this recent situation in mind, Disraeli’s
decision confused many in the German government and public. In “Der englische
Schwerpunct” (“The English Focus”; Figure 4.20), Kladderadatsch indicated this
bewilderment. In the cartoon, Bismarck asked Disraeli why he no longer wanted to
cooperate with Germany in the eastern Mediterranean by agreeing to the Berlin
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Memorandum. The image showed Disraeli holding a piece of paper labeled “Suez,”
implying that the British government’s interest in maintaining its control of the Suez
Canal as the gateway to India meant that Great Britain could not aid in forcing the
Ottoman Empire to reform. The “market” promised to Great Britain for cooperating with
the Three Emperors’ League simply was not significant enough for the British
government to risk losing its access to India through the Suez Canal. This illustration
showed Kladderadatsch’s opinion, echoing that of many in the German government as
well as other European governments, that the British government worked solely for its
own interests in the Near East and chose not to help alleviate the suffering of the Balkan
Christians.41

Kladderadatsch, June 4,1876. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of 13 July 1876 echoed the
German Government’s that the British Government needed to help the Balkan Christians rid themselves of
the Ottoman ‘yoke’ rather than focus on the potential negative effects of Ottoman reform on British Near
East interests.
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Figure 4.20 Die englische Schwerpunct-The English Focus
Kladderadatsch June 4, 1876

Disraeli’s unwillingness to respond to the Bulgarian Atrocities or the Three
Emperors’ League’s calls for reform prompted outcry within the British government and
public along with confusion on the continent. In “The Sphinx is Silent” (Figure 4.21),
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Punch illustrated the frustration within the British public that Disraeli would not address
the Eastern Question. In the cartoon, males surrounded the Sphinx, Disraeli, urging him
to “speak.” In the background, the clouds of the Eastern Question loomed. Disraeli
ignored the calls for a speech regarding the Eastern Question. The British Prime Minister
wanted to maintain his freedom to act, or not act, in spite of what the British public
demanded. Punch’s illustration showed this aloofness in the face of popular outcry. It
also reflected that the British public could be at odds with Disraeli. The British Prime
Minister’s decision to remain quiet, however, meant that the Great Britain’s intentions in
the Near East remained veiled. If he stayed like the Sphinx, observers could only guess
what he might do next, if anything.42
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Punch, July 15, 1876.

148

Figure 4.21 The Sphinx is Silent
Punch July 15, 1876

One of the primary questions regarding the Near East Crisis in Punch and
Kladderadatsch revolved around who actually directed the diplomacy within the Crisis.
While the “serious” journals focused on the Russian government’s intentions to
undermine the Ottoman Empire’s stability by supporting the Balkan revolutionaries, both
Punch and Kladderadatsch looked at other potential instigators of conflict.
Kladderadatsch contended that Disraeli could stop the potential conflict between Russia
and the Ottoman Empire from occurring if he wanted. Later, Punch argued that only
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Bismarck could restrain or allow a clash between Russia and Great Britain in the Near
East. Both of these assertions dismissed the Russian government’s agency in any
subsequent military entanglement rather viewing Russia as a ready participant in any war
allowed by Disraeli or Bismarck.
In “Luftbremse” (“The Airbrake”; Figure 4.22), Kladderadatsch showed Disraeli
as a train conductor trying guiding his train into the path of two others, Russia and the
Ottoman Empire. The cartoon’s caption informed the readers that a new brake invented
in England has had great success in stopping trains even at the last minute. In the image,
Disraeli controlled the brake, meaning that he decided whether or not to use the new
technology to keep the Ottoman Empire and Russia from colliding in the Near East.
Here, Kladderadatsch expressed the opinion that Russia and the Ottoman Empire
appeared destined for war, a view held by many in the European governments and
publics well before the actual onset of the Russo-Turkish War, and Disraeli could either
stop the conflict by allowing the British train prevent the Russian and Ottoman trains
from colliding or he could apply the “brake” and let the two others crashes together.43
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Figure 4.22 Die Luftbremse-The Airbrake
Kladderadatsch December 17, 1876

While Kladderadatsch ascribed a determinant role to Disraeli’s foreign policy in
the Near East at the beginning of the Near East Crisis, by the end of the Russo-Turkish
War, Punch argued that Bismarck had the guiding position in the Near East. In
“Working the Point” (Figure 4.23), published a month after the Kladderadatsch cartoon,
Punch showed the British opinion that Bismarck and the German government determined
European Great Powers diplomacy in the Near East. By May 1878, when this cartoon
appeared, the Near East Crisis threatened to spark conflict between Russia and Great
Britain due to the Treaty of San Stefano and the Russian refusal to move away from the
Straits. In the cartoon, Bismarck stood with his hand on a train lever needed to switch
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tracks. If he pulled the lever, the two trains, Great Britain and Russia, would not collide.
If he left the tracks as they were, they would crash together. To prevent the two
European Great Powers from colliding, Bismarck needed to persuade Russia to agree to
the Congress of Berlin. The cartoon reflected that many in Great Britain, as well as in
Russia, remained unsure of if Bismarck wanted peace between Great Britain and Russia
or if he wanted a conflict to erupt which would render both states less powerful.44
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Punch, May 4, 1878.
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Figure 4.23 Working the Point
Punch May 4, 1878

The Near East Crisis had provided Bismarck an opportunity to make himself, and
Germany, the “honest broker” of European diplomacy. The other Great Powers
recognized that Germany had no territorial ambition in the Near East which further
reinforced Bismarck’s claim to be the best mediator. The acceptance of Germany’s lack
of aspirations in regards to territorial expansion in the region, however, did not negate the
general distrust held for Bismarck by most European diplomats and publics.
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Kladderadatsch, as well as the “serious” German journals, acknowledged this general
opinion but did not share it. In “Ein Wort ‘Deutsch’” (“In a Word ‘German’”; Figure
4.24), the German satirical journal illustrated the European diplomatic distrust of
Bismarck’s interests in the Eastern Question. In the cartoon, Bismarck watched out his
window as the other Great Powers discussed the German government’s involvement in
the Near East Crisis. He complained that he could not read his newspaper in peace
because of their complaining and war alarms. Kladderadatsch argued that the German
government would be the last to want war in the Near East but that did not necessarily
mean that. The other Great Powers agreed with that opinion, according to the German
journal. Bismarck persistently argued that he worked to maintain European peace with
his foreign policy. This image, however, reflected the opinion that the other Great
Powers remained suspicious of his intentions, including trying to expand Germany’s
influence in Europe.45
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Figure 4.24 Ein Wort ‘Deutsch’-In a Word ‘German’
Kladderadatsch February 24, 1878

This opinion found both support and opposition within the British government
and with Disraeli. Neither British diplomats nor Disraeli trusted Bismarck’s claims for
wanting only to be an “honest broker” between the Great Powers. At the same time, they
also thought he represented the only political figure capable of persuading the Russian
government to present the Treaty of San Stefano to the other Great Powers for
acceptance. The duality of Bismarck’s position created resentment within the British
Parliament and in Punch. His hesitancy to condemn the Russian advance through
Ottoman territory vexed the British government and press, but without his presence

155

supporting Disraeli’s call for a congress, the Great Britain’s ability to induce Russia to
attend the meeting would have depended on military force.
In “Everybody’s Friend” (Figure 4.25), Punch illustrated an accompanying story
entitled “Everybody’s Friend but Nobody’s Policeman” in which the British satirical
journal criticized Bismarck’s refusal to stop the Russian government from continuing its
attacks on the Ottoman Empire. In the story, a woman tried to get the policeman,
Bismarck, to crack down on the crimes committed by “Alick,” the Russian government.46
Despite all of the incidents occurring around him, the policeman refused to get involved,
arguing that it was not in his jurisdiction. The visual representation of the story showed
Bismarck, armed, drawing on a map of Europe. In the trashcan next to his desk lay
“treaties.” Here Punch indicated that Bismarck ignored the German government’s treaty
obligations by refusing to step in and stop the Russians from taking territory from the
Ottoman Empire.47
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“Alick” referred to the Russian Tsar Alexander III.
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Punch, March 2, 1878.
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Figure 4.25 Everybody’s Friend!
Punch March 2, 1878

John Bull represented a standard personification of the British public from his
creation in 1712. The British character indicated the British concern with the British
Empire, economically and imperially. To British readers, he reflected everything that
made Great Britain a top power, such as common sense and loyalty. To those skeptical
of British hegemony, John Bull represented the power-hungry, jingoistic, and
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exclusionary British foreign policy.48 The elements of his character reflected in Punch
and Kladderadatsch indicated how the two journals perceived the interests of those
segments of the British public which symbolized the British ruling class politically in
Parliament and economically. The utilization of John Bull as the personification of Great
Britain increased throughout the nineteenth century. By the turn of the twentieth century,
this figure became a primary visualization of both the British public and the British
government, even more than the leaders themselves.
In “Nachwächters Traum in der Neujahrsnacht” (“The Night Watchman’s Dream
on New Year’s Eve”; Figure 4.26), Kladderadatsch illustrated a cynical view of British
Near East interests during the latter stages of the Russo-Turkish War with John Bull’s
image. In the cartoon, the night watchman, John Bull, dreamt that he gained a large key,
Constantinople, to go along with all of the other keys he held, (i.e. Aden, Gibraltar,
Heligoland, Malta) because these keys implied his control over those areas. If he dictated
who could come in and out of this port as well, he controlled the major access points to
and from Europe. This characterization of John Bull challenged the British ruling class’s
aspiration to advance British imperialist holdings in the Near East. Many within the
German government and public, as well as those of other European states, viewed British
diplomacy as working toward the expansion of British interests, in this case direct control
over Constantinople itself. These interests represented to European observers the real
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reason why Disraeli and the British government wanted to intervene in the Russo-Turkish
War, not to maintain the Ottoman Empire’s territorial integrity in the Balkans.49

Figure 4.26 Nachwächters Traum in der Neujarhsnacht-The Night Watchman’s Dream
on New Year’s Eve
Kladderadatsch December 30, 1877

49

Kladderadatsch, December 30, 1877.
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Punch also employed John Bull to illustrate the interests of the British public, but
especially the British middle class which embodied the majority of its readership. Unlike
Kladderadatsch however the British satirical journal showed him as a proactive figure
trying to prompt Disraeli and the British government into action in the Near East. In
“The Drowsy Pointsman,” (Figure 4.27), Punch showed John Bull in a more positive
manner. In the cartoon, John Bull tried to rouse the pointsman, Disraeli, to acknowledge
there was a crash on the “Eastern Lines.” John Bull urged him to pay attention to the
incident so that he can prevent something larger from occurring closer to them. This
cartoon reflected the British middle class’s interest in Disraeli responding to the Near
East Crisis and the possibility of war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire that might
require British intervention. John Bull’s demand that Disraeli stop any further collisions
showed the opinion that only the British government could keep the Near East Crisis
from erupting into war which could draw all of the European Great Powers into a
conflict. The British represented by John Bull in Punch recognized the threats posed to
British economic interests in the Near East posed by a potential conflict between Russia
and the Ottoman Empire. Here, though, John Bull did not covet an expansion of British
control in the Near East rather he wanted the protection of the status quo.50 Like with
Britannia, John Bull existed as visual representation of non-governing groups with
conflicting opinions from the British government and with the interest in and means to
assert those differences. These two entities reflect the emergence of an independent
public opinion prepared to express its displeasure and opposition to their government’s
foreign policy.
50

Punch, September 16, 1876.
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Figure 4.27 The Drowsy Pointsman
Punch September 16, 1876

Conclusion
The cartoons from Punch and Kladderadatsch effectively educated British and
German readers regarding the Near East Crisis. The critical yet respectful commentary
coming from these two satirical journals provided significant observations regarding the
Near East Crisis and its effects on Great Power diplomacy. The ability to challenge the
governments’ actions using metaphors rather than words allowed Punch and
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Kladderadatsch to publish a harsher opinion of events with less danger of being sued for
libel. The two satirical journals appealed to a larger audience than either the ‘official’ or
‘semi-official’ journals discussed previously, which increased the influence of their
observations.
The cartoons analyzed in this chapter illustrate the changing role of the press and
the public in international diplomacy during the Near East Crisis. The metaphors shown
here illustrated the opinions of both the ‘official’ and ‘semi-official’ presses but with
highly recognizable images rather than column after column of words. The methods
utilized by Punch and Kladderadatsch to describe international events paralleled those of
the Times, Kölnische Zeitung, Pall Mall Gazette, and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung
during the Near East Crisis as well as between the Jameson Raid and Algeciras
Conference. As the focuses of the other journals changed, so too did those in the two
satirical journals, as will be seen in Chapter Six.
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CHAPTER V
COMPETITION AND EMPIRE: GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND GERMANY IN
AFRICA BETWEEN THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN AND THE JAMESON RAID

According to Hans Kohn, “nationalist passion and prestige, competition and
jealousy, much more than the rational considerations of economic gain” drove the
imperialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.1 These ‘irrational’
motives helped to account for the bitter hostility that emerged between Great Britain,
France, and Germany in relation to their interactions in Africa during the 1880s and
1890s. During this period, Germany emerged as an imperial power, challenging the
dominance of Great Britain and France around the world but especially in Africa. This
new presence in the colonial world created hostility between the three states’ publics.
This in turn drove the actions of their governments to both maintain and expand the
states’ imperial holdings. The new impetus for imperialism, with its jingoistic and
xenophobic elements, appeared especially potent in Africa.2 In this colonial arena,
economic interests provided less motivation for the continued acquisition of territory.
The aftermath of the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 highlighted this fact, as the
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competition between Great Britain, France, and Germany intensified in different areas
despite the guarantees of free trade in the majority of African territories provided by the
General Act from the meeting.
This intermediate section will provide a brief overview of the effects of African
relations on European diplomacy between the Congress of Berlin and the Jameson Raid.
Following the settlement of European issues following the Congress of Berlin, the Great
Powers’ interests increasingly turned to the colonial world. This interest not only came
from the governments, but also from the presses. The sensationalist portrayal of events
during the Near East Crisis sparked a new public focus on international events involving
Great Power diplomacy. As the governments’ concerns shifted toward Africa, so too did
those of the presses. The presses’ language, regarding reporting the new colonial African
competition that emerged with the shift in the Great Powers’ concerns elicited hostility
and resentment between the governments and publics of the states involved with African
colonization.
The presses and publics of Great Britain and Germany observed African events,
and the Great Powers’ governments’ reactions to those, with increased concern between
1878 and 1896. While the British press and public had significant experience to with
their government’s involvement in imperial growth, the German press and public did not
gain this experience until the 1880s. The ability of Bismarck and the German
government to establish Germany as a Great Power at the Congress of Berlin prompted a
reaction from the German press and public that stressed Germany’s need to establish a
territorial empire similar to those held by the other European Great Powers. Bending to
pressure from different colonial groups, and wanting to exploit the popularity of a
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German Empire within the German public Bismarck moved to establish a German
presence in the colonial world. Due to the long-established empires of the other
European Great Powers, Germany had few regions in which to establish a global empire.
The lack established hegemony in the African interiors and the decline of the Spanish and
Portuguese Empires made Africa the most suitable target for German imperialism during
the 1880s, a fact highlighted by efforts from the German government and the press to
promote commercial and colonial involvement there.
By the 1880s, the British held a dominant African presence, a position they
loathed to relinquish. The territorial acquisition by Great Britain was not necessarily
planned. The activities of British missionaries and merchants drew the government into
increasing its direct presence in Africa. The British government’s activities in Africa
remained passive, preferring not to actively pursue increased expansion through the
1880s.3 The government worked to ‘consolidate’ its African position, but not until the
1890s did the British domestic consensus change to pressure the government to expand
its interests in Africa.4 This growing pro-imperialist sentiment paralleled the increasing
literacy within the British public.5 The rise in jingoistic and xenophobic sentiments in the
British public that turned first against Russia, then France, and finally Germany by the
turn of the century led to the creation of special interest groups that promoted the
expansion of the British Empire. These emerging groups, driven by jingoistic opinions,
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propelled the expansion of British holdings in Africa. The pro-imperialists contended
that this expansion was necessary to assert British power and prevent the growth of other
Great Powers’ interests in Africa. 6 The tactics of these groups included attacks on the
interests and intentions of other involved Great Powers in whatever region being
discussed. The hostility of these segments of the British public expressed in the British
press provoked hostile responses in the other states.7 In this context, the British press
utilized the language developed to discuss European diplomacy during the Near East
Crisis to explain Great Power diplomacy in Africa.
The retorts from other states’ presses prompted stringent defenses of the British
government from different segments of the British public and press. The defensive
nature of the British responses focused on the necessity of colonies for the maintenance
of national prestige.8 By the 1890s, with the expanse of the British Empire extending
around the world, British honor appeared dependent on the continuation of British global
domination.9 Due to the British government’s dependence on elections and the
expansion of the franchise, British leaders had to respond to the British public’s
insistence on increasing its global territorial holdings.10 This in turn spurred more claims
from the British government that it controlled areas such as Egypt and South Africa and
6
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that the other European Great Powers needed to respect those claims.11 To defend their
justifiable colonial efforts, the British press went so far as to claim that the other Great
Powers’, in particular Germany’s, colonizing methods injured the natives and made it
harder to maintain stability within their own African colonies.12 This aggressive stance
provoked refutations from the other Great Powers that prompted increased competition
and possibilities for conflict between the powers.13
Germany’s entry into the race for colonies in Africa had as much to do with
domestic issues and national prestige as it did with economic concerns. Bismarck’s first
forays into Africa came in 1884 when he sent groups to suddenly and unexpectedly take
over the Cameroons. He moved into this realm as “an election stunt.”14 Following this
acquisition, and the lack of international protest against it, the German government began
exploring new opportunities to establish other colonies in Africa.15 In two regions, the
Dahomey-Niger area and in east Africa with Zanzibar, the German presence interfered
with that of the two primary European powers in Africa, France and Great Britain. This
did not stop the German colonial efforts in Africa. It instead sparked competition over
Africa’s future between the European powers. The British reaction to the German actions
in Africa intensified with the increasingly virulent anti-British rhetoric coming from the
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pro-Bismarck press during the 1884 Reichstag elections.16 The challenges to Bismarck’s
domestic political power from groups such as the Catholics and Social Democrats
prompted him to exploit the new pressure for a global German Empire to build a
domestic consensus for his policies. The German Chancellor struggled against the
“internal contradictions” that continued to divide German society even a decade after
unification. The concept of a colonial empire with which he could unify German opinion
prompted his support for colonies despite his earlier hesitations.17 Bismarck also wanted
to utilize the demands for colonies to bolster Germany’s economy through new trade
markets for German industry and commerce.18
Once the German government acquired its first colonies, elements within
Germany wanted to continue to build a larger empire. Concerns regarding national
prestige prevented the German government from stepping out of global affairs once it had
acquired colonies. In the earlier stages of imperial growth, Bismarck wanted to utilize
the colonial issues to build domestic consensus in favor of the German government’s
policies. The initial colonial acquisitions resulted as a by-product of Bismarck’s attempt
to draw France closer to Germany by challenging Great Britain imperially.19 While
successful in this goal, Bismarck had to deal with the consequences of the imperial drive.
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In particular he had to manage the effects of the creation of special interest groups such
as colonial societies and naval supporters that pressured the German government to
maintain and expand its global presence.20 For many, the new German Empire meant
now their state and government deserved a larger voice in international diplomacy.21
With its presence in Africa, Germany had a new position as a power. The German
government and German public adamantly opposed losing any of this expanded power
relative to the new empire. Thus they would not negotiate away any territory acquired
easily. 22 This stance meant that Great Britain and France could not reestablish their once
dominant position in Africa without having to deal with the German interests.23
The region surrounding the Dahomey-Niger hinterland in West Africa was one in
which Great Britain, France and Germany all had direct interest. Here, all three powers
held territory and influence over native leaders. With this already established presence in
the region, centered on access to the Atlantic Ocean, the three powers wanted to expand
inland along the rivers. This would give them access to the interior trade networks,
which European merchants assumed would provide significant new markets. Competition
regarding the river trade involved the British and the Germans as well as the French, who
had hopes for building an empire in central Africa, meant that they all watched events in
this region closely. 24 The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 settled the territorial claims
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on paper, but did not end the competition itself as the three powers’ representatives
continued to explore the regions and develop trading relationships with the locals with
little regard for the agreements made by their home diplomats.
The decline of Ottoman control of Egypt created a power vacuum that Great
Britain and France vied to fill. Maintaining British control of the Suez Canal dictated
Great Britain’s Egyptian policy. The British government viewed its hold on the canal
and the areas surrounding it as vital to British interests in India.25 Otto von Bismarck
utilized this British concern to get the British government to accept German demands in
east Africa and elsewhere. This German policy worked successfully as long as Great
Britain and France continued to contend for control of Egypt and the Sudan, which holds
the headwaters of the Nile River, crucial to maintain necessary stability in the region.26
Once, however, the British and French governments settled the Egyptian question,
however, this German bargaining position no longer retained its power.
The Anglo-French competition over the Sudan and Egypt reached its climax at
Fashoda in September 1898. The Fashoda Crisis has a long, detailed, and well-known
history, but a brief overview of events is necessary here to understand the effects of
competition in Africa on European relations. Leading up to the confrontation between
the British expedition led by Sir Herbert Kitchener and the French expedition led by
Jean-Baptiste Marchand at Fashoda, the British and French governments both claimed the
area, but neither had the ‘effective control’ necessary, according to the dictates of the
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Berlin Conference, to declare a protectorate in this region. To rectify this and achieve
their imperial goals (i.e. a Cape to Cairo railroad for Great Britain and an empire from
east to west across north Africa for France), both governments sent expeditions to
establish physical control over the area.
When the two groups met at Fashoda, Great Britain and France appeared headed
for war as neither side wanted to retreat from their position. Lord Salisbury, at the time
both British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, managed to prevent any conflict with
his diplomacy, and the settlement between the two states effectively secured British
control over Egypt from outside threats. Salisbury’s negotiations provided a justification
for France to withdraw from the region while also allowing the French government to
maintain its national honor and prestige.27 The long-term consequences of the Fashoda
Crisis included the decrease in Anglo-French tensions that enabled the later establishment
of the entente cordiale and the elimination of a major diplomatic chip that the German
government could and would use to manipulate the British government in world affairs.
After the settlement of this incident, the Germans could no longer barter its for British
claims in Egypt to gain imperial benefits elsewhere. Now, the British government no
longer needed to focus on potential French claims on Egypt and therefore could
cooperate more with the French government in African affairs.28
The presence of coveted natural resources such as diamonds in South Africa made
the region a prime target for colonial expansion. The Dutch Boers, living in South Africa
since the 1650s, prevented the British companies, in particular the British South Africa
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Company led by Cecil Rhodes, from establishing a monopoly over the whole of South
Africa. With the First Boer War, from December 1880 to March 1881, the British
government tried to eliminate the Boer control over the Transvaal, but failed to do so.
This failure produced long-term tensions between the Boer Government and the foreign
population, the Uitlanders, regarding civil rights and liberties for the non-Boer citizenry.
During the 1880s and early 1890s, this struggle largely remained one between the British
and the Boers with little outside involvement from other European Great Powers. The
British control of the majority of the area surrounding the Boer Republics along with the
Portuguese government’s, which held the other territory, inability to challenge the British
mean that the conflict over the Transvaal’s future remained as an internal one until the
mid 1890s.29
Portugal’s economic decline and its consequences on the state’s imperial holdings
led to issues in South Africa that prompted increased German involvement in the region.
In the late 1880s, the Portuguese government appeared likely to default on its
international loans. To prevent this, the British and German governments cooperated in
offering financial aid, which would use Portugal’s colonies as collateral. In these
discussions, the Portuguese port of Delagoa Bay emerged as the primary coveted
possession. It also became the territory for which the British and German governments
competed. The port’s position gave it increased significance because it could block trade
between the British holdings in southern Africa and the outside world.30 Due to this
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concern, the British government wanted to prevent Delagoa Bay from being purchased by
any other power. The Germans, looking for profitable territory, worked to persuade the
Portuguese government to sell the territory to them.31 The two governments’ interests in
controlling the port created tensions between them that continued into the mid-1890s,
when the internal conflict between the Boer government of the Transvaal and the British
interest groups in South Africa threatened to spark another war after the Jameson Raid.
When the Portuguese government called for a meeting to settle competing
European claims in Africa, Otto von Bismarck offered to host a conference. The
subsequent Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 met to decide on the future of Africa and its
resources and which state would control them. Without any consultation with the native
powers, at this meeting the European Great Powers established the rules for trade and
colonization in Africa. The nature of the General Act that concluded the conference
reflected the intentions of the Great Powers in Africa. The agreement defined how a
power could set up in a colony or protectorate and made river trade open to all.32 These
two provisions accounted for the primary concerns the European Great Powers had
regarding their status in Africa.
With the Berlin Conference, the French and German governments cooperated
with the intention of limiting British dominance in Africa in the future. The meeting
instead was a success in the diplomacy for the British because it divided the French and

William Roger Louis, “Great Britain and German Expansion in Africa, 1884-1919,” in Britain
and Germany in Africa, ed. Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1967), 24.
30

31

Robinson and Gallagher, 445.

32

Bendikat, 396.

173

Germans from future cooperation due to Bismarck’s unwillingness to support French
claims on Egypt and the Sudan against the British.33 The British press responded,
contending that the conference ended the effective monopoly on Africa claimed by the
British and French by opening trade to all.34 After the Berlin Conference settled the
primary points of contention between the European Great Powers regarding central
Africa, the competition between Great Britain, France, and Germany moved to other
regions such as East Africa, Morocco, and South Africa. This shift in focus of
competition led to changing diplomatic agreements between Great Britain, France, and
Germany in which the French threat declined over time while the German threat
increased. This changing diplomatic situation was especially clear in the wake of the
Jameson Raid and subsequent Krüger Telegram.
Between the Congress of Berlin and the Jameson Raid, the competition regarding
the future of Africa dominated European diplomacy. Following the settlement of the
Balkan instability with the Treaty of Berlin (1878), the future of European peace lay in
the colonial world. The European Great Powers’ interest in maintaining peace in Europe
itself led to the emergence of the importance of gaining and maintaining global empires,
in particular in Africa. By the 1880s, Great Britain and France both had an established,
and dominant, presence in Africa, which put them in direct conflict with each other in the
region. At the same time, the recently unified German Empire moved toward
establishing a global empire similar to that of British government and France, making its
presence known with demands for territory in Africa. The interaction between these
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three states’ governments regarding Africa’s future dictated the development of empires
on the continent itself.
As the British, French, and German governments worked to maintain and/or
expand their imperial power, they all looked to Africa as a primary region suitable for
European exploitation.35 The long-established presence in these regions of merchants
and missionaries boosted the European Great Powers’ justifications to control African
territory.36 As the government’ interest in building African empires grew, so too did the
competition between the European Great Powers. This competition threatened to
provoke armed conflict between the states. Between 1878 and 1898, five areas
constituted the major points of contention in Africa between Great Britain, France, and
Germany: the Dahomey-Niger hinterland, Egypt, South Africa, and East Africa. The
struggle to control these areas created overt hostility and diplomatic crises that provide
the most significant threat to European peace between the Congress of Berlin and
Jameson Raid.37
The hostile nature of British and German press coverage of international events in
which the British and German governments vied for supremacy emerged beginning in the
1880s. The reasonably minimal threat Great Britain and Germany represented to each
other’s global power, however, limited the resentment created by the presses. By the
mid-1890s this changed. By this point the Anglo-German competition in Africa
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represented an important contest in the future of both the British and German Empires.
The sense of competition created by the way in which the British and German presses
reported on African events prompted groups such as colonial societies to promote
activities from their governments that spurred resentment from the other presses and
publics as well as reactions from the other state’s government.
At the point at which the Jameson Raid occurred, the British and German
governments’ reemphasis on maintaining, in the British case, or expanding, in the
German case, a colonial presence as a Great Power. This imperial orientation created an
environment in which Great Britain and Germany competed with the other for territory
and influence. This competition, largely limited to Africa in the 1880s, expanded to
include other regions such as the Pacific Ocean and China during the 1890s. This put
Great Britain and Germany into direct conflict with one another with disastrous results
for the Anglo-German relationship, the focus of the next three chapters

176

CHAPTER VI
ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS AND THE ‘OFFICIAL’ JOURNALS

My dear Baron Holstein,
I will not let the year draw close without sending
you my good wishes for 1902, which I hope, prove more
conducive than recent ones to friendly relations between
our two countries. I have taken every opportunity since I
was in Berlin to broach in conversation with people whose
opinion was worth having the question of a permanent and
stable agreement with England and Germany on the lines
you sketched forth, and I confess I have been surprised at
the almost universal consensus of opinion that, in the
present state of public feeling on both sides, the idea was
quite futile. Many who are disposed to favour it in
principle seem convinced that the German government
would certainly having nothing to say to it, and it is of
course impossible for me, with a due regard for discretion
to do more than express my personal dissent from that
position. The chief argument with which I am most
frequently met is that, whatever may be the sentiments of
the German government, none of its authorised
mouthpieces has ever attempted to check the prevailing
Anglophobia by any public utterances and that even such
an act of filial piety as the Emperor’s visit to England at the
time of the Queen’s death was subjected to misconstruction
of which the significance could not be ignored. The action
of diplomacy is buried away in secret archives and the
‘man in the street’ who has perhaps too large a share in
ruling this country is influenced by what he sees and hears.
The hostility of the German people may not have been
greater than that of other continental nations, but they have
shown more ingenuity in driving it home to us. Illustrated
postcards of the most odious character have been showered
upon people whose names and addresses happen to have
been known in Germany either through business
connections or through having their children educated
there. In some cases it looks as if there must be some
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reference in order to bombard people whose names and
addresses can be obtained in that way, with German war
literature of the most offensive Pro-Boer type. One of the
leading London clubs has, as a matter of historical interest,
made a large collection of this kind of literature from all
parts of the continent since that war broke out, and both in
volume and in virulence the German section is facile
priceps. All this sort of thing, coupled with the language of
a large part of the German press, has unquestionably
created the impression that Germany is the country where
we are best hated and that, however little the German
government may share that feeling, it is bound to take it
into account.
I am reluctantly driven to the conclusion in these
circumstances that all one can hope to do for the present is
to avoid anything which would widen the breach, and to
trust to time and the logic of events to heal it. I must say it
is a great pity that the German press should have selected
Mr. Chamberlain of all men as its tete de Turc. There was
no more zealous, if not always very discreet, champion of
an Anglo-German understanding than he used to be, and he
would be more than human if his zeal were not to some
extent abated by the vinegar douches which have been
poured on to him with a quite too lavish hand.
I am afraid this is not a very cheerful or a very
amiable new year’s letter, but I do not think you would
have me write more pleasant platitudes because they are
supposed to be just now de saison.
Believe me
nevertheless to remain
Very sincerely yours
Valentine Chirol1

When Valentine Chirol, Berlin Correspondent for the Times, wrote this warning
to Friedrich von Holstein, Head of the German Foreign Office, in December 1901 the
future of Anglo-German relations appeared ambiguous. At this point, it remained unclear
whether the two states would come to an understanding, and perhaps alliance, or if the

Norman Rich and M.H. Fisher, eds., The Holstein Papers: the Memoirs, Diaries and
Correspondence of Friedrich von Holstein 1837-1909, Volume IV Correspondence 1897-1909 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1963), 242-243.

1

178

already existent but minimal antagonism might grow into something more substantial.
What was clear to many such as Chirol, however, was the fact that if the British and
German presses did not ease their hostile rhetoric, diplomacy between the British and
German governments could not work. The two presses’ role in creating and sustaining
animosity between Great Britain and Germany did not emerge overnight. It developed
over decades of growing public interest in the foreign policy of their own governments
and the challenges to them as during this period, unlike during the Near East Crisis, the
European governments had to respond to or address what was said in the press.
The Near East Crisis spurred the growth of this public concern with international
affairs, but the changing nature of Great Powers diplomacy meant that instead of focusing
their distrust and animosity on a third power such as Russia, the British and German
presses focused on each other’s government’s foreign policy. The Times and Kölnische
Zeitung both looked upon new international concerns regarding China, South Africa, the
growing Anglo-German naval rivalry, the Berlin-Baghdad Railway, the decline of
Russia, and finally Morocco that created tensions between the British and German
governments. The supposedly ‘inspired’ nature of these journals increased the
appearance of validity. This in turn made their articles appear as accurate reflections of
their governments’ intentions. This in turn enhanced their influence on public opinion
both domestically and abroad. Unlike the Pall Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung, both of which reflected a jingoistic bias in terms of international
politics that will be discussed later, the Times and Kölnische Zeitung indicated a more
objective tone regarding diplomacy. This, along with their perceived close ties to their
governments, increased the influence of their articles on public opinion. These factors
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also made it more difficult for the British and German diplomats to disavow the journals’
words. 2
Between the Jameson Raid and the First Moroccan Crisis both the Times and
Kölnische Zeitung increased their hostility toward Germany and Great Britain,
respectively, particularly when the two states came into conflict in the colonial world.
Unlike during the Near East Crisis, Russia no longer provided a consistent mutual threat
to both states and the search for a new competitor prompted Great Britain and Germany
looking toward each other. The larger crises of the Jameson Raid, Krüger Telegram,
Boer War, Russo-Japanese War, and First Moroccan Crisis did not alone account for this
growing animosity. It was the long-term and consistent conflicts over China, the Far
East, changing influence over the Ottoman Empire, and Anglo-German commercial and
naval competition that created the mutual hostility between the British and German
publics, aspects that the current historiography fails to fully address. In this chapter, I
argue that these created significant barriers for the British and German diplomats to
overcome in conducting diplomacy because it meant that the governments could no
longer act without referring to or calling upon their public’s opinions. This was a marked
change from what they could do during the Near East Crisis as discussed in the first half
of this dissertation.

Appendix A provides charts and graphs in reference to the London Times and Kölnische Zeitung’s
growing interest in the events discussed in this chapter.
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The Jameson Raid and the Krüger Telegram
Tensions in the Transvaal emerging between the German Boers and their British
suzerains sparked the first significant challenge to Anglo-German relations. Two events
prompted this new hostility and indicated the tensions’ potential strength: the Jameson
Raid and the Krüger Telegram. Following a decade of debate regarding the rights of nonBoers in the region, in late December 1895, a group of British subjects led by Dr.
Leander Jameson, the administrator of the British South Africa Company, invaded the
Transvaal as a protest of how Paul Krüger’s Boer government treated the non-Boer
inhabitants of the Transvaal, called Uitlanders. Intended to spark an uprising against the
Boers, the Jameson Raid failed miserably, prompting more outcry and condemnation than
support for their cause, not only internationally but also domestically.
The British government denounced the event and warned other British citizens
from attempting to follow suit.3 While the British government, along with significant
portions of the British press, criticized the Raid, they also warned cautioned Krüger not to
issue too harsh of punishments for the attackers. These threats regarding rebuking the
Raiders prompted hostility from others particularly the German press.4 In response to
these German criticisms, the Times defended its government’s reply. At the same time,
however, the journal criticized the German press’s response to the event.5 Before
Wilhelm II sent the Krüger Telegram, both the Marquess of Salisbury, British Prime
Minister and Foreign Minister, and Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain warned
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Krüger’s government against excessive punishment of the British citizens involved in the
Jameson Raid.
This ‘firm’ stance taken by the British government prompted hostility in the
German press and made it appear to many European observers, not just those in proBoers in Germany, that the British government approved and probably supported
Jameson to take the drastic steps.6 The “semi-official” German press, according to the
Times, expressed dislike of the British government’s aggressive response to potential
punishment for the raiders, but did not advocate German intervention like the
‘independent’ journals.7 The anti-British sentiment in the pages of the Kölnische Zeitung,
which the Times argued received “inspiration” from the German government, made that
government’s claims that it had no ill-intentions against British dominance in South
Africa appear as lies.8
While the Jameson Raid prompted anti-British sentiment to erupt within the
German public opinion and the German press, the Krüger Telegram provoked the same
type of hostility from British public opinion and the British press. On 3 January 1896,
days after the news of the Jameson Raid reached Europe, Wilhelm II sent Paul Krüger a
telegram congratulating his government on successfully defeating the armed invaders and
offering future support to repel another such attack. This reaction indicated to many in
the British press and public that the German government sought to replace the British
government as suzerain in the Transvaal. The Krüger Telegram also revived British
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suspicions regarding the duplicitous nature of German diplomacy thought removed
following Bismarck’s dismissal.
The British and German presses’ response to the challenges presented to their
governments by the aftermaths of the Jameson Raid and Krüger Telegram sparked
hostility within the public opinions of the two states. Wilhelm II chose to issue the
Krüger Telegram for a variety of reasons such as showing his support for the Germanic
Boers against the oppressive British, to punish the British government for not doing what
he wanted in the rest Africa, and to elicit support from German public opinion for his
desired German navy.9 This behavior sparked indignation within the British government,
British press, and British public opinion because of his ties to the British royal family and
due to the British perception that Wilhelm II wanted to exploit Great Britain’s moment of
weakness to expand Germany’s influence in South Africa in spite of these familial
connections.10 Perhaps more problematic for the German government’s relations with
Great Britain, however, was that the Krüger Telegram suggested Wilhelm II’s duplicity
in foreign affairs. At the first opportunity, it seemed to British observers, he chose to
support the British government’s enemies after years of working for a cooperative
arrangement with Great Britain.11
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The German government did not necessarily intend the Krüger Telegram as an
attack on the British government, but it appeared as such for most within the British
government and British public opinion.12 The Jameson Raid and Krüger Telegram
sparked an environment of hostility and distrust between the British and German presses
and governments. The two governments quickly settled their issues regarding the events,
but the publics and presses maintained their distrust toward the other state for
considerably longer, with other events emerging that fed on the existent resentment to
maintain Anglo-German tensions. The Times and Kölnische Zeitung both reflected and
inspired this environment as they persisted in producing articles expressing skepticism
toward the German or British government, respectively, until the First Moroccan Crisis
and beyond.
The British and German ‘official’ journals played a prominent role in reflecting
the effects the Jameson Raid and Krüger Telegram had on Anglo-German relations.
Immediately following the Jameson Raid, the Times, supposedly reflecting the British
government’s “official mind,” denounced the raiders’ intentions, arguing that nothing in
the Transvaal was aggressive enough to warrant Jameson’s actions. The journal
continued that the Boer government itself could not last, even without interference,
because Krüger’s government oppressed those who maintained the economic stability of
the Transvaal: the Uitlanders. While outcry from the European continent emerged
following the Jameson Raid, the Times focused on reaffirming the British government’s
suzerainty over the Transvaal by warning Krüger not to push too hard against British
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control by asserting his authority over the proceedings against the raiders beyond those
levels accepted by the British government.13
The Kölnische Zeitung highlighted the anti-British sentiment following the
Jameson Raid present in Europe, but tried to attribute the majority of the hostility to other
Great Powers, particularly Russia. This attempt largely failed following publication of
items condemning the Jameson Raid as a “violation of international law,” expressing a
view not echoed in the other states’ presses which indicated to British observers that the
Germans represented the largest anti-British population.14 While the German journal
emphasized this resentment, the German government worked to reestablish their interests
in South Africa. According to the Times, the German government wanted a return to the
status quo in South Africa and actively worked to prove that it did not support the
German press’s anti-British sentiment. Neither the British press nor the British
government outright accepted the German government’s claims. British observers
continually contended that the German government had too much control over its press to
allow the inflammatory anti-British remarks to emerge if there was no official support for
them.15 The contradictions between the German government’s assertions and the German
press’s commentary increased the distrust toward Germany from British government and
British public opinion, especially following the Krüger Telegram.16
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that Wilhelm II embodied his people’s will and thus his letter of support to Krüger’s Government reflected
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While many within the British public condemned the Jameson Raid and mirrored
opinions from other Europeans, the Krüger Telegram prompted considerably more
support for the Jameson Raid in Great Britain.17 Wilhelm II’s language in the Krüger
Telegram provoked a great deal of anger within the British government and British public
opinion. The contention that the German government viewed the Transvaal as an
independent entity and not as a British possession, apparent in this correspondence, upset
many in Great Britain.18 This telegram at the same time received significant support from
the Kölnische Zeitung, and other journals in the German press, as it affirmed Germany’s
interests in South Africa and the aspiration that the British government to recognize
those.19 The Times reflected the British hostility toward the Krüger Telegram. The
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British journal reported with skepticism that Wilhelm II and the German government did
not intend any anti-British sentiment with the telegram.20
Despite these claims from the Germans, both the Times and the Kölnische Zeitung
continued to debate the rationale and effects of the document. The Times argued that
Wilhelm II issued the Krüger Telegram to prompt German public opinion in support of
his foreign and domestic policies while the Kölnische Zeitung contended that the British
press’s “threatening” response to the Kaiser was unprovoked.21 Along with the German
press’s attacks on the British government and press, it also published articles supporting
Krüger and his government. The Kölnische Zeitung argued that the Jameson Raid set a
dangerous precedent about the British government using illegal and unofficial methods to
try to expand their spheres of influence. It continued that Krüger had considerable and
legitimate grievances ignored by the British government, particularly in reference to the
monopoly of British firms over the Transvaal’s natural resources that needed to be
addressed.22
In spite of attempts by both the British and German governments to calm their
publics’ agitation regarding the Jameson Raid and Krüger Telegram, the two states’
presses maintained their hostility. The Kölnische Zeitung continually argued that the
British press’s response to the Krüger Telegram used language that threatened Wilhelm II
and the German government for merely defending German interests in the Transvaal.23
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The German journal emphasized the German government’s statements contending it did
not want to replace Great Britain in South Africa. The British press, the Kölnische
Zeitung maintained, ignored the Reichstag speeches and government decrees that clearly
stated that the German government only sought a return to the status quo.24 Hatzfeldt, the
German Ambassador to Great Britain, wrote to Holstein that if not for the British press
the tensions between the British and German governments would ease, thus blaming the
British press for Anglo-German tensions just as the British government and press charged
the German press with the same function.25 Even while the Kölnische Zeitung defended
the German government’s stated intentions, the Times indicated the contradictions
apparent in the German press. The British journal argued the Kölnische Zeitung
maintained its hostility toward the British government which in turn made the German
government’s assurances about not pursuing anti-British action in the Transvaal appear
duplicitous.26 Both governments recognized the effect the two presses’ responses to each
other and on each other’s states’ publics. With this in mind, they tried to calm the
rhetoric in order to reestablish better relations. For example, Salisbury, who supposedly
disregarded public opinion completely, urged Queen Victoria to suggest to Wilhelm II
unfortunate it was that the two presses’ statements were so injurious to Anglo-German
relations.27 This view continued in the decade following the Jameson Raid and Krüger
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Telegram, limiting the diplomacy between the two states by turning public opinion
against the other’s state.
The Far East and the Great Powers
Anglo-German tensions emergent following the Krüger Telegram did not
dissipate despite the two governments contending that they had reestablished cordial
relations with each other. Instead, issues rising in areas where Great Britain and
Germany competed maintained and intensified the tensions in Anglo-German relations.
One of the primary points of contention between the British and German governments
following the Jameson Raid and Krüger Telegram that remained problematic involved
China’s future. By 1896, after decades of decline highlighted by the devastating loss to
Japan in the First Sino-Japanese war, China seemed at the point of imminent collapse.
With this in mind, the Great Powers looked to protect and expand their interests in the
region, in particular those in the commercial realm. Great Britain, Germany, and Russia
especially, but also France and the United States, focused upon gaining trading
concessions, trading ports along Chinese rivers, and control over Chinese railroads.28 As
domestic instability and the internal decay resulting from generations of oppression and
corruption prevented the central Chinese government from asserting itself against the
outside powers the Great Powers concerned themselves with the others that coveted
expanding spheres of influence in China. This struggle between the Great Powers over
Chinese concessions continued until the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. The
Russian control over Port Arthur represented the most problematic aspect of the Great
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Powers’ competition in the Far East. This Russian acquisition, however, only occurred
following the German government’s initial land grab in China that came in March 1898.
Following the assassination of two German missionaries by Chinese revolutionaries, the
German government employed military action to force the Chinese government to offer
reparations for the offense. The Germans held the Chinese government responsible for
the attacks as the assassins received at least tacit support from the provincial government.
Following its successful show of force, the German government received a 99-year lease
on Kiaochow as a concession for the attack.
This acquisition did not prompt immediate seizures of territory from the British
and Russian governments, but it did trigger immediate discussions within the British
government and British press regarding the necessity for British compensation for
accepting the change. Salisbury did not want to make a “grab” for Chinese territory until
he could further justify it by arguing its necessity in relation to maintaining British
interests in the region.29 When Russia leased Port Arthur in later March 1898, Salisbury
had his validation, and he finally did what British public opinion and jingoist British
politicians such as Chamberlain wanted the British government to do and acquired the
lease for Wei-Hai-Wei.30 The acquisition of these Chinese ports by Great Britain,
Germany and Russia meant that these Great Powers’ interests were in direct conflict with
each other. Russia’s competition with Japan over control of Manchuria and Korea,
however, limited the nature of its competition with the other two European powers. This
left Great Britain and Germany as each other’s primary competitor in the Far East which
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in turn heightened the tensions between the two states. The British and German presses
highlighted this new competition. In their discussion of the Far East, they consistently
reflected the opinion that the other Great Powers’ interests threatened the region’s future
and their state’s presence there.
Three issues dominated the debate between the Great Powers regarding China:
trading concessions, control of the Chinese railroads, and the long-term conflict between
Russia and Japan over Manchuria and Korea that ultimately culminated in the RussoJapanese War. Initially, the first two issues represented the largest potential problems for
the Great Powers. The concept of the “open door” for Chinese trade created considerable
debate in the British and German presses as the two states’ governments worked to
expand their spheres of influence in the region. The British government held territory in
China as a result of the Opium wars but wanted to increase British commerce throughout
China. The German government coveted a similar trading arrangement for their own
merchants as well as a Far Eastern base for its navy. In the scramble for Chinese
concessions, the German government looked toward the port of Kiaochow to establish a
trading center. The German acquisition of Kiaochow prompted concern in the German
public as well as in the German press according to the Times. The British journal argued
that the Germans remained unsure about the necessity to take Chinese territory if there
was no guarantee it would be profitable to do so. At the same time, the German
government could not simply buy the concession according to German diplomats,
because German public opinion would not accept purchasing territory it had conquered.31

31

London Times, April 28, 1898, 6.

191

The initial German acquisition of Kiaochow concerned British Prime Minister
Salisbury very little He worried more about keeping British control over the international
trade organization in China than the German actions. His interest, as well as that of the
British government, shifted as the German government appeared ready to expand beyond
their initial position. Salisbury, however, waited until the Russian government, already
annoyed with the German government’s seizure of Kiaochow, leased Port Arthur to force
the Chinese government to cede territory to Great Britain.32 The primary concern
involved in the debates regarding Chinese territory focused on the “open door” policy in
each of the trading ports. In this discussion, the Times and Kölnische Zeitung played
important roles in relations between the Great Powers by attributing ulterior motives to
the Chinese policies of the other Great Powers and contradicting the more positive
statements made by the governments. The Times contended that both the Russian and
German governments wanted to create monopolies in their spheres of influence while the
British government wanted to maintain the “open door” it had always advocated.33 The
British journal also contended that the German government worked to aid Russia in
gaining concessions in China in order to further inhibit British enterprise in the region.34
The British government in turn, according to the Times, only wanted to protect British
interests in China, a point Queen Victoria wanted emphasized to British public opinion.35
During this process, the German government gave very little indication regarding its
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intended Chinese policy, leaving the Times to admit that it interpreted the German
government’s goals in China from observations from its Berlin Correspondent along with
what it read in the German press.36
The British public, reflected by the Times, proved skeptical of the Russian and
German governments’ Chinese policies, expressed a similar concern regarding Russian
activities, the German government indicated an interest in improving its relations with
Russia through China. The German acquisition of Kiaochow, however, represented a
significant barrier to German-Russian cooperation even after the Russian government
received Port Arthur as it introduced a German presence into a region coveted by the
Russian government. This was an unexpected outcome, especially since the German
government worked so long to bolster relations between Germany and Russia.37 In order
to repair the relationship, the German government and the German press tried to
emphasize the anti-Russian sentiment in the British press. By highlighting this antiRussian opinion in Great Britain, the German government sought to prevent any possible
cooperation between Russia and Great Britain in China while also trying to draw one of
the two into an agreement with Germany.38 At the same time it tried to negotiate a
cooperative arrangement with Great Britain in China, the German government and
German press stressed the economic partnership possible between the two states.39 The
Kölnische Zeitung contended that the divisive political issues regarding China did not
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have to affect economic cooperation. The German journal agreed with Balfour that
British and German commercial interests in China paralleled on another and represented
a consistent basis for good relations between Great Britain and Germany. At the same
time, the German journal blamed the British press for the failure of the cooperation.40
While the Kölnische Zeitung and the German government viewed an AngloGerman agreement in China as imminent, the Times and the British government
maintained an isolated stance in Chinese relations until the British government ultimately
settled its differences with the Russian government in the region, much to the chagrin of
Germany.41 The move toward cooperation with Russia showed the British government’s
concern with Russian expansion and its lesser concern with a possible German action.
The Kölnische Zeitung tried to show that it was in both Great Britain’s and Russia’s best
interest to work with Germany than each other. In this vein, the German journal rejected
the opinion of others in the German press that stated German-Russian relations were
cooling. At the same time, the Times recognized that British public opinion understood
Great Britain’s isolation in China. The British journal asserted that the British
government needed to resolve this issue, suggesting that perhaps an agreement with
Germany could achieve this solution.42 To downplay the failure of German diplomacy,
the Kölnische Zeitung emphasized the limitation of the Anglo-Russian agreement and the
continued necessity for German interests to be considered in China. The German journal,
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in line with the continued German emphasis on the “open door” in China, argued that
with this agreement, the British government gave up the “open door” in Northern China
and thus will not fight against German expansion there.43 Holstein warned though that
the calls for increasing German interests in China might prompt the British government
to claim more territory before Germany could do so.44
The debate over Chinese concessions continued through the Russo-Japanese War,
as none of the Great Powers involved wanted to concede influence or territory in the
region. Much like the Ottoman Empire during the Near East Crisis, however, China
attempted to use the animosity and distrust between the Great Powers to refrain from
having to give up any more territory. This strategy worked to a certain degree, especially
in relation to control of the Chinese railroads. Competition between Great Britain and
Russia for the railroads allowed the Chinese government to hesitate in agreeing to the
Great Powers’ demands for concessions.45 During this period, the Times followed the
changing diplomatic situation in China as the British government challenged the Russian
domination of the Chinese railroads, initially with support from the German government.
Later, following the settlement of issues between Great Britain and Russia in northern
China along with the railroads in that region, the British journal commented on German
interests in China, arguing that in order to save their prestige many German politicians
emphasized the supposed imminent collapse of Anglo-Russian cooperation.46
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The contemporary German interest in building an empire in the Far East based on
Chinese concessions and Pacific islands provoked resentment and mockery from the
British press. The Times directed the way in these portrayals, arguing that the German
government demanded too much in the Far East after receiving Kiaochow.47 The
German press, led by the Kölnische Zeitung, dismissed any significance to the AngloRussian agreement and argued that the German government needed to maintain the
German commercial presence threatened by any Anglo-Russian cooperation.48 The issue
of controlling the Chinese railroads proved divisive between Russia and Great Britain.
The Boxer Rebellion and its suppression, however, led to the growth of a more disruptive
Anglo-German hostility.
The Boxer Rebellion, an attempt to by nationalist Chinese revolutionaries to
remove foreigners from China, prompted the forceful establishment of considerably more
control of Chinese territory by the Great Powers. The anti-foreigner attacks on the Great
Powers’ legations prompted cooperation between those states to reinstitute jurisdiction
over their spheres of influence. This collaboration, however, created as much distrust
between the Great Powers themselves as it did between them and the Chinese
government. Wilhelm II chose to use the Great Powers’ expeditions, directed by German
General Count Waldersee, to underscore the strength and capability of his German
Empire. The Kölnische Zeitung supported the Kaiser’s aims in China, especially the
efforts to secure justice for the missionaries’ murders. The Times, however, expressed
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skepticism toward the German government’s intentions in the Far East.49 In particular,
the British journal condemned the German government’s atrocities against Chinese
civilians that supposedly occurred as the Germans suppressed the Rebellion in the areas
they controlled.50 The Kölnische Zeitung responded to these allegations by arguing that
the “atrocities” did not transpire as often as described, and those held responsible for
these actions faced adequate punishment.51 As the Great Powers successfully subdued
the rebels and reasserted their authority in the region, the Times’ and Kölnische Zeitung’s
focus returned to the other Great Powers’ actions in the Far East.
After the Boxer Rebellion, and amidst the Boer War, the British government
began its shift away from isolation. The first move in this direction came with the
Manchurian Convention. This agreement between Russia and Great Britain represented
the British government’s efforts to consolidate its interests in China. The Kölnische
Zeitung, echoing von Bülow, argued that the convention, which had little to do with
Germany and no effect on the Anglo-German agreement in China due to its geographic
parameters, should not divide Manchuria from the rest of China until all of the Great
Powers received their compensation for the Boxer Rebellion.52 The agreement,
according to the Times, settled tensions between Russia and Great Britain over the
Chinese railroads and received significant support from the British public. 53 The
Kölnische Zeitung, however, argued that the British government specifically left out
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major aspects of the convention when published in order to gain the approval of British
public opinion.54
Following this arrangement with Russia, Great Britain looked to the Far East for
future cooperative partners. In 1902, following its victory in the Boer War, the British
government negotiated an alliance with Japan. This understanding, with its defensive
basis, allowed Great Britain to compromise with Russia regarding the situation in
Manchuria without losing any influence in the region. The alliance also meant that the
Chinese government could reject any extension of German mining or railroad interest
without facing any unified retribution. Von Bülow argued that the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance did not change Germany’s Chinese policy despite this fact because the German
government did not want any territory and the new diplomatic arrangement did not
inherently threaten German commercial interests. Here, von Bülow disputed an article in
the Times that said the German government wanted a monopoly in its Chinese holdings.
The German press disagreed with the British journal’s contention. It argued that the
German government had to combat the negative effects of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance
on Germany’s Chinese interests, which resulted in the appearance that it wanted a
monopoly. This was merely an understanding of the German government’s China policy,
according to the Germans, as they wanted free trade maintained throughout China.55 As
the British and German presses accused the other state of exploiting China’s situation for
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their own ends, relations between Russia and Japan steadily deteriorated into a state of
war.
The onset of the Russo-Japanese War surprised few as it followed years of
competition between Russia and Japan in the Far East. The Japanese attack on Port
Arthur represented the culmination of the two states’ inability to compromise on the
future of Korea and Manchuria. While the Russo-Japanese War raged between Russia
and Japan, however, Great Britain and Germany observed events with interest in hopes of
using the conflict to expand their own enterprises in the Far East. Both the Times and the
Kölnische Zeitung recognized those interests and criticized the other state for trying to
exploit the situation for its own gain. At the beginning of the war, the Kölnische Zeitung
argued that the Japanese had little hope to win a land war with Russia, while the Times
focused on the ways in which the Russian government’s aggression provoke the Japanese
actions.56
As the war continued, the British and German presses critiqued the other’s
governments as much as they commented on Russia and Japan. The Times criticized the
attempts by the German government to use the Russo-Japanese War to persuade the
Russian government to agree to an alliance, or at least a closer understanding, with
Germany.57 At the same time, the Kölnische Zeitung continually questioned the supposed
British neutrality. In particular it criticized British support of Japan with horses and ships
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sent to the Far East.58 These criticisms prompted continued debate between the two
presses throughout the Russo-Japanese War and into the peace negotiations. By the end
of the war, the weakened Russia turned toward France rather than Germany, while
Japan’s victory strengthened Great Britain’s position in Asia. These developments added
to the critiques within the British and German presses increasingly made the British and
German governments look toward each other as a primary enemy not only in the Far East
but in the larger world as well.
German Pacific Colonies
The Pacific Ocean region embodied a more direct area of rivalry between Great
Britain and Germany. As the Far East opened increasingly for trade, the Pacific Region
also received a great deal of interest from the Great Powers, especially as the Portuguese
and Spanish Empires faced their final declines. Interested in finding both coaling stations
for their navies and new markets for their industrial output, both Great Britain and
Germany looked to expand their influence and control over the islands in the Pacific
Ocean region. While control of Samoa represented the most significant struggle between
the British and German governments in the region, other recent German acquisitions such
as the Marshall and Caroline Islands also posed problems between the two states.
Control of these islands indicated the prestige and power of each state while the
economic possibilities associated with them further bolstered their importance within
international affairs. As with Chinese affairs, concerns over these islands continued to
prompt debate in the British and German presses about how to defend and/or promote
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their states’ interests in the region. Within these discussions, accusations flew regarding
the true motivations of each government. The British press accused the German
government of taking unnecessary territory and oppressing the native populations. At the
same time, the German press criticized the British government’s attempts to restrain the
German government’s acquisition of more territory on the grounds it might jeopardize the
British Empire and not in an attempt to protect the native groups.
The German Pacific colonies represented the acme of German colonization
efforts. The islands, such as the Marshall Islands purchased from Spain in 1884 as well
as German New Guinea, reflected the successful expansion of German commercial
interests globally. Much like the early British experiences in India with the British East
India Company, the German Empire in the Pacific initially relied on private companies to
manage the territories until they proved incapable to effectively do so. When other Great
Powers held similar interests and claims in a region, the German government took direct
control and the German press showed a more explicit interest. The debates between the
British and German presses produced significant criticism of the British and German
governments. In particular, the two presses questioned their leaders’ willingness to risk
their state’s prestige in handling diplomacy regarding the Pacific Region. The Times and
Kölnische Zeitung both issues arguments that attributed an ‘inspired’ character to the
other’s articles in relation to Anglo-German interaction in the region, more so than any
other topic.
The German interest in Pacific colonies challenged the British Empire as a whole,
unlike the competition between Great Britain and Germany in China. In regards to the
trade region, Australian and New Zealandish companies had considerable commercial
201

investment continually challenged by the presence of German traders and the German
government in the Pacific. When the United States, Great Britain and Germany signed
the Tripartite treaty establishing a government for Samoa, diplomacy appeared to triumph
over sentiment in British and German public opinion which advocated using force to
maintain their state’s dominant interest.59 The treaty signified to the British and German
governments the best possible outcome without having to employ force or give up their
claims completely.
The two states’ presses, however, promoted military action to keep others from
infringing upon their territory. The Times and the Kölnische Zeitung participated in the
discussion of the Pacific islands’ futures. The Kölnische Zeitung indicated the imperial
aspirations of the chauvinistic elements, especially the Pan-German League, in their
discussion of Pacific affairs, advocating the protection and expansion of German interests
in the region. The Times responded to the Kölnische Zeitung’s article by arguing that the
British government should wait for the rhetoric coming from the German press to calm
before responding.60
The German government, and von Bülow in particular, utilized the issue of
German Pacific Colonies as a platform to assert and expand on the newly established
Weltpolitik programme. In order for Germany to become a world power, it needed
holdings spread around the globe from which it could trade. This new direction of
German foreign policy, however, did not find acceptance from the Great Powers already
established in the Pacific region. The Boer War provided a promising opportunity for the
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German government to circumvent British opposition to German expansion according to
the Kölnische Zeitung. The German journal argued that the British government could not
use the British navy to maintain a blockade around South Africa and spend significant
sums of money fighting the Boers and then maintain a strong presence in Samoa at the
same time. Thus, the German government should be able to fully assert its control of
Samoa while the Boer War distracted the British government.61 The Times responded to
this observation by arguing it was based on “naïve ignorance of English affairs as they
are in reality.” The British journal contended that the British Empire had more than
enough capability to maintain a strong presence in both locations.62 Despite the Times’
contentions the German government viewed its acquired position in Samoa as a
diplomatic victory.63
The settlement of the Samoan Question, however, did not resolve all of the
tensions between Great Britain and Germany in the Pacific. A second major issue of
tariffs, emerged regarding the Marshall Islands. According to the Anglo-German
Convention of 1886, German and British traders supposedly received the reciprocal rates
and treatment on the other state’s islands. In practice, this did not occur. The mutual
failure to adhere to the convention sparked controversy between British and German
presses as well as the British and German governments. In December 1904, a group of
Australian merchants protested to the British government that the Jaluit Company that

61

Kölnische Zeitung, November 10, 1899, 1.

62

London Times, November 10, 1899, 5,9.

Paul M. Kennedy, The Samoan Tangle: a Study in Anglo-German-American Relations, 1878-1900
(New York: Barnes and Noble, 1974), 262.

63

203

owned the Marshall Islands charged them high tariffs to trade in the colony. The group
argued this violated the convention and requested the British government present their
grievances to the German government. In response, the German government decided to
take direct control of the Marshall Islands, arguing that the Jaluit Company had not
effectively governed the territory and therefore it lost its rights to administer it.64
In the Times and the Kölnische Zeitung, the debates about trading rights in the
Marshall Islands reflected more than one specific incident. It indicated long-standing
animosity between British and German citizens competing in those markets and their
governments’ attempts to aide them. The Kölnische Zeitung, while defending the rights
of the German government to dictate trading protocol in the German Empire, argued that
the private company should not have brought the issue to the German government, rather
it needed to negotiate its position with the Australian merchants. By bringing the
problem to the two governments, the German journal contended, the private companies
unnecessarily increased tensions between the two states.65 The Times responded to this
argument by asserting that the German view ignored the fact that both the German
company and the German government breached the convention with their actions, which
was what caused the most significant damage between the two states.66
In the debates regarding the German acquisition of Pacific colonies, most readers
considered the Times and the Kölnische Zeitung as representing the official government
views on the issues. As tensions intensified in relation to both Samoa and the Marshall

64

London Times, December 24, 1904,3, 12.

65

Kölnische Zeitung, December 24, 1904, 1.

66

London Times, December 24, 1904, 3, 12.

204

Islands, this assumption only increased. In the Pacific, the British government worked to
maintain its established position and to placate the demands of the populations of
Australia and New Zealand that viewed German expansion in the region as a direct threat
to their commercial enterprises.67 The German government, however, saw this area as
suitable for both trading and coal stations for their expanding naval and commercial
interests.68 For a state new to empire building, the Pacific region represented an
opportunity to establish itself without necessarily having to come into direct conflict with
another power. The German government did not understand that the British government
considered the area as within its sphere of influence due to Australia and New Zealand
representing the dominant European presence. The German press also failed to recognize
this position, and thus when the British press protested and criticized the German
government’s actions, the defensively hostile response only served to maintain and
amplify tensions between the two powers.69
The German Navy
In relation to Germany’s expansion in the colonial sphere there materialized the
drive for a larger German navy. Wilhelm II very much favored a great German navy,
wanting to emulate the British navy and the subsequent strength it provided for Great
Britain as a Great Power. Initially, the British press supported Wilhelm II’s interest in
building up the German navy, as it represented his respect of the British navy.70 This
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British attitude changed once German domestic support for a larger German navy
increased. Prompted by articles present in most segments of the German press, German
public opinion advocated a larger navy to protect the Germany’s growing international
presence and expand global investment. The Times and Kölnische Zeitung produced
more moderate interpretations of the effects of the possible large German navy. Unlike
the critical and jingoistic responses from Pall Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung to be discussed in the next chapter, these two journals downplayed the immediate
consequences for the pro-German navy agitation. Despite the lack of extreme support or
opposition to the German navy project in the Times and Kölnische Zeitung, it is necessary
to discuss how these “official” journals responded to the debate in order to show that
those newspapers supposedly “inspired” by the governments added to the building
tensions between Great Britain and Germany.
Many within the German public opposed the programme to increase the German
navy when the German government first announced its plans. Primarily, this resistance
focused on the cost of the project and the necessity for the populace to pay more taxes to
produce the necessary revenue.71 The Times highlighted the hesitancy to support
Wilhelm II’s plan for a large navy, arguing it would restrain the Kaiser from being able to
challenge the strength of the British navy.72 In response to this observation, the
Kölnische Zeitung pointed out that in order for the new German Empire to protect its
commercial growth globally, there needed to be substantial growth in the German navy,
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specifically battleships.73 Despite the Kölnische Zeitung’s agitation, the Times observed
that German public opinion remained unconvinced.74 This remained the case until two
events involving the British navy prompted a shift in German public opinion in favor of a
larger German navy.
The previously discussed competition in Samoa and the seizure of the German
ships by the British navy off the coast of South Africa during the Boer War served to
spark the German public’s incessant support for a larger German navy. While neither the
Times nor the Kölnische Zeitung harshly attacked the other state in regards to these
events, their discussions educated their populations regarding their states’ interests and
the challenges to those represented by other states. The Times argued that the German
navy presented little threat to the British interests in the immediate future. At the same
time, the British journal observed that those in support of a larger German navy used antiBritish sentiment and jealousy to gain support from German public opinion. In response
to these attempts, the Times worked to dismiss the threats and anti-British feeling
emerging, focusing instead on defending the British government’s activities on the water,
especially following the seizures of the German mail steamers by the British navy during
the Boer War.75 In addition to the Samoa Question, the seizure of these ships prompted
the must approval for a larger German navy in context with the British navy.
The Kölnische Zeitung responding to the Times dismissal of Germany’s needs for
a larger navy, pointed to the British navy’s ability to rule the seas unchallenged as
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determined to the German interests. The German journal argued that the German navy
needed to be powerful enough to prevent a British blockade during war times and to
protect the Ger commercial shipping. These two justifications received little support
until the British navy seized the Bundesrat, Herzog, and General in January 1900,
contending they were carrying contraband to the Boers. With this event, those is favor of
a larger German navy receive a significant boost to their cause. While the Kölnische
Zeitung promoted the view that the situation proved the necessity for a naval increase, the
journal did not attack the British government’s actions. The German newspaper instead
argued that the German government would have reacted in the same fashion.76
It took almost a decade of pro-German navy agitation for the Times to note that
German public opinion really supports a larger German navy by agreeing with Wilhelm
II’s new naval bill in December 1905.77 Until that point, the British journal observed the
continued significant opposition to the project in the German population.78 The
Kölnische Zeitung throughout this period defended its support for a larger German navy
by contending it was necessary for a secure German Empire.79 The Times highlighted
this defensive justification for the increased German navy, and thus showed less concern
than the Pall Mall Gazette’s jingoistic articles produced.80 While the Times and
Kölnische Zeitung did not reflect the overtly hostile sentiment found in the Pall Mall
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Gazette and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, as will be seen in the next chapter, the
sustained discussion of the pro-German navy agitation within the two journals indicated
the continued concern of the two governments regarding the issue and at the same time
educated the two publics of the possible effects of the German government’s attempt to
increase the German navy.
Germany and the Ottoman Empire
During the Near East Crisis, the British government’s determination to maintain
the Ottoman Empire’s territorial integrity dominated Great Power diplomacy. By the
mid-1890s, however, this focus eased and both Germany and Russia attempted to take
advantage of the Ottoman Empire’s increasingly weak state. The growing German
influence over the Ottoman Empire, in particular in relation to the Berlin-Baghdad
Railway, prompted concerns from both Great Britain and Russia. The railroad,
sponsored diplomatically if not financially by the German government to expand German
sway throughout the Middle East and Central Asia, prompting both Great Britain and
Russia to demand various compensation from the Ottoman Empire. The British press
derisively portrayed this new German interest as an attempt by the German government
to manufacture an area where the British government would have to negotiate and deal
with the Germans on their terms.81 The German press, as well as the German
government, deemphasized imperial motivations for German involvement in this region.
They argued instead that only economic concerns drove the project.82
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Unlike during the Near East Crisis, the British press and British government did
not stress their traditional dominance over the Ottoman Empire. Following its
consolidation of control over Egypt, and thus the Suez Canal, the British government did
not need to defend the Ottoman Empire at all costs to maintain its path to India. In this
context, the British government and British press could, and did, mock a German railroad
project in the Middle East, until the extension of the line toward British-dominated Persia
became a threat.83 At that point, some in the British press challenged the non-political
motivations for the venture while the German press and German government emphasized
it. In response to these attacks, the German press questioned the British government’s
ability to maintain its dominance in the Near East and Middle East, wondering if the
negative responses to the Berlin-Baghdad Railway perhaps came from a fear of British
decline and growing German power.84
The Berlin-Baghdad Railway project showed the changed diplomatic environment
in the Near East. The British press and government no longer directed all of their distrust
and hostility toward Russia. Now, skepticism toward the German government’s actions
replaced that anti-Russian sentiment. Following decades of British dominance in the
Near East, the German government replaced the British government as the European
Great Power with the most interests in Ottoman politics. Unlike during the Near East
Crisis, when Disraeli’s government worked diligently to preserve its hegemony, by the
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1890s the British government worried little about maintaining its posture. In particular,
the British government willingly abdicated its position as primary lender to the sultan.85
The Times highlighted this shifting position, arguing that the German government sought
to give loans to get Ottoman concessions while the sultan wanted to tie German banks
down long term investments in order to concede anything to the Germans.86 The German
government viewed this advanced position in the Near East as a symbol of its power and
prestige but Times mocked the opinion arguing that the Germans only gained what no one
else really wanted anymore.87 The Kölnische Zeitung responded to this cynicism by
explaining the German government’s willingness to support the Ottoman Empire even
when none of the other powers will in order to gain influence in the Near East.88
While the British government and Times mocked the perceived diplomatic victory
achieved by the German government in gaining the dominant position with the Ottoman
Empire, the Berlin-Baghdad Railway project resulted in a very different response.
Influence over a decaying empire that only survived due to outside intervention mattered
less than the presence of a foreign state’s sponsored railroad existing too close to one’s
sphere of influence. The Berlin-Baghdad Railway included expanding German influence
along the route. This German involvement moved too close to the British and Russian
spheres of influence in the Middle East and Asia. The Times did not specifically attack
the possibility that the railroad might affect its interests, rather it pointed out the Germans
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attempts to gain Russian and domestic support for the project. The German government
needed Russian support for the Berlin-Baghdad Railway to gain the necessary
concessions from the Ottoman Empire. The Times argued that there existed substantial
Russian opposition to the Berlin-Baghdad Railway and that this could prevent the project
from moving fwd unless the German government managed to gain British support for it.89
The Times’ cynicism toward the potential success of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway
evoked defensive responses from the Kölnische Zeitung. The German journal worked to
show that the British government wanted the project to fail to maintain interests
detrimental for both Germany and Russia. The Kölnische Zeitung contended that the
British press agitated more for Russian opposition than the Russian government itself did.
The German journal also reflected the German government’s assertion that the BerlinBaghdad Railway was a non-political and peaceful project and opposition to it by the
Russian government at the same time Nicholas II tried to negotiate a peace agreement at
the Hague made Russian diplomacy seem hypocritical.90 Ultimately, a German-backed
company completed the Berlin-Baghdad Railway despite opposition from both the British
and the Russians. The results of the debates regarding the railroads merged in Great
Power diplomacy leading up to the First Moroccan Crisis, as the German government
failed to recognize the isolation it achieved by upsetting Russia in the region while
expanding its influence in the Middle East which worried the British government.
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Morocco and the Great Powers
The European domination of Morocco proved the problem that ultimately
prevented any possibility for a long-term Anglo-German alliance or even an
understanding. By the mid-1890s, the sultan’s control of Morocco faced both internal
and external threats. The domestic unrest faced by the Moroccan Sultan prompted
increased European concern, particularly from the French. European interest in Morocco
continued in the last decade of the nineteenth century, but did not provoke any major
issues until 1905. Following the Treaty of Madrid (1880), the European Great Powers
fulfilled their promises not to try and establish exclusive control over any aspect of
Morocco. This changed, however, once the British and French governments decided to
work toward a permanent arrangement. In 1904, the two powers settled long standing
colonial disputes including those involving North Africa. In this settlement, Great Britain
agreed to France establishing a sphere of influence over Morocco while France agreed to
British control of Egypt. This led to the negotiation of the entente cordiale, but did not
meet with universal support. In particular, the German government protested the
Moroccan aspect, viewing its own interest in the area significant enough to warrant their
participation in any negotiations involving Morocco’s future. Neither the British
government nor the British press accepted these arguments, criticizing the German
protests as an attempt to divide the newly established entente cordiale. The German
government and German press, on the other hand, promoted the view that the signatories
of the Treaty of Madrid all had a say in Morocco’s future, meaning there could be no
separate agreements regarding Morocco that could prevent the rest of the interested
powers from asserting their interests. These contradictions in considering the Morocco
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Question provoked the First Moroccan Crisis, which marked the final isolation of
Germany from Russia, France, and Great Britain and from any hope of alliance with
those powers. The effects of these two journals’ articles on the First Moroccan Crisis,
namely preventing any secretive or discreet diplomacy between the Great Powers’
representatives at the Algeciras Conference, emerged due to the constant information
provided to the journals’ reporters by the diplomats. The government officials tried to
use this method to manipulate public support for their goals, but this largely backfired as
the publics, through the presses, indicated support for results not beneficial for all the
parties involved.
As long Russia remained a threat to Great Britain in Asia, the German
government and German press could maintain the belief that the Anglo-French
cooperation in North Africa was unstable. The Times’ articles did little to dispel this
opinion as they consistently challenged the Russian government’s actions in Asia while
only supporting France’s maintenance of the status quo rather than any significant
expansion of French control over Morocco.91 British public opinion maintained its
Russophobia until Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, at which point German
emerged as Great Britain’s primary enemy.92 The Times’ portrayal of Moroccan events
reflected this transition. At the same time, the Kölnische Zeitung indicated the German
government’s and German public opinion’s interests regarding the decline of Russia and
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emergence of the entente cordiale. The Germans wanted to secure an agreement with
France and/or Russia and chose to utilize the Moroccan situation to do so.93
In the years before the entente cordiale’s establishment, both the Times and
Kölnische Zeitung, like the British and German governments, expressed skepticism about
the development of French hegemony over Morocco. Neither the journals nor the
governments viewed the dominance of one Great Power over Morocco favorably.94 Once
the British and French governments established the entente cordiale, however, the British
and German opinions changed. The establishment of spheres of influence in North
Africa represented a primary factor in the Anglo-French agreement, with Great Britain
recognizing French control over Morocco and France agreeing to British dominance over
Egypt.
At this point, the Times no longer expressed suspicion regarding French interests
in Morocco and shifted its support toward Great Britain’s new partners. The British
journal, for instance, argued that the other Great Powers should allow France to maintain
the status quo in Morocco by reestablishing stability in the region.95 The German
government tried to utilize its newly-established arrangement with the Ottoman Sultan to
increase its influence in Morocco in order to challenge French domination. Unlike the
British, the Germans remained dubious of the French intention to protect the interests of
all concerned parties in Morocco.96The Kölnische Zeitung also maintained its skepticism,
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contending that any increase in French power in Morocco interfered with German
interests there. This stance reflected the German public opinion’s continued hostility
toward France even as Wilhelm II and the German government worked to draw France
closer to Germany.97
In 1904, the year leading up to Wilhelm II’s Tangier speech, the Times issued
more overt statements in support of French claims in Morocco and against the German
government’s contentions that Germany had similarly significant interests there. The
British journal argued that even the Moroccan Sultan could do little to stop the French
from asserting their rights in Morocco as the primary involved Great Power due to his
inability to resolve the rebellion within in his realm. The Times further contended that
the German government should support the process as Moroccan stability would only
serve to guarantee German commercial interests in the region.98 During this pre-crisis
period, the British journal criticized German arguments, from groups like the PanGermans, which stated Germany had equal claims in stabilizing Morocco. The British
newspaper dismissed these claims as “irresponsible…manifestations of German
Imperialism” and identified Spain as the only established challenger to French dominance
in Morocco.99
The Kölnische Zeitung, reflecting the German government and German public
opinion, countered these claims by contending that they challenged the Moroccan
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Sultan’s sovereignty guaranteed by the Treaty of Madrid of 1880. Much like the British
arguments regarding the Ottoman Empire and the Treaty of Paris (1856) during the Near
East Crisis, the German stance supported restricting foreign interference in Morocco,
even to reestablish order. The Moroccan Sultan attempted to utilize the differences
between the Great Powers, along with trying to push all foreigners out to appease his
population, to reassert his control.100 The Germans living in Morocco urged their
government to step in and assert the authority the French government did not in order to
end the chaos.101 German public opinion, reflected by the Kölnische Zeitung, wanted
Germany’s interests protected and advanced in Morocco, which in turn provided he
necessary impetus for Wilhelm II to sail to Tangier.102
By 31 March 1905, when Wilhelm II landed at Tangiers, the Moroccan Question,
much like the Eastern Question of the Near East Crisis, threatened to draw the European
Great Powers into direct conflict. The Moroccan instability developed over the decade
preceding the German Kaiser’s arrival and the assertion of support for the Moroccan
Sultan’s independent sovereignty. What made this event so dangerous was its inherent
threat to the recently established entente cordiale. While the German government
attempted to defend its Moroccan position, the Times challenged the Germans,
emphasizing what it viewed as ulterior motives beyond the maintaining the status quo.
With this interpretation, the British ‘official’ journal educated British public opinion
about the duplicitous nature of German diplomacy. The British newspaper also reflected
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the British public’s concerns regarding the growing German threat to British interests.103
While the Times questioned the German government’s actions the Kölnische Zeitung
critiqued the British position of defending the French government’s hegemony in
Morocco. At the same time, the German ‘official’ journal supported the German
government’s position in the region.104
Wilhelm II’s arrival in Morocco and avowed support for the Moroccan Sultan in
defiance of French claims prompted a war scare between Germany and France, which,
according to the Times, concerned observers in Great Britain. The British journal argued
that the trip had inherent political value, despite what the German government announced
otherwise. It further contended that Wilhelm II’s mere presence presented an obstacle to
French interests in Morocco guaranteed by the entente cordiale. The Times also argued
that British public opinion supported the British government’s plan to support its
partner’s goals.105 This British encouragement eased the martial tensions between
German and France but worsened relations between Great Britain and Germany. While
emphasizing the supposed political nature of Wilhelm II’s trip, the Times rejected the
German arguments that the German government had significant interests to protect in
Morocco.106
The Kölnische Zeitung disagreed with the Times’ portrayal of the German
Kaiser’s visit to Tangier. The trip, according to the German ‘official’ journal, was to
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protect German commercial interest from the entente cordiale’s provisions by
guaranteeing the Moroccan Sultan’s sovereignty.107 The Kölnische Zeitung dismissed
French criticism of German claims in Morocco, arguing that the German government
represented the only Great Power that wanted to maintain stability without establishing
hegemonic control over Morocco.108 The German government also rejected French
attempts to settle the Moroccan Question between because, according to the German
journal, this would undermine the Moroccan Sultan’s authority on which the Germans
based their Moroccan policy.109
With the German government’s decision to negotiate directly with the Moroccan
Sultan rather than the French government to guarantee German commercial rights, the
Times increased its hostility toward the German’s intentions in Morocco. The British
journal clearly indicated that it viewed the German government’s Moroccan policy as
threatening to the entente cordiale. Reflecting both British public opinion and the British
government’s stance, the Times argued that the German attempt to divide France and
Great Britain resulted in closer ties between the entente cordiale powers. 110 The British
journal also mocked the German government’s attempts to force the French government
into a conference to decide Morocco’s fate. The Times, however, contended that these
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German actions, with their intention to divide the entente cordiale and draw France closer
to Germany, only made the French turn fully against Germany.111
While the Times, British public opinion, and the British government highlighted
the German attempt to use the Moroccan Question to destroy the entente cordiale, the
Kölnische Zeitung, German public opinion, and German government emphasized the
French government’s illegal actions in Morocco. The Kölnische Zeitung continually
referred to the Treaty of Madrid (1880) when it discussed the negotiations between the
French and German governments regarding Morocco. The German journal argued that
this agreement negated the permission the British government gave to France with the
entente cordiale to establish hegemony in Morocco. Furthermore, the German
newspaper argued that the French government intended to utilize is Moroccan position to
set up a protectorate to allow French commerce to push out all foreign competitors, rather
than to reestablish Moroccan stability.112
The Times warned the German government and Wilhelm II regarding their efforts
to manipulate the Moroccan Question for the improvement of the German position and to
the detriment of the French. The British journal argued that this involvement would only
increase British hostility toward Germany as well as encourage the British public to
support the French more.113 When it appeared that German machinations caused
Germanophobe French Foreign Minister’s Theophile Delcasse’s resignation, the Times
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reaffirmed British support for the French position in Morocco.114 This support only
increased as the post-Delcasse French government agreed to the Algeciras Conference.
The Kölnische Zeitung firmly supported the German government’s action in
challenging French hegemony in Morocco, including the pressure put on the French
government to force Delcasse to resign. The German journal, like German public
opinion and the German government, viewed the move as a diplomatic victory that
justified the German Moroccan position.115 By removing what it thought represented the
primary obstacle to Franco-German cooperation, the Kölnische Zeitung argued that the
German government’s protection of the “open door” in Morocco would prevail.116 The
French political transition also removed the last major barrier to the Algeciras
Conference, which the Kölnische Zeitung contended would benefit all of the Great
Powers’ interested in Morocco.117
The Algeciras Conference, from 16 January to 7 April 1906, represented the last
diplomatic opportunity for the German government to rend apart the entente cordiale and
draw France into an alliance. The meeting included those Great Powers that signed the
Treaty of Madrid. The German government viewed the conference as a diplomatic
victory simply for the fact that it met. The British and French government only agreed to
it in order to solidify France’s dominant interest in Morocco and to guarantee acceptable
reforms that would help reestablish stability in Morocco. Much like with the Congress of
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Berlin that ended the Near East Crisis, the Great Powers’ diplomats negotiated the
majority of the primary points of contention before the meeting officially started. This
conference differed from the earlier meeting in that embedded reporters from interested
journals telegraphed information back to the journals’ editors far quicker than in the
previous period. This meant that the European publics, including those of Great Britain
and Germany, had easier access to the negotiations than before. The publics’ interest in
the Algeciras Conference and the presses’ ability to provide them with desire information
prevented the Great Powers’ diplomats from being able to negotiate in the elitist manner
they had at the Congress of Berlin.
The Times highlighted the emergent role of the press at the Algeciras Conference.
The British journal indicated that von Bülow wanted to utilize this presence in order to
convince the European publics, not just the German public, that Germany had important
claims to protect in Morocco.118 The Times argued that the presses’ presence at the
Algeciras Conference could alter the way in which the diplomats reacted.119 The British
journal’s correspondent at Algeciras continually reported on the changing methods of
German diplomacy. The reporter indicated that as the meeting continued, the German
government increasingly recognized its isolation which led the German delegates to
become more conciliatory to French and British demands.120 As the Algeciras
Conference ended, the Times reflected the British government’s victorious sentiments
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regarding maintaining French control over Morocco. This victory, the British journal
concluded, solidified the entente cordiale and finalized German isolation from all of the
other Great Powers accept the Austro-Hungarian Empire.121
The Kölnische Zeitung also issued a description of the Algeciras Conference,
unsurprisingly more favorable to German diplomacy. The German journal supported the
von Bülow’s contention that the German government had a long-term commercial
presence in Morocco but that it had always supported France and Spain’s historical
claims there.122 Unlike the Times, the German ‘official’ newspaper argued that German
diplomacy succeeded in its goals at the Algeciras Conference.123 Despite its position as
the ‘official’ German journal, the Kölnische Zeitung critiqued the German government’s
diplomacy at the meeting. The Kölnische Zeitung, suggested that German government
should have worked to expand the German commercial interest in Morocco.124 The
German journal’s opinion reflected resentment from German public opinion that the
German government gave up its claims too easily at the Algeciras Conference.125
The Algeciras Conference confirmed Germany’s diplomatic isolation. This
isolation made the German leadership increasingly concerned with the future of their
empire. These concerns increased tensions between German and the other Great Powers,
especially Great Britain. Following the conference, Great Britain moved closer to
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France’s ally, Russia, with the view that Russia no longer had the capability to threaten
British interests in Asia, therefore an alliance between them was feasible. In the long run,
the First Moroccan Crisis was a definite defeat for Germany, a fact clearly shown in the
historiography of the event. At the time, however, many in Germany felt that the First
Moroccan Crisis represented a victory for Bülow and a defeat for Great Britain. The
conference was not necessarily a victory for France, both in the short term and the long
run, because now France had to justify its actions to the other Great Powers and Germany
now had an internationally accepted avenue through which to check French pretensions
in Morocco.126 Despite the image of a German victory at Algeciras, within the German
government failure was evident. The Algeciras Conference that ended the First
Moroccan Crisis was the last real opportunity the Germans had to end their diplomatic
isolation, but the German leadership’s inability to manage the Crisis and the negotiations
at the conference effectively meant that German isolation remained fixed. German
diplomats spent the years following the Crisis trying to compensate for that isolation,
with disastrous results.127
Conclusion
When the news of the Jameson Raid broke, few could predict that within ten
years, Germany would be separated from Great Britain, France, and Russia. The
diplomatic isolation faced by the German government resulted from a continuing
competition between Great Britain and Germany that pushed Great Britain toward France
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and later Russia. The diplomatic events that caused this contention did not necessitate
this outcome. The involvement of the British and German presses, however, in educating
and inciting their readers created an environment in which traditional diplomacy, that
made by the ‘big men’ of history such as Benjamin Disraeli and Otto von Bismarck, no
longer worked in isolation and without input from public opinion. The specific role of
the Times and Kölnische Zeitung spurred this tension due to their perceived ‘official’
nature. When these two journals expressed their opinions on interactions between the
British and German governments, observers from both their own publics and those
abroad assumed they reflected the official government view. This supposition impeded
diplomacy, as if those situations where the Times and Kölnische Zeitung published an
item that contradicted explicit statements made by the two governments, it created a
misapprehension of duplicity, which in turn made the two presses further distrust the
other government. This sentiment resulted in pressure on the governments not to
cooperate with the other. The more jingoistic, but still mainstream, journals the Pall Mall
Gazette and the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, which will be discussed in the next
chapter, reinforced this opinion, especially in periods of crisis.
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CHAPTER VII
ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS AND THE ‘SEMI-OFFICIAL’ JOURNALS

“Can any good thing come out of the German press?”
Pall Mall Gazette January 19, 18971
This query from the Pall Mall Gazette reflected the overall sentiment of many
segments within the British press between the Jameson Raid and the First Moroccan
Crisis. The British jingoistic journal posed this question in reaction to the German
press’s attacks on colonial policy in Africa, and it indicated the criticism of the German
press’s response to British foreign policy in general. The Pall Mall Gazette’s tone
toward the German press throughout the period remained hostile, despite fluctuating
portrayals of Wilhelm II and events involving the German government. The conservative
German journal, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, responded to these attacks by
defending any and all aspects of German foreign policy or German public opinion
targeted by the Pall Mall Gazette.
In this chapter, I argue that the antagonistic way in which the Pall Mall Gazette
and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung responded to each other’s coverage of
international events between the Jameson Raid and First Moroccan Crisis created a tense
environment that inhibited the British and German diplomats’ ability to conduct
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diplomacy. The two ‘semi-official’ journals had an increased role in this process
compared to their position during the Near East Crisis. The Pall Mall Gazette and
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung’s coverage of three issues highlight the growing
antagonism present between Great Britain and Germany: the decline of Russia, the
growth of direct competition between Great Britain and Germany, and Wilhelm II’s
words and actions in relation to world affairs. In their discussions regarding these areas
of concern the two ‘semi-official’ journals largely ignored the ‘official’ statements given
by government officials and instead relied on the other journal for a true interpretation of
the other state’s intentions. This differed from the coverage provided by the Times and
Kölnische Zeitung that emphasized the governments’ statements, and provided a more
powerful and critical opinion on international diplomacy that prevented the discrete
diplomacy used by the Great Powers during the Near East Crisis.2
The Decline of Russia
Russia’s decline as a Great Power prompted a great deal of discussion between
the British and German presses as well as the two governments. The potential power
vacuum that would likely emerge due to any Russian collapse presented an opportunity
for both Great Britain and Germany to expand their international interests, particularly in
the Far East. The Russo-Japanese War appeared to the Pall Mall Gazette and
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung to confirm that Russia no longer represented a
significant threat to their territorial interest. This decline, however, made Russia a more
attractive alliance partner as both Germany and the entente cordiale powers worked to
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draw the Russian government into a closer arrangement. The Pall Mall Gazette and
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung both responded to this diplomatic shift in which Russia
was no longer a ‘bogey.’ These responses targeted the new challenger to their state’s
interests replaced Russia. The two ‘semi-official’ journals pointed to the other journal’s
government as the primary villain in exploiting Russia’s decline. Both the Pall Mall
Gazette and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung looked to the other to justify this new
definition of their state’s primary enemy by arguing that the other state had greater
interest in Russia’s decline. This new definition in turn increased tensions between the
two state’s governments.
The most significant change in international diplomacy between the Near East
Crisis and the latter period discussed here concerned the role of Russia as the primary
enemy of Great Britain. During the earlier period, Russophobia dictated the nature of
British foreign policy. At the same time, Bismarck looked to maintain cordial relations
with Russia while also preserving Germany’s amicable interaction with Great Britain.3
While the German government tried to firmly establish a diplomatic arrangement with the
Russian government between the Jameson Raid and the First Moroccan Crisis, the
Russian government, following their French allies increasingly turned toward the British,
a fact highlighted with approval in the Pall Mall Gazette and suspicion in the
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung.4 Within this shift, Nicholas II emerged as a
sympathetic figure in both jingoistic journals.
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Nicholas II succeeded to the Russian throne following his father’s assassination
on 1 November 1894, but his coronation did not take place until May of 1896. During
their coverage of this ceremony, both the Pall Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung emphasized the attention placed on the possible reforms the new tsar
might make. In particular, the two journals discussed the possible positive consequences
the changes could have for improving international diplomacy. Nicholas II himself
projected a vulnerability, both mentally and physically, that his father did not. The new
tsar therefore raised hopes that his reign would ease the harsh autocratic system of
government and police that characterized his father’s years as tsar.5 At the same time, the
Pall Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung both recognized Nicholas II’s
limitations in international diplomacy, and they wanted their governments to exploit that
while preventing others from doing so.6
While Nicholas II himself appeared relatively weak and peace-loving, his
government did not.7 The aggressive and expansionist tendencies of the Russian
government continued to cause diplomatic problems well into the Russo-Japanese War.
Many politicians and newspapermen hoped that Nicholas II could move Russia away
from this traditional foreign policy. Most, however, recognized that the stagnant Russian
bureaucracy would not allow the Tsar to rapidly accomplish the reforms that Russia
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desperately needed.8 The Russian government’s failure to industrialize like its Western
European counterparts meant Russia lagged significantly economically and militarily
which in turn started its decline as a Great Powers. The Pall Mall Gazette and
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung both recognized this downward shift and the effect of
that on Great Power diplomacy.9 They differed, though, on the extent and consequences
of this decline on their own state’s interests, especially in the Far East. Throughout these
debates on Russia’s future, Nicholas II consistently appeared as a beacon of hope for
reform and peace. The obstacles he faced, though, and the British or German
government’s exploitation of those for their own benefit remained a point of contention
between the British and German presses which then caused increased hostility and
tensions between the British and German governments.10
The situation in the Far East that involved all of the Great Powers showed both
the apex and the nadir of Russia’s expansionist policies. The Russian acquisition of Port
Arthur in 1898 reflected the Russian ability to force its will in China while the RussoJapanese War revealed Russia’s significant decline as a Great Powers. These two events
that both the Pall Mall Gazette and the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung as they
indicated the danger, or absence thereof, of Russian aggression for their own
government’s Far East ambitions. While the Russian government appeared antagonistic
in the Far East in the Pall Mall Gazette’s columns, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung

8

Pall Mall Gazette, April 18, 1898, 1-2, 5, Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, April 7, 1898, 1.

Troy R.E. Paddock, “Still Stuck at Sevastopol: the Depiction of Russia during the Russo-Japanese
War and the Beginning of the First World War in the German Press,” German History 16, no. 3 (1998):
369.

9

10

Pall Mall Gazette, January 28, 1904, 1.

230

offered a less suspicious view. The British jingoistic journal harshly criticized the
Russian attempts to establish hegemony in the Chinese territory around and including
Manchuria and Korea.11 On the other hand, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung
suggested that Russian influence in the region did not necessarily indicate negative
consequences for other Great Powers’ trade there, but the British government’s demands
regarding Russia in the Far East demonstrated the hypocritical nature of British foreign
policy. The German journal continued by contending that whenever another Great
Powers received a concession coveted by Great Britain the British press and government
declared it to be a result of bullying but when Great Britain received something similar
the resulting territorial and commercial environment was the best option for all Great
Powers.12
The Pall Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung indicated that the
British and German governments consistently debated the intentions of the Russian
government in regards to Port Arthur. The British jingoistic journal continued its antiRussian sentiment when discussing the Far East that it had conveyed throughout the
earlier Near East Crisis.13 In this vein, the British newspaper reflected those dominant
elements of British government and British public opinion that assumed that any Russian
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action in Asia must reveal the Russian government’s interest in expanding territories to
the detriment of other Great Powers.14 The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, on the
other hand, portrayed the Russian acquisition of Port Arthur in a much more sympathetic
light. Reflecting a pro-Russian sentiment of Wilhelm II and the German government, the
German journal contended that the Russian government acted well within its rights of
leasing Port Arthur, a move that the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung did not view as
overly aggressive.15 These portrayals of the Russian leasing of Port Arthur, both the Pall
Mall Gazette and the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung showed their government’s
interest in Russia as an alliance partner. The British government, led by Salisbury, did
not care to draw the Russian government into a closer arrangement, while Wilhelm II
very much wanted to entice Nicholas II and his government into a closer diplomatic
understanding.16 These intentions did not remain unnoticed and both journals noted the
ulterior motives of the other state’s government in dealing with the Port Arthur issue.17
During this expansionist phase of Russian involvement in the Far East, Nicholas
II represented a figure that both embodied and stood apart from the Russian government.
Due to the autocratic nature of Russia, Nicholas II supposedly made the final decisions
for his state. Within this type of government, the Russian Tsar theoretically only needed
to dictate change or reform for it to occur. In reality, however, even at the height of his
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power, Nicholas II faced difficulties in forcing the Russian bureaucracy to enact his plans
to modernize Russia.18 The Pall Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung
recognized this overwhelming obstacle to Nicholas II’s plans for Russia.19 This
observation allowed both journals to separate him from the supposed negative actions of
his government when they chose to make the distinction.20
The Pall Mall Gazette more often distinguished Nicholas II’s wishes for peace
and cooperation from the hawkish aristocracy that dominated the Russian government.
The British jingoistic journal stressed its belief that Nicholas II acted with good intension
despite the Russian government’s activities that potentially threatened British interests.21
The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung showed the Russian Tsar as a far stronger
individual. It emphasized his and his government’s ability to disregard British demands
and exert its control in those Chinese regions Russia dominated.22 The Norddeutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung’s depiction of Nicholas II and the Russian government reflected
Wilhelm II and the German government’s ambitions for an alliance between Russia and
Germany. German public opinion would not accept another diplomatic arrangement with
a weak state, the Austro-Hungarian Empire already hindered rather than helped Germany,
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therefore Russia needed to appear as a strong state.23 The Norddeutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung’s portrayal of Nicholas II and Russia provided evidence of that reality.24
During the final years before the Russo-Japanese War, the Pall Mall Gazette and
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung’s interest in Russia as a Great Power intensified. The
Russian government’s attempts to industrialize, along with its refusal to accept any sort
of reform resulted in the emergence of a significant revolutionary movement which
destabilized Russia internally and limited the Russian government’s ability to do much
internationally. In this environment, the Russian Tsar perhaps should have instructed his
government to compromise with Japan in the Far East. The issues of Russian prestige as
a Great Power, however, prevented any concessions of power in the Far East such as
those demanded by Japan to prevent a war.
The Pall Mall Gazette argued that the Russian government needed to agree to
Japan’s conditions, but predicted that it would not be able to do so.25 The Norddeutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung expressed the view that if Nicholas II wanted to go to war to defend
its interests in the Far East then the German government should remain neutral and
prevent other states, in particular Great Britain, from interfering in the Russo-Japanese
War.26 The German journal, like many within the German government and German
public opinion, assumed that the British government waited for an opportunity to join the
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conflict on Japan’s side in order to remove the Russian threat to India permanently.27
The Pall Mall Gazette dismissed these types of claims from the German press and
produced its own theories about Wilhelm II wanting to pressure Nicholas II into allying
with Germany.28
The Russo-Japanese War, prompted by decades of conflict over Korea and
Manchuria, interested both the British and German governments, presses, and public
opinions as it involved a long-standing, but declining European Great Powers fighting a
newer but more capable Asiatic power. Following as it did the reaffirmation of the Dual
Alliance between Russia and France, the successful establishment of both the AngloJapanese Alliance (1902) and entente cordiale (1904), the war included the risk of
spreading into a general conflict if the alliances went into effect. Based on the powers
competing in the Russo-Japanese War, the British and German presses perhaps should
have focused on the dangers presented by the Japanese or Russian action. Instead, they
both highlighted the other state’s machinations behind the scenes that explained the
diplomatic environment created by the war for their own imperial goals.
As the war progressed, these British claims increased, especially following the
Björkö meeting, at which Wilhelm II tried to convince Nicholas II to an alliance between
Germany and Russia. The Pall Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung
applied differing significance to the event. The British jingoistic journal argued that the
meeting showed Wilhelm II and the German government’s intention to exploit Russia’s
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growing weaknesses to pressure the Russian government into a strong understanding.29
The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung responded to these claims by contending that the
Russian government was not as weak as the British press argued, but that the changing
diplomatic environment offered new opportunities for the Germany and Russia to come
to a close understanding.30 This attempt by Wilhelm II to use his personal relationship
with Nicholas II to gain prestige and power increased resentment toward Wilhelm II and
the German government within the Pall Mall Gazette.31 This growing hostility in turn
prompted the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung to defend its government’s action
increasing the debate between the two presses and public opinions.32
The British press and the British government viewed this as an attempt by
Wilhelm II to manipulate his “weaker” cousin into abandoning his alliance with France
for one with Germany. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung did not denounce the
claims outright, rather it explained that the German Kaiser wanted to help the Russian
Tsar in his time of need when his French ally failed to do so.33 The British government,
it argued, also wanted the Russian government to stay as weak as possible in international
diplomacy which was why it so adamantly opposed any agreements between Germany
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and Russia.34 The encounter concluded with little success due to the fact that neither von
Bülow nor Witte would agree to the treaty negotiated there. The treaty’s nullification did
little to negate the effect of it in the British and German presses.35
Another incident involving Russian actions in the Far East during the RussoJapanese War that prompted an increase in Anglo-German tension involved Russian
navy’s assault on British trawlers in the North Sea at Dogger Banks. On 21 October
1904, the Russian Baltic Fleet fired on British civilian ships fishing at Dogger Banks. An
unprovoked attack on civilian targets from a neutral country during wartime usually
provokes hostile criticism and in this instance, some within the British press and
government agitated for a declaration of war against the Russian government as a
response.36 Trying to prevent this event from inciting war between Great Britain and
Russia, Nicholas II and his government contended that the Russian navy fired upon the
British trawlers because the seamen identified the ships as Japanese warships. The
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Russian government continued that it would appropriately punish those to blame but that
it would not simply halt the voyage of the Russian Baltic Fleet on its way to fight in the
Russo-Japanese War in order to investigate an isolated incident.
While the British government accepted the apology, significant segments of the
British press and British public opinion echoed the Pall Mall Gazette’s stance that the
British government did not pursue enough justice for the civilians’ deaths and that in turn
injured British prestige and belied the perception of British power.37 The British
government’s response to Dogger Banks indicated the shift away from the Russophobia
that so long drove British foreign politics. An attack such as this in a previous generation
probably would have caused a significant war scare between Great Britain and Russia.
The fact that the British government gave no indication it would go to war over the issue,
as well as the prominent opinion that the Germans actually caused the incident reflected
the solidification of the British government’s new direction in diplomacy in which it
could negotiate an understanding with Russia while not being able to do so with
Germany.38
The Pall Mall Gazette and the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung reflected the
resentment caused between Great Britain and Germany by the British and German
presses as a result of Dogger Banks. Once the immediate anger toward Russia died
down, which only took a few days, the Pall Mall Gazette initiated a debate regarding the
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German government’s culpability in Dogger Banks.39 The British jingoistic journal,
using evidence produced by the French, argued that the German government’s warnings
to Russian government about the supposed presence of Japanese warships in the North
Sea prompted the event. The Pall Mall Gazette further contended that the Germans
wanted to exploit the consequent conflict it predicted to occur after the attack to isolate
Great Britain in Europe and bring Russia closer to itself.40 The Norddeutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung responded to these accusations by pointing out that the Russian Admiral did not
act outside the rules of civilized warfare at Dogger Banks due to the alliance between
Great Britain and Japan and to the knowledge that British firms built Japanese warships
thus making it conceivable that there would be Japanese warships in the North Sea. The
German journal also criticized the British press’s militant response to the event, arguing
that if the British government had remained strictly neutral and not allowed British firms
to sell Japan ships, then the Russian government could not rationally assume that the
Japanese navy would be present in the North Sea.41
Russia’s decline following the Russo-Japanese War made it a more viable alliance
partner for both Great Britain and Germany. Even as the Pall Mall Gazette considered
Nicholas II in a positive manner throughout the period between the Jameson Raid and the
First Moroccan Crisis, not until after Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese War did the
British journal began really advocating a closer arrangement with the Russian
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government.42 At the same time, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung published items
that reflected the similar interests the German government had in such an agreement with
Russia.43 The Russian government’s apparent weakness allowed the Pall Mall Gazette to
support the British government’s shift toward joining its entente cordiale partner France
in working with Russia rather than trying to deal with an aggressive Germany while also
prompting Wilhelm II to try to exploit that vulnerability to manipulate Nicholas II into
signing an alliance with Germany.44
The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung argued, similarly to the Pall Mall Gazette,
that Russia now needed a stable alliance partner. Wilhelm II decided that the best choice
for Russia would be his own state and worked to utilize his personal relationship with
Nicholas II to achieve this goal. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung supported the
German government’s attempts to negotiate a diplomatic agreement with Russia and
emphasized the possible benefits to both Germany and Russia.45 When Nicholas II
rejected Wilhelm II’s overtures, largely due to the fact that sort of alliance between
Russia and Germany would be an inherently unequal one in which Wilhelm II held more
power than Nicholas II and the fact that Nicholas II did not want to move away from
France, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung began to criticize France and Great Britain
as exploiting the Russian government’s desperation for loans to force it into an
unbalanced arrangement that would only serve to injure Russian interests in the long-
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term.46 In this discussion of Russia’s diplomatic future, Nicholas II played an important
role. Wilhelm II hinged all of his plans on being able to convince the Russian Tsar to
follow his lead and bring the Russian government with him.47 When this failed, the
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung argued that Nicholas II’s inability to force his
government to follow him, rather than the Russian Tsar simply not wanting to work with
Wilhelm II, led to his shift closer toward Great Britain and France.48
The support for diplomatic arrangements between the British and German
governments, by the Pall Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung
respectively, due to Russia’s decline during the 1890s indicated the vast difference in
European diplomacy between the Near East Crisis and in the decade following the
Jameson Raid, the British and German presses no longer focused on the Russian Menace,
rather they highlighted their government’s attempts to move closer to Russia. This shift
left the two states as the other’s primary enemy and the critiques made against the other
state’s imperial interests in regards to the other Great Powers only worked to increase
resentment between the two presses which then limited the diplomatic cooperation or
agreement between the two governments.49
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The Effects of Direct Competition on Anglo-German Relations
Russia’s decline had a major impact on Anglo-German relations as it expanded
the areas in which Great Britain and Germany’s interests came into direct conflict.
Unlike during the Near East Crisis, when Germany had little competition with Great
Britain, especially territorially, by 1896, and increasingly in the decade preceding the
Algeciras Conference, the expanding German Empire challenged the hegemony held by
the British Empire globally. This challenge prompted the Pall Mall Gazette to attack the
German government continuously between 1896 and 1906 whenever and wherever Great
Britain and Germany came into contact but the German government did not act like the
British journal thought it should. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung performed the
same function in Germany against British actions. There were four issues highlighted by
the Pall Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung over which the British and
German governments directly conflicted: questions of sovereignty in the Transvaal before
and during the Boer War, the growth of the German navy, spheres of influence in the Far
East, and the future of Morocco. The antagonistic articles coming from the two ‘semiofficial’ journals that heavily criticized the other government regarding these issues
created increased tensions between the British and German governments. The British
and German governments could do little to restrain the jingoistic sentiment within the
Pall Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung as the two newspapers reacted
to each rather than the other government’s statements.
The Jameson Raid sparked criticism, even from the Pall Mall Gazette. The
jingoistic British journal agreed with the Times that the situation in the Transvaal did not
warrant such an attack. Where the Pall Mall Gazette differed from the ‘official’ journal
242

was in the fact that the conservative newspaper worked to disavow any claim by Krüger’s
government that might use the Jameson Raid to justify moving farther away from British
control.50 The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, however, supported Krüger’s claims,
much like Wilhelm II did with the Krüger Telegram.51 The German jingoistic journal
contended that British pretensions of suzerainty over the Boers ignored the current
situation in the Transvaal where the Boers controlled the government.52
The Pall Mall Gazette warned that the other Great Powers, but especially
Germany, needed to recognize that Krüger’s government did not have sovereignty
outside of the domestic relations in the Transvaal.53 The British jingoistic journal also
cautioned against the other Great Powers trying to utilize the situation to further their
own aims in the region. With this warning, the Pall Mall Gazette specifically targeted
the German government as it had already made claims regarding territory near the
Transvaal.54 These threats against German action in South Africa prompted the
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung to defend the German government’s response via the
Krüger Telegram while also emphasizing the British government’s ulterior motives and
probable involvement supporting and promoting the Jameson Raid.55
Wilhelm II’s message of congratulations and support to Krüger for repelling the
Jameson Raid, the Krüger Telegram, provoked immediate hostility and resentment in the
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British press in general.56 The Pall Mall Gazette condemned the action, arguing that the
message represented a challenge to the British Empire itself as a foreign monarch offered
future aid to a British colony without consulting the British government.57 Even after the
extreme reaction to the Krüger Telegram died down, the British jingoistic journal
continually referred to it when it criticized the German expansionist policies in South
Africa and elsewhere through to the First Moroccan Crisis and beyond.58 The
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung issued a defense of Wilhelm II’s action, contending
that the Krüger Telegram did not intend to challenge the British government, rather it was
an attempt to support Krüger’s government against the extra-legal invasion.59 Despite
not trying to threaten the British government’s power in South Africa with the Krüger
Telegram, it appeared to the Pall Mall Gazette reflected that this was the message’s
purpose.60
Following the British outcry against the Krüger Telegram emerging in the British
government, and facing the threat of possible repercussions from the telegram, Wilhelm
II issued an explanation for sending the message to Krüger.61 This explanation placated
the British government but not the Pall Mall Gazette, which continued to agitate for a
few more weeks for an example of what would happen if another Great Powers decided
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to intervene on the behalf of one of its colonies.62 As the fervor in the British public died
down so did the anti-German rhetoric in the Pall Mall Gazette. In response to these
attacks, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung emphasized the apologetic tone employed
by Wilhelm II in his explanation of the Krüger Telegram but did not necessarily condone
it.63 The German journal expressed the opinions of those pro-Boer segments of German
public opinion that wanted to aid the Boers in their struggle for sovereignty against Great
Britain.64 The Pall Mall Gazette, as well as many within the British government,
contended that those views published in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung reflected
the majority of both German public opinion and the German government.65
The Pall Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung’s interest in the
other government’s role in Transvaal events largely died down in the months after the
Krüger Telegram. Another contentious issue, however, emerged at the same time: the
development of a large German navy. The German government’s campaign to build a
strong German navy represented one of the primary obstacles to close relations between
Great Britain and Germany. In the British press’s discussion of the German navy, the
Pall Mall Gazette represented the jingoistic and pro-British navy opinion within the
British public opinion, while the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung performed the same
function in the German press. The Pall Mall Gazette’s description of his programme,
however, did not always indicate a sense of concern, leading to the Norddeutsche
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Allgemeine Zeitung to defend its government’s naval status.66 The British perception
changed along with those of Wilhelm II and his Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow as the
German government started to present a challenge to Great Britain.67 The Pall Mall
Gazette chose to discuss the German navy in three ways: mocking the German need for a
navy at all, as an insipid entity that could not compete with the British navy, and as a tool
of German aggression. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung responded to all of these
descriptions which only served to increase debate between the two journals regarding the
German navy’s status. By potraying the German navy as they did, the Pall Mall Gazette
showed that the British navy remained the supreme naval power and the British
government continued to maintain that position among the Great Powers and the
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung indicated the German government’s interest in altering
that dominance with a larger German navy.68
Wilhelm II’s desire to have a modern German navy based on the British navy
prompted the German government’s interest in building a large fleet. Initially, he
intended a modest increase as he did not want to provoke war with Great Britain.69 The
German government worked to dismiss the inherent dangers of a larger German navy to
the status quo, but few in the British press and British public opinion indicated that they
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believed this. At this point, the British press focused on the reasons why Germany did
not need a larger navy. British public opinion, as well as German public opinion, shared
this opinion, the latter fact made it necessary for the German government to build
domestic support for the German navy. In order to do so, Wilhelm II and his advisors,
along with the leading sections of Germany society, highlighted international events such
as the Samoan Crisis and the Boxer Rebellion to advocate their position.
While the pro-German navy groups in German society stressed the need to have a
significant increase in the navy’s size due to protecting the German Empire abroad, the
British press consistently mocked the very idea that there was a real empire to protect.70
The immediate competition that emerged during this period, however, indicated a sense
of rivalry between Great Britain and Germany in which the British held the superior
position due to their naval strength. The Pall Mall Gazette discussed this sense of
rivalry, epitomized by the “Made in Germany” debate, which objected to the supposed
trade deficit between Germany and Great Britain. While other segments of the British
press pushed for the British government to consider this commercial situation, the British
jingoistic journal argued that the German commercial interests did not represent a
significant threat to the British economy due to the markets and available the empire.71
When the German government attempted to circumvent British trade with its colonies,
the Pall Mall Gazette attacked the effort.72 At this point, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine
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Zeitung fully advocated the enlargement of the German navy in order to access markets
dominated by Great Britain’s naval control.73
The Pall Mall Gazette refused to countenance the argument that any navy could
seriously complete with the British navy in the late 1890s. By the early years of the 20th
century, however, the intention of the German government to build a naval force capable
of challenging the British navy appeared clear to Pall Mall Gazette.74 This shift
prompted hostility from this newspaper as well as from the rest of the British press. The
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, reflecting the opinion of Wilhelm II and the German
government, argued that this British presumption further necessitated the German navy’s
growth.75 The debates between the British and German presses regarding this reinforced
the resentment existent between the British and German presses regarding their states
internationally and challenges to these.
By the turn of the 20th century, the British government and public opinion all
viewed Wilhelm II and the German government’s naval program as indicative of
Germany’s aggressive aims in international affairs.76 This opinion prompted the harshest
criticism against a larger German navy from the Pall Mall Gazette and strongest support
for it from the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. Throughout the 1896 to 1906 period,
Wilhelm II and his government stressed the defensive nature of the new naval plans.
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According to these men, Germany needed a larger fleet in order to protect its commercial
interests recently acquired via territorial concessions, particularly in the China and the
Pacific Ocean region.77 The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung promoted this view,
linking the new naval plan to the needs of the new German Empire.78 The Pall Mall
Gazette, however, pointed to the planned German navy as a possible tool for German
aggression.79 The British jingoistic journal argued that since Germany really had no need
for a large navy due to the limited scope of its empire, that the move to increase it
indicated that the German government intended to increase the size of its international
holdings by force.80
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, reflecting the opinion of Wilhelm II and the
German government, argued that this British presumption further necessitated the
German navy’s growth.81 It also provoked the German journal’s defense of Wilhelm II
and the German government. The German journal argued that the British government
bullied other Great Powers with its navy, threatening crippling blockades and seizure of
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ships if or when the other power acted in a way contrary to British interests.82 These
types of actions, the Germans argued, required the German government to increase the
German navy. This did not necessarily entail that the German navy had to be numerically
equal to the British navy as that was really impossible to accomplish. What the German
government intended to do rather was to improve its navy’s strength to a degree at which
it could prevent a successful blockade of German coasts by the British navy as well as
with the help of another power effectively challenge the dominance of the British navy
globally and thereby end the British government’s bullying of the other Great Powers.83
Much like with their discussions of Nicholas II and Russia, the Pall Mall Gazette
and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung looked to the Far East when considering the
growing competition between Great Britain and Germany. The Pall Mall Gazette and
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung focused on two primary areas regarding the activities
of the Great Powers in the Far East: China’s future and the effects of Russian expansion
on diplomacy discussed previously. In both of these, all of the Great Powers, but
especially Great Britain, Germany, and Russia, had significant interests. The Far East
represented the region in which these Great Powers’ holdings directly conflicted. From
the German acquisition of Kiaochow to the Russo-Japanese War’s conclusion, the Pall
Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung devoted considerable amounts of ink
and column space to the situation in the Far East both dealing with China’s decline and
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with Russia increasing and later decreasing presence in Manchuria and Korea.84 By the
time Russia and Japan signed the Treaty of Portsmouth the two main jingoistic British
and German journals focused more on each other governments than the position of
Russia, or any of the other Great Powers, in the Far East as they considered the other as
the primary opponent to their state’s interests.85 Even in those instances of cooperation
between the Great Powers, such as during the Boxer Rebellion, this skepticism and
hostility of Germany’s intentions from the Pall Mall Gazette and of Great Britain’s in the
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung remained prominent.86 These negative statements only
added to the resentment with which the British and German presses viewed the other and
the other’s government.
China’s decline as a Great Power sparked competition between the other Great
Powers regarding control of its vast resources and markets. The Great Powers wanted to
carve out territorial concessions that would provide commercial success for its state that
would then increase the government’s prestige. It took actions by the Chinese
themselves, however, before Great Britain and Germany could justify acquiring Chinese
territory to their public. The Russian government, on the other hand, had no such
concerns when staking its claims on the coveted possession of Port Arthur.
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As discussed in the previous chapter, the concessions taken by Great Britain,
Germany, and Russia followed the murders of Germany missionaries by Chinese
civilians. The German government’s justifications for taking Kiaochow appeared clearly
understandable, but the Pall Mall Gazette wondered when the British would require
similar concessions from the Chinese government to maintain a balance of power in the
region.87 Salisbury worried little about the German seizure of territory but also
understood that British public opinion required the British government demand
compensation from the Chinese government.88 The British Prime Minister waited until
the Russian government forced the Chinese government to give it Port Arthur to insist on
a similar concession in the region.89
The Pall Mall Gazette and the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung both strongly
advocated their government’s acquisition of Chinese territory that included significant
opportunities for commerce. At the same time, both journals also criticized the behavior
and motivations of the other states’ representatives in those concessions.90 Once Great
Britain, Germany, and Russia acquired these Chinese territories, they directly conflicted
with each other in the Far East. While this competition between these Great Powers did
not necessitate discord between these three governments, this fact did not prevent the
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jingoistic journals here from highlighting the threats created by the measure of other
Great Powers means to own territory.
The Pall Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung referred to the
German and British, respectively, territory in depreciative terms. The British jingoistic
journal rejected any real significance for the German holding at Kiaochow, the Pall Mall
Gazette argued that this territory really offered few advantages for the German Empire.
It further contended the German acquisitions caused the German government more
problems with the other Great Powers than they were already prepared to handle.91 The
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung portrayed the British acquirement of Wei-hei-Wei in
similar fashion. The German journal contended that the British interest in this area of
China, away from the already established colony of Hong Kong, represented a move
against the German and Russian aims, rather than a real commercial benefit in the
region.92 The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung also stressed the weak value of Wei-heiWei. When British officials, such as Lord Salisbury, publicly questioned the benefits of
the new Chinese concession, it served to validate and amplify foreign mockery of the
acquisition.93
Despite the limited economic value of Wei-hei-Wei and Kiaochow, both British
and German governments continued to emphasize the importance of maintaining these
colonies.94 Both also stressed the supposed commercial advantage of the territory and the
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necessity of their militaries’ presence in the region to keep the other Great Powers from
taking advantage of the Chinese government’s weakness.95 The Pall Mall Gazette and
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung emphasized the advantages of their Chinese territories
for their own state while downplaying the attractiveness of the other European holdings.
This coverage prompted each journal to respond to the other in defense of their state,
further increasing tensions.
Morocco was final area in which Anglo-German interests competed, one that
produced the most significant threat to European peace. Otto von Bismarck once
predicted that the next European war, after the Franco-Prussian War, would erupt over
Morocco.96 By 1905, at the beginning of the First Moroccan Crisis, it appeared to some
within the British and German governments presses and publics that the prophecy may be
fulfilled. Before the entente cordiale’s establishment, the British government and Pall
Mall Gazette followed events in the North African state closely, waiting to see if France
or Spain attempted to gain control of ports along the Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic
Ocean.97
The Pall Mall Gazette argued that it made sense that these two states wanted a
greater position in Morocco, but the British government would never allow another Great
Powers to completely dominate any of the ports near Gibraltar.98 The French interest in
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establishing hegemony over Morocco, the British jingoistic journal contended, reflected a
rational consequence of the French concern with maintaining stability in its Algerian
colony.99 The instability in Morocco that continued throughout the period threatened to
spread into France’s colonial realms of North Africa. Therefore, the French government
needed the Morocco chaos to end, preferably with it receiving general European support
for a mandate there.100
The German government and the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung viewed the
Morocco questions rather differently. Both criticized the French attempts to exploit
Morocco’s instability to extend French influence in North Africa.101 At this earlier point,
before 1905, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung did not necessarily advocate German
intervention in Morocco, as it assumed the British intentions regarding protecting
Gibraltar would keep the French government from expanding its authority.102 The
German journal emphasized the potential danger to British Mediterranean interests,
specifically in relation to Gibraltar and Egypt, rather than any German commercial
involvement in the region that might need protection from the German government.
Following the announcement of the entente cordiale in April 1904, the
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung’s focus shifted away from the conflict of interests
98
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between Great Britain and France which would limit the obstacles the French government
would put up against German commerce in Morocco. Instead of emphasizing the benefit
of the Anglo-French tensions for German trade in North Africa, the German journal
highlighted the negative effects this new understanding between Great Britain and France
potentially might have on German interests.103 The criticisms emerging from the
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung specifically targeted British government’s wanting an
alliance with any European power not Germany. The German journal, like the German
government, understood that France needed the entente cordiale but could not forgive
Great Britain for choosing France over Germany.104 The Norddeutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung’s critique of British policy and French pretensions in Morocco only intensified
during the First Moroccan Crisis.105
On 31 March 1905, Wilhelm II arrived at Tangiers. He gave a speech specifying
his and his government’s intentions to help maintain the Morocco Sultan’s sovereignty
and the economic open door for all the Great Powers. The German Kaiser, pushed into
making this stand by von Bülow, sparked the First Moroccan Crisis with this
appearance.106 Much like its critiques of German’s involvement in China and its new
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naval program, the Pall Mall Gazette discussed the German government’s interests in
Morocco in mocking terms.107
The British jingoistic journal like the British government, dismissed Wilhelm II’s
demands and observations. The Pall Mall Gazette argued that France’s intention to
restore order to Morocco promoted rather than prevented an open door policy as a stable
commercial market benefitted all states involved.108 The British newspaper continued its
criticism of the German Kaiser’s Tangier’s speech by pointing out how limited the
German commercial interests the German government sought to protect actually were
compared to both Great Britain and France.109 The Pall Mall Gazette also expressed
skepticism toward the German government’s real intentions in Morocco. The British
jingoistic journal like the British government, argued that the German government’s
intention in Morocco was to destroy the entente cordiale, not to protect the Morocco
Sultan’s sovereignty.110 This British stance prompted significant resentment and hostility
from the German press, as well as the German government, both of which objected to the
British press’s portrayal of their supposed ulterior motives in Morocco.
The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung provided a direct counterpoint to the Pall
Mall Gazette’s suspicion of German’s motives and promotions of France’s interests in
Morocco. The German journal echoed the German government’s emphasis on
Germany’s significant Moroccan interest. They both argued that Great Britain and
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France needed to consider these before making decisions regarding Morocco’s future but
that they refused to do so.111 The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung also stressed the
German government’s focus on protecting the Moroccan Sultan from French pretenses to
undermine his authority.112 The German government’s decision to demand a conference
to decide on Morocco’s future in relation to European intervention echoed Norddeutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung’s contention that only a decision by all interested powers could gain
acceptance by the Great Powers not involved in the entente cordiale.113 This agreement,
according to the Pall Mall Gazette and British government, reinforced the opinion that
the German government intended to destroy the entente cordiale with the Morocco
question.114 Although the German government succeeded in calling a conference to
decide on Morocco’s future, the Algeciras Conference, the achievement did not equate
with any long term triumph despite what the German press and the German government
argued about their diplomatic victory.115
The Algeciras Conference itself destroyed all remaining hope that the German
government could gain any beneficial alliances with the other Great Powers beyond its
long-standing agreement with the Austro-Hungarian Empire.116 The First Moroccan
Crisis also strengthened the entente cordiale and increased European distrust of the
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German government.117 The French government received control over the police force
along with Spain, and the meeting confirmed the already existent open door in Morocco.
Despite the German government’s failure to achieve any of its goals at the Algeciras
Conference, the German press, much to the amusement of the Pall Mall Gazette,
maintained its view that by securing the continued sovereignty of the Moroccan Sultan,
along with the preserving commercial free trade, the German government achieved its
goal at the Algeciras Conference.118 The British jingoistic journal mocked these
delusions of success, arguing that the European publics knew that France won the
diplomatic contest, despite German claims to the contrary.119
For the Pall Mall Gazette and the British government, the German actions during
the First Moroccan Crisis proved the duplicitous and scheming nature of German foreign
policy, especially as the German government continued to argue that the British and
French were the ones creating obstacles at the Algeciras Conference while all evidence in
the European presses showed otherwise.120 The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung
supported the German government’s contention that it achieved its goals at the Algeciras
Conference.121 With this in mind the hostility toward Great Britain within the German
press following the publication of these types of articles prompted the Pall Mall Gazette
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to question the strength of anti-British sentiment in the German public and the possible
disastrous consequences of those feelings.122
These two journals advocated the interests of their states’ colonial policies in
reference to Morocco. For the Pall Mall Gazette and the British government, this meant
first highlighting the possible consequences of French hegemony in Morocco and later
supporting French claims there.123 The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung and the
German government focused on challenging the French government’s contentions and
promoting the German commercial presence in Morocco.124 As Great Britain and France
shifted closer together, a move culminating in the entente cordiale, the British and French
governments’ interests intertwined, meaning that any German challenge to France in
Morocco also meant one to Great Britain. The German government intended these
disputes according to the Pall Mall Gazette, to destroy the entente cordiale, a contention
the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung dismissed.125 The German jingoistic journal
instead tried to promote the German government as the only Great Powers truly
interested in maintaining the Moroccan Sultan’s sovereignty, an argument rejected by the
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British jingoistic journal.126 The debates between these two newspapers, and their focus
on the imperial motivations for involvement in Morocco, reflected the overt hostility
present in both the British and German public opinions by the time of the First Moroccan
Crisis.
Wilhelm II
The Pall Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung’s portrayal of
Wilhelm II epitomized the reactive nature of the discussions occurring between the two
‘semi-official’ journals. In their articles, the two newspapers responded to the other’s
interpretation of the German Kaiser’s words and actions, rather than to what was actually
said or done. Following the Jameson Raid, the British press increasingly critiqued
Wilhelm II. In response to the British press’s criticism of Wilhelm II epitomized by the
Pall Mall Gazette, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung continually issued defenses of
the German Kaiser’s actions and words. This support went far beyond the rules of lese
majeste , which forbid the German press from criticizing Wilhelm II. It indicated the
view that the German Kaiser was correct in his words and deeds. It also maintained that
the other European presses, in particular that of Great Britain, misunderstood his
intentions, which in turn prompted them to write scurrilous items about Wilhelm II. 127
The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung also provided more criticism of the British press’s
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critiques of the German Kaiser. The German journal argued that Wilhelm II’s activities
differed little from those of any other monarch and therefore did not necessarily warrant
the suspicion of other Great Powers.128
Like with the Pall Mall Gazette, Wilhelm II represented the German government
for the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung as well. This, however, was not problematic
for the German journal as it did not view his rhetoric as irrational or overly dramatic.129
During periods of crisis between Germany and other Great Powers, the Norddeutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung consistently argued that the other Great Powers’ refusal to consider
the German government’s equal interest in international events caused the tensions rather
than anything said or done by Wilhelm II. This deflection of blamed continued
throughout the period, as the German journal contended that the German government and
Wilhelm II intended to act in a way to create outcomes to benefit all involved, but the
selfish attitudes of the other Great Powers, particularly Great Britain, made Wilhelm II
look to consistently have ulterior and destructive motives to injure those parties’ interests
that did not parallel those of Germany.130
The Pall Mall Gazette’s portrayal of Wilhelm II differed depending on his actions
in international diplomacy. Meanwhile, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung
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maintained a defensive posture toward its monarch. The British jingoistic journal
showed Wilhelm II as an effective and capable ruler when he acted in a fashion that
supported the British government’s interests. When the German Kaiser did not play the
role expected of him, the newspaper described him in overly dramatic, problematic, and
autocratic terms.131 Between the Jameson Raid and the First Moroccan Crisis, Wilhelm
II’s diplomatic activity sparked significant interest within the Pall Mall Gazette. This
attention ranged from overt hostility, like following the Krüger Telegram to praise, as
happened at the time of Queen Victoria’s death.132
Wilhelm II’s actions also dictated the ways in which the Pall Mall Gazette
described his actions. The British journal highlighted the German Kaiser’s intelligence
either seriously, meaning it positively, or sarcastically, depending on how his actions
rejected or contradicted the British government’s policy.133 Perhaps the most significant
aspect of the Pall Mall Gazette’s coverage of Wilhelm II was its consideration of whether
or not he actually drove German foreign policy.134 In its portrayal of the German Kaiser,
the British journal showed how the characteristics attributed to him indicate when and if
the newspaper thought Wilhelm II’s steered German foreign policy.
During the initial years of his reign, the British press portrayed Wilhelm II
primarily in a positive light. It especially welcomed the youth and enthusiasm the
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German Kaiser exuded in his actions. At the same time, however, the British press
always expressed concern regarding the militaristic and expansionistic attitude Wilhelm
II displayed that might challenge British imperial power.135 The British press’s reaction
to the Krüger Telegram sparked a series of changing portrayals of Wilhelm II that shifted
from extremely negative to positive. With the Krüger Telegram, Wilhelm II according to
the Pall Mall Gazette, expressed a significant anti-British feeling held by the German
government.136 This telegram also indicated for the British jingoistic journal a German
desire to replace the British as the dominant European power in South Africa.137
The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung reflected the opinion that Wilhelm II did
not intend the message to Krüger as a threat to Great Britain, rather he meant only to
express support for suppressing an extra-legal external attack.138 This stance by the
German journal replicated the German public opinion’s support for their German Dutch
“brothers.”139 The Pall Mall Gazette’s negative portrayal of Wilhelm II did not last long
following his clarification of his intentions regarding the Krüger Telegram. The British
jingoistic journal did, however, continually refer back to the event whenever Wilhelm II
did or said something that appeared irrational or petulant.140
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One event spurred the British press to portray Wilhelm II in a fully positive
manner: the final days of Queen Victoria and her death. In late December 1900, the
German Kaiser received news that his grandmother lay on her deathbed. Abandoning the
celebrations planned for his upcoming birthday, Wilhelm II rushed to England to see
Queen Victoria before she died. The German Kaiser held his grandmother as she died
and stayed in England until after her funeral. The Pall Mall Gazette reflected the
favorable British sentiment and continued to utilize this example throughout this latter
period to illustrate Wilhelm II’s positive qualities and the nature of his pro-British
feelings whenever he acted in a way that paralleled or supported British interests.141
The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung also used this event to indicate the German
Kaiser’s sympathies with Great Britain. Unlike the Pall Mall Gazette, however, the
German journal consistently argued that Wilhelm II did not want tensions with Great
Britain. It alluded to examples such as his devotion to his grandmother, who epitomized
the British Empire, which showed his relationship to the British Royal Family spurred his
interest in closer Anglo-German relations. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung
contended that the hostility within the British press presented an obstacle Wilhelm II
could not overcome with filial devotion. This, the German journal concluded, meant that
his efforts to employ familial sympathies to improve Anglo-German relations could only
fail.142
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To the British press in general, but especially to the Pall Mall Gazette, Wilhelm II
represented the German government.143 The German government tried to argue that the
anti-British rhetoric in the German press prompted by emotional reactions to the major
events between the Jameson Raid and First Moroccan Crisis only reflected small
segments of German public opinion. Despite this contention, Wilhelm II’s usually
tempestuous and irrational responses to major diplomatic events such as the Jameson
Raid, Krüger Telegram, Boxer Rebellion, Russo-Japanese War, or First Moroccan Crisis
represented to the British press the true outlook of German public opinion.144 The Pall
Mall Gazette did not usually welcome the bombastic rhetoric Wilhelm II utilized in his
speeches, even when it supported the British government’s goals. The British jingoistic
journal disliked Wilhelm II’s emotional manipulation of German public opinion to get its
support for his policies.145 For example, the British newspaper mocked the German
Kaiser’s attempts to incite German public opinion in favor of cooperation with the other
Great Powers during the Boxer Rebellion. The language employed in these speeches
worked to increase the sense of German superiority rather than equality with the other
Great Powers, despite the German government continually stressing the need for
cooperation with the others.146 When Wilhelm II’s speeches defied the British
government’s interests, however, the Pall Mall Gazette harshly critiqued the German
Kaiser, arguing that his words only served to isolate Germany even more from the other
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Great Powers.147 This criticism significantly increased during times of crisis between
German and other European states, such as with the Krüger Telegram and the First
Moroccan Crisis.
Conclusion
The decline of Russia, the emergence of direct competition between Great Britain
and Germany, and the controversial figure of Wilhelm II changed the way in which the
Pall Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung reacted to international events.
Issues emerging due to these new situations prompted the two ‘semi-official’ journals to
react in increasingly hostile ways. Instead of reacting to the events themselves, the Pall
Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung responded to the interpretation of
those events from the other journal. The debates emerging from these considerations
prompted more antagonism between the British and German presses, which in turn
limited the ability of the British and German governments to negotiate mutually
beneficial agreements internationally.
The overt animosity present in the Pall Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung that caused this increase in tensions differed from the coverage of
events within the Times and Kölnische Zeitung. The two ‘official’ journals did not attack
the other state like the ‘semi-official’ journals did. The effect of this type of coverage
was also different than during the Near East Crisis. In this later period, the British and
German presses had a more significant role in restraining or advancing diplomacy.
Therefore when the Pall Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung so
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aggressively critiqued the German or British government, they produced negative
consequences for any Anglo-German cooperation.
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CHAPTER VIII
ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS AND THE SATIRICAL JOURNALS

Figure 8.1

Out of Drawing

Punch December 11, 1901
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On December 11, 1901, Punch published a cartoon entitled “Out of Drawing”
(Figure 7.1) in response to continental criticism regarding British tactics against civilians
during the Boer War. The illustration showed a German artist’s interpretation of John
Bull as a monstrous man with a pointed tail carrying knives dripping blood. John Bull,
who was standing behind him as dapper gentleman, admonished the man. He suggested
the cartoonist get his glasses checked as he looked nothing like that, indicating that the
lens through which he saw the world needed changing.1
This image represents the changing nature of satirical illustrations at the turn of
the century. Both Punch and Kladderadatsch used more metaphorical representations of
major diplomatic events and problems to maximize the effect of the cartoons than in
Chapter Three. Like during the Near East Crisis, Punch and Kladderadatsch employed
the metaphors of females, children, and animals to illustrate the relationship between
states. What differed during this latter period was which states appeared with the weaker
characteristics inherent in this imagery. Between the Jameson Raid and the Algeciras
Conference, Punch and Kladderadatsch, paralleling the changing methods in the
‘serious’ journals, began aggressively critiquing those Great Powers that acted in ways
that conflicted with their own states’ interests. The two satirical journals also used
realistic images of specific leaders such as Joseph Chamberlain and Bernhard von Bülow
to clearly attack the policies of the other states. These portrayals prompted responses in
the other press, either by reciprocal attacks or, as in Figure 7.1, attempts to dismiss the
criticism by suggesting the illustration reflects a distorted view of reality. Often, the
cartoons challenged not only the actions of the character in the drawing itself, but also the
1

Punch, December 11, 1901.
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society from which it came, usually by portraying the other state as a representation such
as John Bull or Germania, rather than Queen Victoria or Wilhelm II.
The way in which Punch and Kladderadatsch drew the diplomatic events between
the Jameson Raid and the First Moroccan Crisis had much to do with the rising tensions
and distrust between Great Britain and Germany. This new focused changed
significantly from the period of the Near Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878, when the two
journals used their harshest critiques on specific events in the Near East and the possible
effects on European peace, rather than on the effects of the other state’s policies on their
European and international position. The cartoons in Punch and Kladderadatsch
provided an easily understandable interpretation of international diplomacy that needed
little translation. Readers did not need to know the language of all of the information
regarding any given event to comprehend the sentiment portrayed in the two satirical
journals’ illustration. The ability to evoke an emotional response with an image rather
than with words allowed Punch and Kladderadatsch to influence their readers’ opinions
regarding diplomacy between their state and the other states.
In illustrating the interaction between the Great Powers themselves and also the
Great Powers and smaller states and colonies at issue in the diplomatic contests of this
period, the two satirical journals used three types of representations to help their
readership understand the foreign policy of their own state as well as that of the other
Great Powers. They continued to use females, children, and animals as metaphors. The
two satirical journals, like the Pall Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung
did not just simply react to events as they occurred, they responded to each other. They
also responded to the “serious” journals of their own press and the other state’s press.
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These illustrations increased the satirical journals’ credibility for relating the events, as
they reflected items from those journals, such as the Times and the Kölnische Zeitung,
that already possessed acknowledged credibility. Finally, Punch and Kladderadatsch
described diplomacy as a source of entertainment, akin to gambling, theater, horse racing,
or a circus, in such a way that appealed to readers.
These types of representations made the cartoons in the two journals far more
dangerous and evocative to Anglo-German relations than historians previously described
them.2 These cartoons did not simply parody events in the international arena, they also
educated those that read them regarding the effects of those situations on their state’s
interests. I argue in this chapter that these illustrations were easily identifiable figures
and themes that readers, both inside and outside of government, from both British and
German publics, used to interpret how the other state’s public viewed events in
international diplomacy. I also argue that the more explicit attacks on political actors and
other states using these metaphors shows the increasing sophistication of the two
readerships as well as the growing antagonism between Great Britain and Germany. In
order to best relate the changing states of international diplomacy in Punch and
Kladderadatsch, I included a case study. Russia represented the primary changing factor
in Anglo-German relations between 1896 and 1906. That state’s decline spurred growing
animosity between Great Britain and Germany. Punch and Kladderadatsch’s utilization

Most historians focus on the “serious” journals when discussing diplomatic history. The satirical
journals, however, provide critical evidence for the developing Anglo-German tensions. Both Ann Taylor
Allen in Satire and Society in Wilhelmine Germany: Kladderadatsch and Simplicissimus, 1890-1914
(Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1984) and Thomas Milton Kemnitz in “The Cartoon as a
Historical Source,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 4, no. 1 (Summer 1973): 81-93 emphasize the
importance of political cartoons in understanding diplomatic history.
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of the types of imagery described to discuss Russia’s problems, and the consequences of
those, reflects the usefulness of interpreting political cartoons to understand international
diplomacy.
A Continuation of the Past
Punch and Kladderadatsch continued to utilize the metaphors of females,
children, and animals as they did during the Near East Crisis. Unlike the previous period,
however, the two satirical journals used this imagery to attack the other Great Powers’
exploitation of non-Great Power states. They also started to critique the other Great
Powers’ statuses as powerful states by portraying them as females that needed assistance,
in particular France. Finally, Punch and Kladderadatsch criticized the other Great
Powers by attributing the negative characteristics of a female, child, or animal to those
states. The change in tone by these journals, now less respectful and more aggressive,
paralleled the attacking sentiment increasing present in the ‘serious’ journals.
The struggle for Samoa involved Great Britain, the United States, and Germany,
all of whom declared they had the best claim on and intentions for the territory. The
desire of the Samoan population did not factor into the competition, as the three Great
Powers argued between themselves for control. In this instance, the conflict erupted into
violence between the native population and the colonizers that took years to resolve.
Ultimately the three Great Powers involved negotiated a diplomatic arrangement that
suited none of them completely. Following the treaty, each of the states attempted to
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persuade the elites among the natives to support their claims, thereby causing instability
which undermined the treaty, while disregarding those of the other two powers.3
The cartoon “Stradella auf Samoa” (“Stradella on Samoa”; Figure 7.2) reflected a
part of this competition. The image, based on an opera by Louis Niedermeyer, showed
Germany comforting Samoa while the United States and Great Britain, dressed as
assassins, who originally intended to kill Samoa quarreled between themselves. Samoa
did not appear enamored with Germany, but linked her arm in his. This indicated the
shift by the Samoan elites to support the German claim as the least of three evils. The
cartoon showed the German assumption that Samoa was a helpless woman who needed
protection from the ulterior motives of the United States and Great Britain. Within this
assumption, the German government did not want to simply exploit Samoa like the other
two Great Powers, it only merely wanted to protect the native population with its
presence. The American and British governments, however, did not agree with this
perception. They both tried to use aspects of the Tripartite Convention of 1899 between
themselves and Germany to reestablish influence in Samoa, but with less success than the
German government had. For Kladderadatsch, this meant that Germany should have
control over Samoa, but this did not equate to immediate acceptance by the United States
and Great Britain.4 Germany maintained a dominant position in Samoa, using diplomacy
such as inducing the elites to support its claims on the island. In this image, the German
satirical journal justified that decision, attacking the British interest in the territory while
supporting the German government’s intentions there.

Paul M. Kennedy’s The Samoan Tangle: a Study in Anglo-German-American Relations, 18781900 (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1974) discusses this interaction at length.
4
Kladderadatsch, April 16, 1899.
3
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Figure 8.2

Stradella auf Samoa-Stradella on Samoa

Kladderadatsch April 16, 1899

Morocco represented another sovereign state over which Great Powers vied and
another region they could exploit. Great Britain, Germany, and France competed with
one another to become the “protector” of Morocco’s sovereignty. More importantly for
those states, guaranteeing Morocco’s status would allow their commercial interests to
dictate the African state’s trade. Previously, France represented the dominant European
power in Morocco, but protests against the sultan’s regime, and the role of France in it,
challenged that position. In early 1901, these protests presented an opportunity for Great
Britain and Germany to replace France as the prevailing European power in Morocco. By
June 1901, however, France and Morocco settled their differences, reestablishing France
as the dominant European figure in the region. The view that the Moroccan government
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made an incorrect decision in choosing France permeated the British and German
presses.
In Punch’s cartoon “’Two’s Company,’ &.,” (Figure 7.3) Morocco appeared as a
young woman succumbing again to the French officer with whom she previously had a
relationship. In the image, two alternative beaus (Germany and Great Britain) stand in
the background, regretfully accepting the woman’s choice. The way in which Morocco
draped herself over France indicated Punch’s view that as a weak woman, Morocco fell
victim to France’s charms. Here, the British satirical journal illustrated the critical
perception that the French government unfairly took advantage of the Moroccan
government.5

5

Punch, June 12,1901.
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Figure 8.3

‘Two’s Company,’ & c.

Punch June 12, 1902

The metaphor of a weak female did not only apply to non-Great Powers in Punch
and Kladderadatsch. The two satirical journals also employed it when commenting on
the changing relationships among the Great Powers themselves. In “Entente” (Figure
7.4), Kladderadatsch indicated an interesting opinion regarding the new relationship
between Great Britain and France. This illustration reinforced the German opinion that
France needed to look for stronger alliances due to Russia’s weakness following the
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Russo-Japanese War. It also indicated a view that the British government intended to use
that need to draw the French government closer to it. Here, Kladderadatsch mocked the
French government’s new weakness while also charging the British with trying to exploit
this changing power situation for their own ends.6

Figure 8.4

Entente

Kladderadatsch April 16, 1906

Many within the British and French governments argued that Germany’s actions
in Morocco that sparked the First Moroccan Crisis intended to draw Great Britain and
France apart. The entente cordiale, only a year old at the beginning of the Crisis in

6

Kladderadatsch, April 16, 1905.
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March 1905, appeared to Bülow and Wilhelm II as unstable susceptible to destruction.
With this view in mind, the German government challenged the French government’s
dominance in Morocco, stating that it intended to protect the sultan’s sovereignty.
Punch, in “The Match-Maker Malagré Elle” (Figure 7.5), reflected these suspicions of
German interests in Morocco. In the cartoon, John Bull and Marianne chat while she sits
on the couch (Morocco). Both look back toward Germania, here a matronly lady
scowling at their closeness. As she glowers, France suggests that the she and John Bull
formalize their arrangement because it is clear that Germania already does not like them.
Punch here indicated the opinion that Germania, like the German population, did not
approve of the entente cordiale and the issue of Morocco showed how much the Germans
resented the new Anglo-French relationship. It also reflected a similar view to that of
Kladderadatsch that France, here as a female, needed Great Britain, here John Bull, to
firmly establish its claim on Morocco.7

7

Punch, April 12, 1905
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Figure 8.5

The Match-Make Malgre Elle

Punch April 12, 1905

New ‘Big Men’ of Diplomacy
While Britannia and Germania appeared often within Punch and Kladderadatsch,
most often the journals used male representations of the state to describe its actions.
Punch usually used the image of Wilhelm II when illustrating German foreign policy
rather than Michel which Kladderadatsch utilized. Punch’s use of Wilhelm II’s image to
critique German foreign policy reflected the ever present and vocal position the German
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Kaiser had. The fact that Wilhelm II actively worked to portray himself as an autocratic
ruler reinforced the assumption illustrated Punch that Wilhelm II’s interests represented
those of the German government.
Germany’s lesé majesté laws also protected the British monarch, as well as other
monarchical foreign heads of state, from attack. Kladderadatsch, in order to challenge
British foreign policy but not censure the monarchy, used the image of John Bull as the
personification of British imperial policy. Using John Bull allowed Kladderadatsch to
condemn British actions in a severe way that it could not do using Queen Victoria,
Edward VII, or to some degree even elected politicians.

Punch, in response to these

attacks using John Bull, increasingly ridiculed Wilhelm II’s actions while also debating
the image of John Bull himself. These representations created significant resentment
between the British and German publics which only increased when the two satirical
journals attacked the other states’ political leaders, in particular Chamberlain and Bülow.
The recognizable male figures used by Punch and Kladderadatsch often faced more
severe condemnation than the generic cynicism of the general portrayal other states’
interests. The critical evaluations of specific events using these figures reflected a
harsher opinion regarding international diplomacy of the other Great Powers. When
illustrating a longer term policy, however, both used other representations of the other
states.
Wilhelm II appeared for many in the British press and government as a dramatic
actor reciting lines full of bombastic rhetoric but without ever acting on the threats
inherent in his speeches. As Great Britain and France drew closer, this sentiment only
intensified. The images of Wilhelm II in Punch illustrated not only this dramatic flair of
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his personality, but also the inherently dangerous effects it could have on German foreign
policy. The German Kaiser’s intention to govern as much as autocratically as possible
meant that the British press linked his actions directly to the imperial policies of Germany
that conflicted with Great Britain.
In 1905, Wilhelm II, encouraged by his Chancellor and the Head of the Foreign
Ministry Friedrich von Holstein, made a speech at Tangiers supporting the Moroccan
Sultan’s defiance of French encroachment. Unlike the Krüger Telegram which provoked
an immediate response from the British press which encouraged a forceful response
against Wilhelm II, this speech evoked more amusement and irritation than concern
among European diplomats. Punch portrayed Wilhelm II in “On Tour” (Figure 7.6) as an
actor giving a highly anticipated performance. This illustration showed the view of
Wilhelm II, and to a lesser extent the German government, as a superficial threat that
spews rhetorical threats but with little intention of following through on them. This view
impelled many within the British government to call Wilhelm II’s bluff during the First
Moroccan Crisis, maintaining their support for French hegemony in Morocco despite
German threats. This represented a change in British views on the German government
following the Krüger Telegram. In 1896, this offer of support from Wilhelm II to the
Boers sparked concern within the British government and press that the German
government sought to expand its interests in South Africa at British expense. This
message threatened to provoke a conflict between Great Britain and German. By 1905,
when Wilhelm II went to Tangiers to offer similar support to the Moroccan Sultan against
the French, he faced ridicule from the British press. This shift in perception regarding the
danger of Wilhelm II’s words reflected a long term process in which Wilhelm II issued
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strong warnings but never actually followed through on them. Punch’s cartoon
illustrated the outcome of this transition and suggested that Wilhelm II’s Tangiers speech
was little more than a superficial show.8
Kladderadatsch circumvented the lesé majesté laws by using the image of John
Bull to represent the British government in its most critical illustrations of its actions. In
“Der Zauberspiegel” (“The Magic Mirror”; Figure 7.7), the German satirical journal
showed John Bull looking at himself after running the gauntlet of the foreign press. John
Bull viewed his reflection with approval because it made him appear to be a dapper
gentleman. In Kladderadatsch’s reality, however, he appeared haggard and carried a
stick with blood and hair on it that he used to get through the attacks. The image
referenced the Continental press’ attacks on Great Britain that challenged the British
justification for going to war. The Continental press attacked pretensions about a quick
victory against the Boer army. They also challenged the British justifications for needing
to assert its power in South Africa. Kladderadatsch showed in the illustration that the
British, just like John Bull, did not realize how much damage the declaration of war
against the Dutch Boers caused to their image in Europe.9

8
Punch, April 05, 1905. Historiography typically ignores the notion that the British Press showed
Wilhelm II, and thereby informing the British population, as a figure who continually issued empty threats
in light of the effect of later threats in regard to World War I. Wilhelm II’s inability or unwillingness to
follow through on those threats decreased his diplomatic credibility. At the same time, however, it
increased British suspicion in both the Government and Press about his true intentions in international
diplomacy. Wilhelm II’s portrayal in Punch reinforced these assumptions and showed its readership that
they could not trust him to do anything. Historiography about Wilhelm II shows British suspicions
emerging from his actions. Punch showed that it was his inaction that sparked this distrust.
9
Kladderadatsch, October 29, 1899.
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Figure 8.6

On Tour

Punch April 5, 1905

During the Near East Crisis, Punch and Kladderadatsch illustrated their
interpretation of the British government with the image of British Prime Minister
Benjamin Disraeli. By the time of the Jameson Raid, John Bull increasingly represented
the British government, particularly in reference to British imperialism. Unlike during
the Near East Crisis when Disraeli clearly dominated the British government, in this latter
period the British government had several primary actors who determined British foreign
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policy. Lord Salisbury and Chamberlain represented the two British politicians with the
most consistent power following the Jameson Raid but even they did not control the
British government like Disraeli during his tenure. This meant that using John Bull to
represent the British government’s interests became increasingly effective during this
later time period. For Kladderadatsch, utilizing John Bull’s image allowed it to
circumvent censorship laws while continuing to critique British foreign policy.
Unlike during the Near East Crisis, the German Kaiser, now Wilhelm II, appeared
more often than any of his Chancellors in Punch and Kladderadatsch when illustrating
international diplomacy. Wilhelm II’s actions as Kaiser attracted the spotlight. Both
satirical journals emphasized his autocratic approach to governing. This proactive
approach on Wilhelm II’s part indicated a significant shift away from the German
government of the Near East Crisis in which Bismarck dominated. Punch and
Kladderadatsch’s utilization of Wilhelm II’s image to indicate the opinion of the German
government indicated the recognition of this changing relationship between the German
Kaiser and his government.
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Figure 8.7

Der Zauberspiel-The Magic Mirror

Kladderadatsch October 29, 1899

At those times when Punch and Kladderadatsch chose to attack a specific policy
of the other states, the used illustrations of individual leaders. Chamberlain and Bülow
both received a great deal of criticism from the other states’ presses. The censorship laws
that protected the autocratic heads of state did not apply to these men, thus they
represented important targets for the cynical opinions toward their states’ foreign
policies. Bülow’s tenure marked the era in which the German government really pushed
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for their “A Place in the Sun” through the acquisition of colonies in Africa and Asia. His
belief in Wilhelm II’s contention that German deserved a larger share of global power
made him a threatening figure. Punch showed the danger represented by Bülow’s
diplomacy reaching its apex during the First Moroccan Crisis. In “The Sower of Tares,”
(Figure 7.8) the British satirical journal showed the German Chancellor trying to use the
Moroccan Question to disrupt European peace. The aggressive tactics Bülow and the
German government used during the First Moroccan Crisis created too significant a
challenge to the status quo in Morocco for France to accept, and France’s entente
cordiale partner supported the French government fully in this contest.10

10

Punch, August 23, 1905.
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Figure 8.8

The Sower of Tares

Punch August 23, 1905

Kladderadatsch’s coverage of Chamberlain’s activities spanned a longer and
more chaotic period, largely due to the length of his tenure as Colonial Secretary, dating
from 1895 to 1903. During this time, Great Britain successfully defeated the Boers,
while defending its imperial interests elsewhere. The prominent discussion of these
interests in daily news items put a spotlight on Chamberlain. He neither came from
aristocratic lineage, nor was he the head of the British government, thus Kladderadatsch
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could critique him without domestic censure. In particular, Kladderadatsch focused on
the duplicitous nature of his foreign policies. In “Die Vielseitingen,” (“The Versatile”;
Figure 7.9) the German satirical journal highlighted Chamberlain’s adaptation of his
actions abroad based on the opponents. In the cartoon, the Colonial Secretary treated the
Boxers with civility and judicial fairness, while in South Africa he used brutal tactics to
suppress the Boers. The conflicting nature of these two clashes dictated this response,
but Kladderadatsch portrayed him as only serving the best interests of Great Britain and
not considering the international implications of his decisions. The representations of
these politicians showed how the two satirical journals saw the other government. By
critiquing these men, and not the heads of state, they could attack the other government’s
actions with more impunity. 11

11

Kladderadatsch, October 7, 1900.
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Figure 8.9

Die Vielseitigen- The Versatile

Kladderadatsch October 7, 1900

Punch and Kladderadatsch: Reflections of the ‘Serious’ Journals
Punch and Kladderadatsch frequently illustrated interesting highlights of the
items from the “serious” journals in both their own press and that of the other state in
order to make an issue of them. Punch usually described its source as a “Daily Paper,”
unless the Times republished an item from the foreign press. In that case, the British
satirical journal quoted item’s text as a caption for the cartoon. When this occurred,
290

Punch indicated both the foreign and domestic source. Kladderadatsch, on the other
hand, when discussing specific British or German newspapers, clearly identified the
journal referenced. The representations of these “serious” journals made it increasingly
credible to think that the two satirical journals reflected more of the real criticisms
existing in the British and German publics than perhaps they might have otherwise.
Punch and Kladderadatsch’s cynical satire illustrated not only the official government
accounts from the Times and Kölnische Zeitung but also the semi-official and
chauvinistic journals such as the Pall Mall Gazette and Norddeutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung. By doing this, they appeared to represent a larger segment of public opinion.
This perception made the attitudes present in these journals increasingly important in
informing both the British and German publics about the supposedly true opinions of the
other population.
Punch responded to the critiques from the Continental press with an arrogance
reflective of the British government and public at the time. The British government
entered the Boer War with the opinion that it would be a short, easy victory. The British
army’s colonial victories in the decades preceding this conflict indicated to British
leaders and public that their military had the capability to easily defeat an untrained
colonial force. Punch showed this arrogance with an image in which a junior officer
planned to bring his polo equipment to South Africa. When questioned by his superior
why he had it, the subordinate replied that he thought they would have to time to play
after lunch, implying that the war would be over by then.12 (Figure 7.10) Most in British
society shared the common perception that the British army would quickly win the Boer
12

Punch, November 1, 1899

291

War. Due to this assessment of their military’s strength, emphasized by the British press,
the British army’s struggle against the Boers led to ridicule from foreign observers.
Many European observers forecast the impending demise of the mighty British Empire
following early devastating losses to the Boers. By the spring of 1900, however, the
British army finally started to have success in South Africa. In response to this, Punch
published “Who Said Dead?” (Figure 7.11), in which the British Lion roared out and
scared the jackass (Continental press) that mocked it. In this image, the British Lion
showed it had not fallen into decline and was prepared to fight and win the Boer War.13

13

Ibid., March 7, 1900.
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Figure 8.10 Untitled
Punch November 1, 1899

293

Figure 8.11 Who Said ‘Dead’?
Punch March 7, 1900

The mocking nature of commentary from the Continental presses prompted a
defense of British efforts. Direct attacks that condemned British methods, however,
sparked counterattacks from the British press. Journals from every Continental power
produced critiques of British actions, but do to its previous reproaches of the British
government and its pronounced support for the German Boers, German journals received
the most attention from the British press. The German press heavily criticized the brutal
tactics the British army began using in South Africa. In particular, the use of
concentration camps and the destruction of farms to weaken the Boer War effort
triggered anti-British sentiment throughout Germany. Kladderadatsch, for example, in
“Der Friede Naht” (“The Peace Approaches”; Figure 7.12) showed the effects of British
294

army methods to subdue the Boers. In the image, John Bull hails the success his forces in
bringing peace to South Africa while talking to Frau Botha. As he talks, the fruits of his
success march by, cattle and children chained together while Boer farms burn in the
background.14 In “A Short Memory” (Figure 7.13), Punch responded to these charges.
Instead of defending its army’s tactics, the British satirical journal went on the offensive.
The cartoon, using Bismarck’s ghost, reminded the Germans of their past strategy to win
wars. The image reflected the anti-German response emerging in Great Britain, which
argued that the Germans could not critique British methods since they had set the
precedents for them with their behavior against the French during the Franco-Prussian
war.15

14

Kladderadatsch, May 19, 1901.

15

Punch, September 11, 1901.
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Figure 8.12 Der Friede naht-The Peace Approaches
Kladderadatsch May 19, 1901
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Figure 8.13 A Short Memory
Punch September 11, 1905

Kladderadatsch used the Times as the representation of British press opinion
when critiquing that foreign media. The German satirical journal showed the “official”
British newspaper as an old woman intent on forcing others to do what she wanted. In
“Komische Leute” (“Funny People”; Figure 14), this meant demanding Krüger give the
British government access to the Transvaal’s gold and diamond resources since it spent
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so much on defense in the region.16 Later, in “Aus der Hexenküche” (“In the Witch’s
Kitchen”; Figure 15), Kladderadatsch portrayed the Times as a witch stirring up a potion
of “hate” and “envy” to use against Germany. For the German newspaper, the Times
reflected the British government’s “official mind.” Thus, when that British newspaper
published articles critical of German policy, Kladderadatsch interpreted the items as
echoing the British government’s opinions, not developing its own.17

Figure 8.14 Komische Leute-Funny People
Kladderadatsch October 16, 1899

16

Kladderadatsch, October 18, 1896.

17

Ibid., September 25, 1904.
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Figure 8.15 Aus der Hexenküche-In the Witch’s Kitchen
Kladderadatsch September 25, 1904

Diplomacy as Entertainment
Perhaps the most significant element of Punch and Kladderadatsch to their
publics’ political knowledge was their representation of international diplomacy.
Regularly the two satirical journals used the metaphor of entertainment to describe
different diplomatic events. The use of theater and classic literature, gambling, horse
racing, and circus references gave the readership a sense of the falsity with which Punch
and Kladderadatsch viewed the Great Powers’ interaction. Some of the images,
additionally, conveyed an impression of the danger involved in the games being played
by the diplomats. Referring to popular forms of entertainment made diplomacy
accessible to the general public as well as to those elites who conducted it.
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Theater often reflected the norms of contemporary society and the challenges to
those. Productions allowed viewers to interpret society, both their own and historically.
They used common folk tales, like those from the Grimm Brothers and from well-known
sources such as William Shakespeare. Neither the theaters nor the two journals, however,
needed to ensure that their consumers knew the story or plot. The producers, rather,
intended the audiences to gather their understanding through sympathy with the
characters on stage or in the illustrations. Theater allowed those within society not
comfortable with the massive societal shifts present in the fin de siècle period to look
back toward the Renaissance and classical antiquity for comfort. Both of these earlier
periods provided the middle class and upper tier of the working class a sense of purpose
and an idea that they drove society. These two groups represented the primary readership
of Punch and Kladderadatsch and both journals reflected their interests within the
illustrations, suing common theatrical productions too as metaphor for their critical
portrayals if foreign affairs.18
The use of popular literature and theater to prompt particular emotions and
opinions within the publics lent itself well to educate the masses regarding international
diplomacy. Using easily recognizable stories allowed Kladderadatsch and Punch to
allude to foreign events and the Great Powers’ response to them without directly
illustrating them. Kladderadatsch used the Grimm Brothers’ folk tale “Die sieben
Schwaben als Vermittler” (“The Seven Swabians as Mediators”; Figure 7.16) to explain
possible Great Power intervention in the Russo-Japanese War. In the cartoon Michel

The essays edited by Suzanne Marchand and David Lindenfield in Germany at the Fin de Siecle:
Culture, Politics, and Ideas (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2004) illustrate the
changing nature of culture of Europe, particularly Germany, at the turn of the twentieth century.
18
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stood at the front of a line of the Great Powers. According to the traditional story, this
indicated that he was the bravest and shrewdest. This, however, did not provide a true
indication of his abilities. In the tale all of the Swabians jumped into danger without
thinking and then ran away when the danger became too scary. The illustration
questioned the Great Powers’ intention to intervene in the war, portraying it as a fanciful
adventure like those taken by “The Seven Swabians.” Kladderadatsch placed Michel,
representing the German government, at front of the group, indicating a cynical view of
that government’s actions in regards to the Far East. The image showed Michel, as well
as the others, acting without thinking and then having to retreat when their actions
became too dangerous.19

19

Kladderadatsch, October 02, 1904.
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Figure 8.16 Die sieben Schwaben als Vermittler-The Seven Swabians as Mediator
Kladderadatsch October 2, 1904

Punch, like Kladderadatsch, used a recognizable British story to illustrate the
attempt by Wilhelm II to “woo” France into an alliance. Using imagery and language
from William Shakespeare’s “Romeo and Juliet,” the cartoon “Hoch! Hoch! The Wrong
O’It!” (Figure 7.17) showed the doomed attempt to unite Germany and France into an
alliance. In the cartoon, Wilhelm II refused to reveal himself, because like Romeo to
Juliet, his state was a mortal enemy to France. British involvement in the Boer War, and
the reestablishment of a reasonably agreeable diplomatic relationship with France
encouraged Wilhelm II’s belief that he could get France to move away from its revanche
sentiment and work with Germany against the British. Punch recognized the futility of
this attempt, as France would never give up on regaining Alsace and Lorraine. Thus, like
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Romeo and Juliet, France and Germany remained star-crossed lovers who could never
form an alliance.20

Figure 8.17 ‘Hoch! Hoch! The Wooing O’t!’
Punch July 19, 1899

20

Punch, July 19, 1899.
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By the late nineteenth century, gambling represented a popular past time among
all segments of society in Europe. The expansion of the card games from being played in
clubs of the elites, to the parlors of middle class homes, to the experiences of working
class players showed the prevalence and acceptability of participation in gambling
acquired by the early twentieth century. By this point, however, horse racing represented
the most democratized form of gambling.21 All segments of society participated in
betting on the outcome of a horse race they observed together. More involvement in
gambling meant that the readership of Punch and Kladderadatsch understood the
gambling metaphor used to discuss the nature international diplomacy without captions
explaining the game being played.22
The metaphor of international diplomacy as a high stakes gamble required little
translation. Many in the general public recognized that the Great Powers used their
armies, navies, and treasuries to bet on an uncertain outcome that could have devastating
consequences. In “Rouge et noir” (“Red or Black”; Figure 7.18), Kladderadatsch
illustrated the dangerous gamble taken by Russia and Japan in February 1904 to risk war.
In the cartoon, the two play roulette, with death as the croupier, while the other Great
Powers watch. Roulette represented a competition that pitted two sides (red and black)
against one another with very little chance for a third party (green) to get involved. This
reflected events in the Russo-Japanese War as only two sides fought while all others had

Janet E. Mullin, “Private Passion, public Order: Gaming, Gender and the Middle Class in
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little intention of involving themselves. Playing roulette carried dangerous consequences,
because there were clear winners and losers as if one side, say black, won then the others
completely lost. The same consequences appeared relevant for the Russo-Japanese War’s
contestants. For one to win, the other faced utter defeat and due to long standing
animosities between Russia and Japan, there was little chance that the outcome would be
mild and beneficial to both sides. The image showed the hesitancy by the other Great
Powers to stop Russia and Japan even while they saw the inherent danger in such a
conflict.23

Figure 8.18 Rouge et noir-Red or Black
Kladderadatsch February 21, 1904

23

Kladderadatsch, February 21, 1904.
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Punch, too, viewed international diplomacy as a gamble, albeit perhaps not as
dangerous as Kladderadatsch indicated. In “A Game of Speculation” (Figure 7.19), the
British satirical journal portrayed the competition between Germany, Russia, and Great
Britain for Chinese concession as a high stakes card game. In the cartoon, whichever
power bought the expensive winning card from China won the prize of concessions. This
illustration showed Punch’s opinion of the Great Powers’ diplomatic interests in China.
It indicated this by pointing to the Great Powers’ willingness to compete to spend the
most money, and usually manpower, in order to gain the concessions it wanted.24

Figure 8.19 A Game of Speculation
Punch January 15, 1898

24

Punch, January 15, 1898.

306

Horse racing often appeared in the pages of Punch and Kladderadatsch to indicate
a competition with a fixed conclusion, such as a period of crisis or war. Horse racing as a
metaphor allowed the two satirical journals to combine the images of gambling and
racing while giving the public the sense that the outcome could change at any point. In
“Vom Rennsport” (“From Racing”; Figure 7.20), Kladderadatsch illustrated the “race”
between France and Germany for control of Morocco. At the point during which this
image appeared, in the summer of 1905, Germany appeared to be winning the race for
Morocco. France lagged behind while John Bull looked panicked. At this point the game
made by the German government for claiming to protect Morocco seemed to be a good,
safe bet. France, however, was not yet out of the race.25

25

Kladderadatsch, July 9, 1905.

307

Figure 8.20 Vom Rennsport-From Racing
Kladderadatsch July 9, 1905
Punch used a horse racing metaphor to illustrate the Russo-Japanese War. In
“The Manchurian Stakes” (Figure 7.21), the British satirical journal showed Russia and
Japan racing for control of Manchuria. Their alliance partners, Marianne and John Bull
respectively, stood in the crowd watching. Japan had a clear lead, noted by John Bull,
but Marianne responded that the race was not yet half complete. This cartoon showed
two aspects of the Russo-Japanese War. Firstly, that the Japanese dominated Russia in
the conflict from the beginning. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, it showed that
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France and Great Britain intended to remain uninvolved, as if spectators in the crowd at a
horse race.26

Figure 8.21 The Manchurian Stakes
Punch June 1, 1904

26

Punch, June 1, 1904.
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The circus, like horse racing, offered an egalitarian entertainment experience. It
reflected the interest in merging the culture of the elite (i.e. equestrian sports) with that of
the lower class (i.e. comedians).27 It also reinforced concepts of empire and nation by
bringing in exotic animals that represented ‘the Other’ and highlighted the areas in which
regions of the state shared commonalities. While providing entertainment to all in the
same fashion by using buildings such as arenas where spectators had similar views of the
show, the circus also proved to be a source of education and information. The audiences
learned about military capabilities with exhibitions of sportsmanship, they learned about
foreign locales through demonstrations involving exotic animals, and they saw the ability
of the Great Powers to dominate their colonial realms through shows where the white
man also subdued the native.28
Kladderadatsch and Punch used the circus to represent international diplomacy
and their illustrations here too showed their cynical view of diplomatic events as
spectacles. In these displays, the Great Powers forced each other’s diplomats to perform
acrobatic type stunts to achieve its goals. In “Mißlungene Dresseur” (“Unsuccessful
Trainer”; Figure 7.22), Kladderadatsch showed Chamberlain as a circus performer trying
to stand on two galloping horses while balancing a sword on his nose, while Lord
Kitchener appeared as the horse trainer. The German satirical journal used this image to
demonstrate the tenuous balancing act the British Colonial Secretary used to handle
problems facing Great Britain at the turn of the Twentieth Century, even with help from
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the most successful British General of the time. The two horses he tried to control
represented China and the Transvaal, while the teetering sword symbolized British
prestige. The complicated nature of Chamberlain’s performance reflected
Kladderadatsch’s view of his diplomatic challenges, and his inability to guide the British
government successfully through them. He faced significant obstacles in successfully
handling British claims in South Africa and China while also maintaining British
prestige.29

Figure 8.22 Mißlungene Dresseur-Unsuccessful Trainer
Kladderadatsch January 27, 1901

29

Kladderadatsch, January 27, 1901.
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Punch, too used the circus to describe changing international diplomacy. The
decline of Russia that became readily apparent during the Russo-Japanese War pleased
Punch, as well as most of the other segments of the British press. In particular, the fact
that Russia no longer represented an imminent threat to Great Britain’s control of India
satisfied the British public at large. In “Till Further Notice” (Figure 7.23), the British
satirical journal showed the declining threat Russia posed in Central Asia. In the cartoon,
the Russian Bear posted an announcement stating that the Russian Circus’s performance
of the “Conquest of India,” would be postponed indefinitely. When this cartoon
appeared, the Russo-Japanese War still raged, so it remained unclear if the Russian threat
would return at some point. It was evident, however, that Russia no longer was the Great
Power once feared over all other by the British government. The Russian government’s
attempts to expand its influence in Central Asia ultimately became, therefore, a show put
on with no real expectations of success.30

30

Punch, July 20, 1904.
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Figure 8.23 Till Further Notice
Punch July 20, 1904

Russia: a Case Study
Punch and Kladderadatsch used the same type of metaphors to describe Russian
diplomacy that they did to discuss international diplomacy as a whole. Russia represents
an illuminating case study for the way in which the two satirical journals viewed Great
Power politics. Both Punch and Kladderadatsch considered Russian actions as indicators
of international problems during the period between the Jameson Raid and the First
Moroccan Crisis. At the time of the Jameson Raid, the British government and press
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viewed Russia as a significant threat to British interests in Asia. The German
government and press indicated a more positive opinion of the potential threat Russia
posed to Great Britain’s interests in the region. When Russian actions appeared
contradictory to German interests, Kladderadatsch cynically questioned them in their
illustrations. While Russia remained a strong Great Power, it appeared in Punch and
Kladderadatsch most often as Ivan, a Russian Cossack, or as the Russian Bear. As
Russia declined, however, the Russian Bear became less formidable and a sickly image
of Nicholas II replaced the imposing Ivan. Like with their illustrations of international
diplomacy, both Punch and Kladderadatsch used familiar metaphors to characterize
events. In the case of Russia, the two satirical journals illustrated Russian diplomacy
with metaphors of females, animals, competition, traditional folk lore, and classical
Greek mythology. Punch and Kladderadatsch’s coverage of events involving Russia
using these familiar metaphors represented the culmination of the effectiveness of the
different images utilized. Russia had a central role in European diplomacy during this
period and illustrating that position with these cartoons emphasized the general
acceptance of that significant position.
Punch and Kladderadatsch did not utilize the image of Russia as a female as often
as they did to describe Germany, Great Britain, or France. When the two journals chose
to characterize the Russian government as weak it more often showed a thinner version of
Ivan, or later Nicholas II. In at least two cases, referred to below, Russia did appear as a
female in these newspapers. In both instances, the illustrations showed the depth of
Russia’s decline in strength domestically and as a Great Power following the RussoJapanese War and Russian Revolution of 1905.
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Kladderadatsch employed the metaphor of a weak woman in showing the Tsarist
government’s inability to effect the necessary changes to reimpose order following the
Russian Revolution of 1905 in “Im russischen Volkston” (“In Russian Folk Style; Figure
7.24). In the cartoon, Witte and Nicholas II sat, dressed as females in a small Russian
shack. Witte worked to sew together a garment (“Universal Suffrage”) as Nicholas II
complained to him that his efforts were useless. Outside the door to the shack, two
figures (“Anarchy” and “Reaction”) wait with scissors to cut the garment apart. The
image reflected the view that the Russian government’s efforts to fulfill its promises of
reform were doomed to fail. Neither of the radical elements, those that wanted a
complete overhaul of the government nor those that wanted to maintain the status quo of
absolutist government wanted the piecemeal reforms represented by the promise of
universal suffrage. Witte and Nicholas II appearing as women indicated that the Russian
government’s inability to enforce the type of changes it had promised. They instead had
to alter the state (the garment in the cartoon) to try to placate as much of the Russian
populace as possible.
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Figure 8.24 Im russischen Volkston-In Russian Folk Style
Kladderadatsch January 7, 1906

Punch used the metaphor of a female to illustrate Russia’s declining power
following the Russo-Japanese War and the Russian Revolution of 1905 that led to
rapprochement and a later alliance between Great Britain and Russia. In “Why Not?”
(Figure 7.25), the British satirical journal showed Russia as a female at a dance. Next to
her sat another female (France) who urged Russia to dance with John Bull who stood
chatting with a third female (Japan). Russia responded that she wanted to dance with him
but was afraid that he would step on her toes. France assured Russia that he would not as
he was much better than he used to be. The image, from the fall of 1905, indicated the
British view that Russia was increasingly in decline as a consequence of the Russo316

Japanese War. At this point, Russia needed an alliance partner, just as a female needed a
strong male counterpart, to solidify its Great Power status. Russia’s concern that John
Bull might step on her toes reflected the Russian apprehension that an alliance with Great
Britain might lead to Russia not being able to assert its interests in international
diplomacy. France assuring Russia that this would not happen indicated the previous
French concern that an arrangement with Great Britain would lead to British imperial
domination over French colonial interests had been for naught. Since the British did not
dominate the French colonially, France assured Russia that Great Britain would treat her
in the same manner. This illustration showed the complete shift regarding the Russian
threat to British interests. Russia no longer represented a significant menace to British
interest. Russia, no longer Ivan or even Nicholas II but as a young female, needed British
cooperation to stabilize itself. Punch indicated the British government’s view that now
an Anglo-Russian understanding could occur because Russia no longer represented the
principal danger to British interests.31

31

Punch, October 11, 1905.
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Figure 8.25 Why Not?
Punch October 11, 1905

The Russian Bear provided a ubiquitous representation of Russia in the pages of
Punch and Kladderadatsch even as other animals occasionally appeared in metaphorical
illustrations of Russia’s foreign policy. Both satirical journals used an animal metaphor
to comment on Russian interests in the Far East and the British response to those. The
Russian government’s attempts to expand its influence in that region prompted different
responses. These depended on which Great Power that expansion affected. This was
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particularly true in those instances where British and Russian interests merged which they
often did in Asia.
Kladderadatsch illustrated the scheming nature of British diplomacy in relation to
Russian interests in the Far East using an animal metaphor. In “Da steckt etwas hinter”
(“There Is Something Behind”; Figure 7.26), the German satirical journal illustrated the
struggle between Russia and Japan over Korea, in which Great Britain played a concealed
but important role, employing dogs as representative of the conflicting states. In the
cartoon, a big dog (Russia) and a small dog (Japan) try to pull a bone (Korea) out of the
other dog’s mouth. The caption referenced the general amazement that the small dog
would challenge the bigger animal. In the cartoon, Kladderadatsch offered an
explanation for that bravado, as behind the fence another dog (England) waited, holding
Japan’s leash. This illustration indicated the cynical diplomatic opinion that the British
government had a large role in what Japan did in the Far East. The British dog both
restrained and supported the Japanese dog’s position thereby allowing it to challenge the
Russian dog but without letting it do so without boundaries. The British restraint
maintained peace in the Far East but did not end the tensions between Russia and Japan,
just as the British dog held Japanese dog back but did not keep it from fighting.32

32

Kladderadatsch, December 27, 1903.
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Figure 8.26 Da steckt etwas dahinter-There Is Something Behind
Kladderadatsch December 27, 1903

Punch’s illustrations regarding Russian diplomacy in the Far East used the more
common Russian Bear. In the case of China, the interaction between British and Russian
diplomacy provided an opportunity for Anglo-Russian cooperation. In “The Open
Mouth; or the Integrity of China” (Figure 7.27), Punch indicated its cynical opinion
toward this new friendly relationship between Russia and Great Britain in China. The
cartoon showed the British Lion and Russian Bear announcing their recent friendship to
the Chinese government. At this point, the two European governments agreed to divide
the Chinese concession between the two of them thereby ending tensions regarding which
power had too much influence over China. The illustration showed the two animals
explaining their intention to divide China, with teeth and claws. Here it was obviously
that the Chinese government had little chance to stop the British and Russian acquisition
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of Chinese concessions, much like the Chinese Man in the cartoon could do little to
prevent the British Lion and Russian Bear from eating him alive.33

Figure 8.27 The Open Mouth; or, the Integrity of China
Punch May 10, 1899

During the Russo-Japanese War, Punch and Kladderadatsch utilized a metaphor
of organize competition to illustrate the conflict. The way in which both journals used
this metaphor echoed the gambling and horse racing imagery discussed previously.
Russia and Japan appeared as the sole competitors with the other Great Powers as

33

Punch, May 10, 1899.
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observers waiting to see what the conflict’s outcome produces. The Great Powers
illustrated depended on the perceived interests they had in the war. Kladderadatsch
reflected the view that all of the Great Powers had a stake in the outcome, at least at the
beginning of the conflict. Punch, on the other hand, indicated the opinion that the British
government was an uninterested, and therefore totally neutral, party. These divergent
views regarding the Far East’s future as a consequence of the Russo-Japanese War
represented not only the struggle by the Russian government for dominance in the region,
but also the perceived interests the British and German governments had there.
Kladderadatsch, in “Vor der Entscheidung im Osten” (“Before the Decision in the
East”; Figure 7.28), characterized the Russo-Japanese War as a wrestling match between
the Russian Bear and a Japanese Samurai. Around the area in which the match took
place, the other Great Powers are sleeping. At their feet lay the betting slips each held for
the outcome of the event. The cartoon indicated the idea that by May of 1905 the war no
longer drew the rapt attention of the Great Powers as it once had. According to the
image, the Great Powers at an earlier point wagered on the outcome of the war but soon
tired of watching the competition. This image reflected the Great Powers’ disinterested
observation of the Russo-Japanese War once it became clear that no major changes
would occur in the region and neither side appeared willing to move to the peace table.
Kladderadatsch’s opinion remained clear however. All of the Great Powers at one point
had an interest in the war’s outcome, but they all became bored with watching and
waiting to see if their wagers to paid dividends.34
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Kladderadatsch, May 21, 1905.
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Figure 8.28 Vor der Entscheidung im Osten-Before the Decision in the East
Kladderadatsch May 21, 1905

Punch, too, illustrated the Russo-Japanese War as an athletic competition between
Russia and Japan where the other Great Powers remained outside observers. The British
satirical journal, however, did not include Great Britain as an interested spectator, only
indicating France and Germany watching the ice skating competition between Russia and
Japan. In the cartoon “An Emergency Exit” (Figure 7.29), Punch showed the Russian
Bear losing badly to the Japanese man in an ice skating competition. The Russian Bear
teetered precariously on the ice looking for an escape route. The only one available to it
was through “dangerous Chinese territory.” The Russian Bear did not think that it was
too dangerous because he would be “rescued” if it went out there. The lack of a British
presence in the cartoon reflected the supposed lack of British involvement in the Russo323

Japanese War even as observers. The two observers that did appear, however, the French
and German officers, indicated the continued support given Russia in the Far East by the
French and German governments from the 1890s onward to the end of the RussoJapanese War.35

Figure 8.29 An Emergency Exit
Punch, January 25, 1905

35

Punch, January 25, 1905.
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Punch and Kladderadatsch also described Russian action in terms of a
performance similarly to the way in which they illustrated international diplomacy as a
type of theater. This portrayal of Russian diplomacy, as a production intended to elicit a
specific reaction, paralleled the two satirical journals’ opinion of international diplomacy
as a dramatic show that often ended with little change. The presence of Russia in the
production did not always indicate, however, that it had the most significant role. It also
showed the unwillingness of the Russian government to continue participating in the
show, reflecting a shift away from the farcical intentions of another Great Power. The
performances in which Russia acted illustrated by Punch and Kladderadatsch represented
shifts made by the Russia away from the status quo positions of its government both
domestically and in foreign policy and the results of that change.
Kladderadatsch, in “Nicholaus als Dompteur” (“Nicholas as Tamer; Figure 7.30),
illustrated Nicholas II calling for a Duma and the reaction of Russia’s ruling elite to that
entity. In the cartoon, the tiger tamer (Nicholas II), opened a door from which the tiger
(Duma) watched the audience. The crowd (Russian elite) drew back in fear, concerned
about what the new creature might do to them. Nicholas II assured the audience that the
animal could not attack them because it was too large to break out from its enclosure.
The illustration reflected the concern many in Russia’s ruling class had of the new Duma
which Nicholas II had to call following the Russian Revolution of 1905. This new
political introduced, like the tiger to the performance, an unknown and wild entity that
threatened their dominance. Nicholas II’s assurance that the animal was too large to do
anything indicated the view that the Duma’s composition made it too unwieldy to affect
much political change in Russia. The cartoon itself illustrated the belief in Europe that
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Nicholas II’s attempt to appease the Russian public by calling a Duma represented little
more than a performance that would not lead to any substantial change in Russia itself.36

Figure 8.30 Nicholaus als Dompteur-Nicholas as Tamer
Kladderadatsch September 3, 1905
Punch, in “Leaving the Concert” (Figure 7.31), showed Russia as one of many
musicians in the “Concert of Pekin,” sent to reestablish European control in China. The
Boxer Rebellion prompted the Great Powers to join together to ensure their continued
control over Chinese concessions under a joint leadership. The appointment of German
General von Waldersee to lead this cooperative enterprise did not meet with universal
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Kladderadatsch, September 3, 1905.
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approval. His arrival in China in fact provoked France and Russia to try to withdraw
from the enterprise in protest. This cartoon illustrated that response. In the image, when
Waldersee began to “conduct” the “concert” of Great Powers, the French and Russian
musicians leave in disgust. This joint move between France and Russia showed the
results of the Franco-Russian Alliance, as France did not want to be directed by a German
officers and the Russian followed his partner’s actions. The image also reflected Punch’s
opinion regarding the inability of a German leader to effectively command a joint force in
China but without including a direct British protest. This view echoed the British
government’s minimal protest toward appointing a German general in this position.
Russia following its French bandmate out of the concert put the performance in jeopardy.
The only way to get all of the musicians back into the orchestra, the conductor had to
allow the musicians more say in the concert itself. This increased involvement reflected
the Great Powers’ demand for and receipt of guaranteed Chinese concessions following
the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion necessary to keep them all playing their part in
the concert.37
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Punch, September 26, 1900.
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Figure 8.31 Leaving the Concert
Punch September 26, 1900
Punch and Kladderadatsch also illustrated Russian diplomacy with metaphors
from traditional folklore, much like the utilization of prominent literary metaphors
mentioned previously. These stories, which highlighted the strength, bravery, and ability
of historical figures did not necessary indicate a true event in the past. These stories
needed little explanation, as they were easily recognizable by the general public. The
tales also served to show the weaknesses of those illustrated. When the contemporary
figures characterized by the recognizable heroes failed to act in the expected way, it
emphasized their inability to reflect the traits of the figures that made them so powerful in
the stories.
In July of 1904, Nicholas II appointed a new Minister of the Interior, Pyotr
Sviatopolk Mirsky, to replace the assassinated Vyacheslav von Plehve. As a Russian
Governor-General in the Baltic region, Mirsky successfully implemented liberal reforms
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that ended revolutionary activity and restored order. Nicholas II chose him as Minister of
the Interior due to that success in hopes that he could do the same for Russia as a whole.
In “St. Georg in Rußland” (“St. George in Russia”; Figure 7.32), Kladderadatsch
illustrated Nicholas II’s decision to appoint a new man to combat Russia’s internal
disorder. In the traditional tale, St. George saved a village by slaying the dragon
terrorizing it. In this cartoon, Nicholas II handed St. George a spear to kill the Dragon
(“Terror”) being held on the ground by the knight’s horse. The imagery reflected the
view that instead of relying on Mirsky’s effective means of restoring order, Nicholas II
looked to solutions from the past, hoping that brute force could easily destroy those
causing problems. This response epitomized by violent repression of dissent, worked
well in the past but appeared antiquated and incapable of ending the challenges to
Russia’s internal stability. Kladderadatsch indicated the opinion that this solution would
not succeed because the revolutionaries were not a single entity that a knight could slay
with a single spear. The Russian government needed a response that prevented the
creation of new dragons, like the reforms made by Mirsky, to return order to Russia, but
Nicholas II clung too strongly to the past with its autocratic notions of ruling to do more
than attack the dragons whenever they appeared.38
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Kladderadatsch, August 7, 1904.
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Figure 8.32 St. Georg in Rußland-St. George in Russia
Kladderadatsch August 7, 1904
Punch illustrated the expansion of Russian influence with a story about King
Canute from traditional English folk lore. In the story, King Canute sat on the beach in a
chair. Responding to challenges to his power, he promised to show his strength by
forcing the sea to recede on his command. Those in attendance urged him to fulfill his
promise. Canute then ordered the water to recede and it did which showed his power to
those that would challenge him. In “The New Canute” (Figure 7.33), Punch
characterized the British government’s response to consistent Russian expansion in China
using this story of Canute. In the cartoon, Canute (Salisbury) sat on a chair on the beach
watching the water (Russia) encroach on the beach (China). Next to him stood his
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chamberlain (Joseph Chamberlain) who urged him to order the water to recede.
Salisbury replied that he understood Chamberlain’s speech regarding keeping Russia out
of China, but they should really move further up the beach instead of making a stand.
The cartoon illustrated the consternation felt by many in the British government and press
because Salisbury refused to halt Russian expansion in China. The image of Salisbury as
Canute suggested that his power in the British government could rival that of the ancient
king, but his refusal to use that strength meant he would not equal Canute’s abilities in
enforcing his government’s will. Russia as the sea proved a larger threat to deal with
than the rebellious barons faced by Canute. This more significant concern prompted
Salisbury to shift back away from direct confrontation in China.39
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Punch, June 25, 1898.
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Figure 8.33 The New Canute
Punch June 25, 1898

Along with illustrating Russia’s foreign policy with traditional stories, Punch and
Kladderadatsch also used classical Greek mythology to describe Russian diplomacy.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the emerging British and
German middle classes looked back toward antiquity with new interest. The myths of the
ancient world represented stories neither corrupted by modernism nor based solely on
real life historical precedents. They also served the same sort of function metaphorically
as the classical literature described previously. They showed diplomacy in a way that
allowed the audience to interpret the illustrations for themselves. This active role for the
public gave the journals a larger function in creating and reflecting public opinion. The
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use of mythology by Punch and Kladderadatsch proved particularly fitting in terms of
Russia’s struggle after the Russo-Japanese War and Russian Revolution of 1905 to regain
its stability. The heroes’ struggle to overcome the gods’ actions reflected clearly the
considerable difficulty with which the Tsarist government continued to hold power.
In “Der gefesselte Prometheus” (“The Bound Prometheus”; Figure 7.34),
Kladderadatsch illustrated the problems faced by Nicholas II during the Russo-Japanese
War both internally and externally with the myth of Prometheus. In the classical Greek
myth, the gods bound Prometheus to a rock for eternity for giving humanity the ability to
make fire. The gods then increased his suffering by setting two buzzards to pick at his
body while he could do nothing due to his restraints. With this mythological metaphor,
Kladderadatsch showed the struggle faced by Nicholas II during the Russo-Japanese
War. In the cartoon, the tsar lay bound to a rock (the war) while buzzards (revolution and
mutiny) moved toward him. Nicholas II could do little to protect himself, and therefore
the autocratic tsarist regime, from these threats because he could not remove himself
from the Russo-Japanese War. This cartoon indicated the hopeless situation Nicholas II
faced in 1905. He could not effectively meet any of the challenges to internal stability
while also trying to fight the Japanese in the Far East. Kladderadatsch portrayed
Nicholas II here as a helpless figure, far removed from the dominant Ivan used previously
to describe Russian diplomacy in the Far East. Like Prometheus in the myth, Nicholas II
had little choice but to lay on the rock and hope the buzzards leave before destroying
him.40

40

Kladderadatsch, July 30, 1905.
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Figure 8.34 Der gefesselte Prometheus-The Bound Prometheus
Kladderadatsch July 30, 1905

Punch, too, used a classical Greek myth to illustrate Russian politics. The British
satirical journal, however, chose to describe the struggles of the newly called Duma with
the image of baby Hercules fighting snakes. In the myth, Hera, wife of Zeus sends two
snakes to kill the child, son of Zeus and a mortal female, in a fit of jealousy. Hercules,
whose divine heritage equipped him with super strength destroys those snakes sent to kill
him. In the cartoon “Will He Strangle Them?” (Figure 7.35), Punch characterized the
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challenges faced by the Duma to survive Russian politics. In the image, Hercules
(Duma) held two snakes (despotism and bureaucracy). The British journal wondered if
Hercules would destroy them as he had in the myth. Nicholas II calling the Duma did not
equate to the Russian government changing itself. The “despotism” and “bureaucracy”
that had represented Russian politics throughout the Tsarist Period did not disappear once
the Duma met. In fact, the Russian ruling elite sought to undermine the Duma as much
as possible for fear they might lose their positions. Punch, like most other observers, in
Great Britain as in Continental Europe, recognized that the newly born Duma faced
serious threats from the established elite. Those elites, like the jealous Hera, wanted the
Duma to die. Punch’s question “Will He Strangle Them?” indicated the opinion that the
Duma, despite being like baby Hercules a product of a god (Nicholas II represented a
ruler with power given from God), may not be able to successfully destroy those entities
wanting it dead.41
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Punch, May 2, 1906.
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Figure 8.35 Will He Strangle Them?
Punch, May 2, 1906

The Russian case study represents the changing nature of international diplomacy
between the Jameson Raid and Algeciras Conference as illustrated in Punch and
Kladderadatsch. The two satirical journals utilized similar imagery to that of the Near
East Crisis, but with a different purpose. In the previous period, discussed in Chapter
Three, the cartoons illustrated Near East events and presented a critical, but always
respectful, interpretation of the Great Powers’ actions. The female metaphor represented
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inherent weakness during the Near East Crisis, but during the latter period that female
played victim to a Great Powers’ damaging intentions. The female also played a
necessary role for Punch and Kladderadatsch’s attacks on the other Great Powers’ aims.
The same proved true for the illustrations involving children and animals.
More straight forward attacks on Germany and Great Britain by Punch and
Kladderadatsch, respectively, utilized the inclusion of recognizable diplomatic leaders
and the ever-present John Bull. Punch provided a critique of German foreign policy with
cartoons involving von Bülow and even Wilhelm II. The British satirical journal did not
face the same restrictions on criticizing foreign leaders that Kladderadatsch did. The
German satirical journal, bound by Germany’s lese majeste laws, could not aggressively
condemn the actions of Queen Victoria and later Edward VII. Due to this censorship,
Kladderadatsch commented on British foreign policy utilizing the imagery of Joseph
Chamberlain and the fictional John Bull. These images allowed the German journal to
parallel the attacks on Great Britain found in the ‘serious’ journals with relatively few
negative consequences.
Entertainment as a metaphor for the challenges of international diplomacy
remained a constant type of imagery used by Punch and Kladderadatsch between the
Near East Crisis and the 1896-1906 period. The types of entertainment included reflected
the continuation of traditional sources of amusement such as theatre and horse-racing as
well as the emergence of new forms of leisure such as the circus. Like the new purposes
for the other metaphors, Punch and Kladderadatsch used the entertainment imagery to
attack the other Great Powers’ actions. All of this imagery aided in creating an
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increasingly tense diplomatic environment that prevented a resolution of Anglo-German
tensions following the Algeciras Conference.
Conclusion
The emergence of a united Germany as a Great Power changed the European
diplomatic landscape. The presence of a large state with an efficient military and
bureaucracy in Central Europe prompted close observation from all European
governments and presses. By 1876 and the onset of the Near East Crisis, however, the
concerns regarding an aggressively expansive Germany eased when compared to the
potential collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In particular, the British government, Disraeli,
and the British press worried more about the Russian threat to the Ottomans than the
German threat to the Netherlands and Belgium. Throughout the Near East Crisis, both
the British and German presses focused on the effects of events in the Near East on their
own state’s interests, not yet attacking the German or British governments.
While the British and German presses both commented on the Near East Crisis in
increasingly critical language, they largely maintained support for their governments.
Also at this point the British and German governments could maintain discrete diplomacy
without seeming to bend to the public’s will. This was changing, however, as the
increasingly literate masses, educated by the presses, critiqued and demanded actions
from their governments. Even the major diplomatic leaders Disraeli and Bismarck had to
address expressions of public opinion despite their claims to the contrary.
At the Congress of Berlin that ended the Near East Crisis, the limits of the presses
on influencing European diplomacy appeared clearly evident. The two presses and
publics wanted reform to assist the Balkan Christians to move away from Ottoman
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oppression, but the representatives at the meeting chose instead to settle issues in the
Great Powers’ best interests. This meeting gave Germany the role of an ‘honest broker,’
while also giving Disraeli the eastern Mediterranean island. It, however, took the
territorial spoils of war away from Russia and failed to resolve the Balkan Christians’
grievances that prompted the Near East Crisis. The inability of the Russian
representatives to maintain the martial gains signaled a weakness of Russia as a European
Great Power. This did not yet change the British view that Russia represented the
greatest threat to the British Empire, but it did begin a process in which Germany
emerged as Great Britain’s primary enemy rather than Russia.
During the Near East Crisis, discussed in Chapters One, Two, and Three, the
British and German presses largely focused on the other Great Powers’ role in
perpetuating the crisis. When they did criticize their own governments, as with the
criticism in the British press of the British government’s inaction following the Bulgarian
Atrocities, the British and German leaders could still choose to ignore the presses’
opinions and negotiate terms beneficial to their own aims. The expanded press in
international diplomacy created and ever increasing obstacle to secretive diplomacy that
was decided by a few big leaders such as Disraeli and Bismarck. The British and
German governments tried to continue the traditional process for diplomacy that only
utilized ‘the man on the street’s’ opinion when it served to justify and enhance their
position during the Near East Crisis. Following the aftermath of the Jameson Raid and
Krüger Telegram, however, this no longer remained an option.
The consequences of the Jameson Raid and Krüger Telegram, discussed within
Chapters Four, Five, and Six, prompted the acceleration of emerging Anglo-German
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tensions. The territorial and sovereignty issues at stake in the Transvaal spurred
competition between the British and German governments that intensified the effects of
the Jameson Raid and Krüger Telegram. The British and German presses’ reaction to
those events caused a press war that started a permanent estrangement between the
British and German governments. This animosity lasted beyond the immediate aftermath
of the Jameson Raid and Krüger Telegram. It persevered due to events in the Near East
and Far East that put Great Britain and Germany’s interests in direct competition. These
news areas of potential conflict increased the British and German presses’ concerns with
the demands and desires of the other states’ governments. This focus in turn educated the
two publics on international events deemed significant by the two presses.
The consequences of the rising interest from the British and German publics, as
shown by increased coverage in the British and German presses, regarding international
events proved critical for diplomacy between the British and German governments.
Conflicting interests between Great Britain and Germany in the Near East, Far East, and
Pacific Ocean region provided issues to which the British and German presses could
point in order to show that the German or British government wanted to inhibit the other
state for their own gain. These regions’ importance increased with the decline of Russian
power there and the possibilities presented by that for the growth of British and German
power. The British and German publics, educated by reading these journals, assumed
that they expressed the true opinions of both the other public and government. The
‘official’ and ‘semi-official’ nature they reflected provided the journals with more
presumed authority. The two publics created their opinions based on these supposed
established roles. Therefore when the journals increased their hostility toward the actions
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of the other state, the British and German publics reacted as if the attack came from the
whole of the other population.
These public perceptions altered the way in which the British and German publics
reacted to international events, which in turn affected the ability of their governments to
conduct diplomacy. The British and German governments, by 1906, could not conduct
diplomacy without addressing the demands of their public’s opinion. These views
emerged from interpreting the articles coming from the British and German presses and
how they reported diplomatic events. The obstacles created from the hostile British and
German public opinions prevented Germany from escaping its dreaded diplomatic
isolation while also solidifying the entente cordiale as well as pushing Russia and Great
Britain closer to a diplomatic understanding. This change in the European diplomatic
environment from 1878, when Germany was the ‘honest broker’ and Russia the ‘bogey,’
to 1906 when the German government threatened European peace with its actions in
Morocco, showed the effects of the British and German presses’ influence on the shifting
British and German public opinion and the significant consequences it had on European
diplomacy. Looking at the role of the two presses in international diplomacy shows that
the Anglo-German estrangement present at the Algeciras Conference resulted from a long
series of conflicting issues, not simply emerging as a consequence of the periodic crises
on which this period’s historiography focuses.
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Figure A.1 Great Powers in the Far East
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Figure A.2 German and British navies

353

180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0

1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906
LT-WII and GG 64
32
80
91
119 125
14
75
39
37
4
KZ-WII and GG 53
34
81
67
75
27
9
8
12
16
1
LT-GB
60
41
78
91
118 109
15
25
36
40
5
KZ-GB
126
75
155 115 111
34
17
7
30
16
1

Figure A.3 Wilhelm II and Anglo German relations

354

LT and Russia

KZ and Russia

94

73
60 59

63

51
44
37
30

28

27

23
16

26

30

34

23

18

18

20
6 5

1896

1897

1898

1899

1900

1901

Figure A.4 Russia
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Figure B.2 Germany and Great Britain in the Far East
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